mirror of
https://github.com/rohitg00/skillkit.git
synced 2026-11-19 02:13:58 +00:00
Compare commits
2
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
fcff9c5e7d | ||
|
|
b28a2801b2 |
@@ -223,12 +223,13 @@ skillkit generate # AI skill generation wizard
|
||||
skillkit serve # Start REST API server
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||||
```
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||||
|
||||
### Discovery
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### Discovery & Security
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
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||||
skillkit marketplace # Browse skills
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skillkit tree # Hierarchical taxonomy
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||||
skillkit find <query> # Quick search
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skillkit scan <path> # Security scan for skills
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```
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||||
|
||||
### Advanced
|
||||
|
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@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ import {
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SkillMdInitCommand,
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SkillMdCheckCommand,
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ServeCommand,
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ScanCommand,
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} from '@skillkit/cli';
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||||
|
||||
const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
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@@ -231,5 +232,6 @@ cli.register(SkillMdInitCommand);
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cli.register(SkillMdCheckCommand);
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cli.register(ServeCommand);
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cli.register(ScanCommand);
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|
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cli.runExit(process.argv.slice(2));
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||||
|
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@@ -362,6 +362,40 @@ skillkit publish --dry-run # Preview without writing
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skillkit publish submit # Submit to SkillKit marketplace
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```
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||||
|
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## Security Scanning
|
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|
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```bash
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skillkit scan <path> # Scan skill for vulnerabilities
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skillkit scan <path> --format json # Output as JSON
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skillkit scan <path> --format table # Tabular output
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skillkit scan <path> --format sarif # SARIF for GitHub Code Scanning
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skillkit scan <path> --fail-on high # Exit 1 if HIGH+ findings
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skillkit scan <path> --skip-rules UC001 # Skip specific rules
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skillkit scan <path> --quiet # Suppress non-essential output
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```
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|
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**Threat Categories:**
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||||
|
||||
| Category | Description |
|
||||
|----------|-------------|
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||||
| Prompt Injection | Override/bypass agent instructions |
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| Command Injection | eval(), exec(), shell commands |
|
||||
| Data Exfiltration | Webhook URLs, env var reads, credential access |
|
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| Tool Abuse | Tool shadowing, autonomy escalation |
|
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| Hardcoded Secrets | API keys, tokens, private keys |
|
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| Unicode Steganography | Zero-width chars, bidi overrides |
|
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|
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**Install Integration:**
|
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|
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Skills are automatically scanned during `skillkit install`. Use `--no-scan` to skip, or `--force` to install despite findings.
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**Output Formats:**
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|
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- `summary` (default) - colored terminal output
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||||
- `json` - machine-readable JSON
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||||
- `table` - tabular format
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||||
- `sarif` - SARIF v2.1 for GitHub Code Scanning / IDE integration
|
||||
|
||||
## Interactive TUI
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
|
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@@ -33,6 +33,15 @@ const COMMAND_GROUPS: CommandGroup[] = [
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{ cmd: 'publish', desc: 'Submit to marketplace' },
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],
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||||
},
|
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{
|
||||
name: 'Security',
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commands: [
|
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{ cmd: 'scan <path>', desc: 'Security vulnerability scanner' },
|
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{ cmd: 'scan --format sarif', desc: 'SARIF for GitHub Code Scanning' },
|
||||
{ cmd: 'scan --fail-on high', desc: 'CI security gate' },
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{ cmd: 'audit log', desc: 'View audit trail' },
|
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],
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'Advanced',
|
||||
commands: [
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ export default function App(): React.ReactElement {
|
||||
<svg className="w-3.5 h-3.5 text-zinc-500 group-hover:text-yellow-500 transition-colors" fill="currentColor" viewBox="0 0 24 24">
|
||||
<path d="M12 2l3.09 6.26L22 9.27l-5 4.87 1.18 6.88L12 17.77l-6.18 3.25L7 14.14 2 9.27l6.91-1.01L12 2z" />
|
||||
</svg>
|
||||
<span className="text-xs font-mono text-zinc-400 group-hover:text-white transition-colors">{stats.stars}</span>
|
||||
<span className="text-xs font-mono text-zinc-400 group-hover:text-white transition-colors">{stats.stars || '—'}</span>
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ export default function App(): React.ReactElement {
|
||||
</nav>
|
||||
|
||||
<main className="pt-14">
|
||||
<Hero version={stats.version} stars={stats.stars} />
|
||||
<Hero version={stats.version || '—'} stars={stats.stars || '—'} />
|
||||
|
||||
<div className="border-b border-zinc-800/50 py-2.5" style={{ background: 'linear-gradient(to bottom, rgba(9,9,11,0.95), rgba(0,0,0,1))' }}>
|
||||
<div className="mx-auto max-w-5xl px-4 sm:px-6 lg:px-8">
|
||||
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ export default function App(): React.ReactElement {
|
||||
className="flex items-center gap-1.5 text-zinc-500 hover:text-white transition-colors group"
|
||||
>
|
||||
<span className="text-zinc-600 group-hover:text-zinc-400">v</span>
|
||||
<span className="text-white font-medium">{stats.version}</span>
|
||||
<span className="text-white font-medium">{stats.version || '—'}</span>
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
<span className="text-zinc-800">·</span>
|
||||
<a
|
||||
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ export default function App(): React.ReactElement {
|
||||
<svg className="w-3 h-3 text-zinc-600 group-hover:text-zinc-400" fill="none" viewBox="0 0 24 24" stroke="currentColor">
|
||||
<path strokeLinecap="round" strokeLinejoin="round" strokeWidth={2} d="M4 16v1a3 3 0 003 3h10a3 3 0 003-3v-1m-4-4l-4 4m0 0l-4-4m4 4V4" />
|
||||
</svg>
|
||||
<span className="text-white font-medium">{stats.downloads}</span>
|
||||
<span className="text-white font-medium">{stats.downloads || '—'}</span>
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
<span className="text-zinc-800">·</span>
|
||||
<a
|
||||
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ export default function App(): React.ReactElement {
|
||||
<svg className="w-3 h-3 text-zinc-600 group-hover:text-yellow-500" fill="currentColor" viewBox="0 0 24 24">
|
||||
<path d="M12 2l3.09 6.26L22 9.27l-5 4.87 1.18 6.88L12 17.77l-6.18 3.25L7 14.14 2 9.27l6.91-1.01L12 2z" />
|
||||
</svg>
|
||||
<span className="text-white font-medium">{stats.stars}</span>
|
||||
<span className="text-white font-medium">{stats.stars || '—'}</span>
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
<span className="text-zinc-800 hidden sm:inline">·</span>
|
||||
<a
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -82,6 +82,17 @@ const COMMAND_GROUPS: CommandGroup[] = [
|
||||
{ cmd: 'serve --cache-ttl 3600000', desc: 'Cache TTL' },
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'Security',
|
||||
commands: [
|
||||
{ cmd: 'scan <path>', desc: 'Security scan' },
|
||||
{ cmd: 'scan --format sarif', desc: 'SARIF output' },
|
||||
{ cmd: 'scan --fail-on high', desc: 'CI gate' },
|
||||
{ cmd: 'install --no-scan', desc: 'Skip scan' },
|
||||
{ cmd: 'audit log', desc: 'View audit logs' },
|
||||
{ cmd: 'validate', desc: 'Validate format' },
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
name: 'Advanced',
|
||||
commands: [
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -70,6 +70,15 @@ const FEATURES: Feature[] = [
|
||||
</svg>
|
||||
)
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
title: 'Security Scanner',
|
||||
description: 'Detect prompt injection, secrets, and malicious patterns in skills.',
|
||||
icon: (
|
||||
<svg className="w-5 h-5" fill="none" viewBox="0 0 24 24" stroke="currentColor">
|
||||
<path strokeLinecap="round" strokeLinejoin="round" strokeWidth={1.5} d="M9 12.75L11.25 15 15 9.75m-3-7.036A11.959 11.959 0 013.598 6 11.99 11.99 0 003 9.749c0 5.592 3.824 10.29 9 11.623 5.176-1.332 9-6.03 9-11.622 0-1.31-.21-2.571-.598-3.751h-.152c-3.196 0-6.1-1.248-8.25-3.285z" />
|
||||
</svg>
|
||||
)
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
title: 'Testing',
|
||||
description: 'Built-in test framework with assertions.',
|
||||
@@ -106,6 +115,7 @@ const COMPARISONS = [
|
||||
['Translation', 'Rewrite for each', 'One-click conversion'],
|
||||
['Team Sharing', 'Copy/paste files', '.skills manifest'],
|
||||
['Discovery', 'Search forums', 'AI recommendations'],
|
||||
['Security', 'Manual review', 'Auto-scan on install'],
|
||||
['API Access', 'None', 'REST + MCP + Python'],
|
||||
] as const;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ export function Hero({ version, stars }: HeroProps): React.ReactElement {
|
||||
<path fillRule="evenodd" d="M12 2C6.477 2 2 6.484 2 12.017c0 4.425 2.865 8.18 6.839 9.504.5.092.682-.217.682-.483 0-.237-.008-.868-.013-1.703-2.782.605-3.369-1.343-3.369-1.343-.454-1.158-1.11-1.466-1.11-1.466-.908-.62.069-.608.069-.608 1.003.07 1.531 1.032 1.531 1.032.892 1.53 2.341 1.088 2.91.832.092-.647.35-1.088.636-1.338-2.22-.253-4.555-1.113-4.555-4.951 0-1.093.39-1.988 1.029-2.688-.103-.253-.446-1.272.098-2.65 0 0 .84-.27 2.75 1.026A9.564 9.564 0 0112 6.844c.85.004 1.705.115 2.504.337 1.909-1.296 2.747-1.027 2.747-1.027.546 1.379.202 2.398.1 2.651.64.7 1.028 1.595 1.028 2.688 0 3.848-2.339 4.695-4.566 4.943.359.309.678.92.678 1.855 0 1.338-.012 2.419-.012 2.747 0 .268.18.58.688.482A10.019 10.019 0 0022 12.017C22 6.484 17.522 2 12 2z" clipRule="evenodd" />
|
||||
</svg>
|
||||
<span className="font-mono text-sm text-zinc-300 group-hover:text-white transition-colors">Star</span>
|
||||
{typeof stars === 'number' && (
|
||||
{typeof stars === 'number' && stars > 0 && (
|
||||
<>
|
||||
<span className="w-px h-4 bg-zinc-700"></span>
|
||||
<svg className="w-3.5 h-3.5 text-yellow-500" fill="currentColor" viewBox="0 0 24 24">
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -54,9 +54,9 @@ function setCachedStats(data: Omit<Stats, 'loading'>): void {
|
||||
|
||||
export function useStats(): Stats {
|
||||
const [stats, setStats] = useState<Stats>({
|
||||
version: '1.9.0',
|
||||
downloads: '2.4k',
|
||||
stars: 66,
|
||||
version: '',
|
||||
downloads: '',
|
||||
stars: 0,
|
||||
loading: true,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -74,9 +74,9 @@ export function useStats(): Stats {
|
||||
fetch('https://api.github.com/repos/rohitg00/skillkit'),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
let downloads = '2.4k';
|
||||
let stars = 66;
|
||||
let version = '1.9.0';
|
||||
let downloads = '';
|
||||
let stars = 0;
|
||||
let version = '';
|
||||
|
||||
if (npmResponse.status === 'fulfilled' && npmResponse.value.ok) {
|
||||
const npmData = await npmResponse.value.json();
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -159,6 +159,20 @@ skillkit command generate <agent> # Generate agent-native commands
|
||||
skillkit command list <agent> # List available commands
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Security Scanning
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
skillkit scan <path> # Scan skill for vulnerabilities
|
||||
skillkit scan <path> --format json # Output as JSON
|
||||
skillkit scan <path> --format sarif # SARIF for GitHub Code Scanning
|
||||
skillkit scan <path> --fail-on high # Exit code 1 if HIGH+ findings
|
||||
skillkit scan <path> --skip-rules UC001,UC002 # Skip specific rules
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Detects: prompt injection, command injection, data exfiltration, tool abuse, hardcoded secrets, unicode steganography.
|
||||
|
||||
Skills are automatically scanned during `install` (use `--no-scan` to skip) and `publish`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Utilities
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
@@ -184,6 +198,7 @@ skillkit install ./local/path # Local directory
|
||||
--yes # Skip confirmation prompts
|
||||
--global # Install globally
|
||||
--force # Overwrite existing
|
||||
--no-scan # Skip security scan
|
||||
--agent=cursor,windsurf # Install to specific agents
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -118,3 +118,4 @@ export { SkillMdValidateCommand, SkillMdInitCommand, SkillMdCheckCommand } from
|
||||
|
||||
// API server
|
||||
export { ServeCommand } from './serve.js';
|
||||
export { ScanCommand } from './scan.js';
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { promisify } from 'node:util';
|
||||
|
||||
const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
|
||||
import { Command, Option } from 'clipanion';
|
||||
import { detectProvider, isLocalPath, getProvider, evaluateSkillDirectory } from '@skillkit/core';
|
||||
import { detectProvider, isLocalPath, getProvider, evaluateSkillDirectory, SkillScanner, formatSummary, Severity } from '@skillkit/core';
|
||||
import type { SkillMetadata, GitProvider, AgentType } from '@skillkit/core';
|
||||
import { isPathInside } from '@skillkit/core';
|
||||
import { getAdapter, detectAgent, getAllAdapters } from '@skillkit/agents';
|
||||
@@ -94,6 +94,10 @@ export class InstallCommand extends Command {
|
||||
description: 'Minimal output (no logo)',
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
scan = Option.Boolean('--scan', true, {
|
||||
description: 'Run security scan before installing (default: true)',
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
async execute(): Promise<number> {
|
||||
const isInteractive = process.stdin.isTTY && !this.skills && !this.all && !this.yes;
|
||||
const s = spinner();
|
||||
@@ -259,6 +263,29 @@ export class InstallCommand extends Command {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (this.scan) {
|
||||
const scanner = new SkillScanner({ failOnSeverity: Severity.HIGH });
|
||||
for (const skill of skillsToInstall) {
|
||||
const scanResult = await scanner.scan(skill.path);
|
||||
|
||||
if (scanResult.verdict === 'fail' && !this.force) {
|
||||
error(`Security scan FAILED for "${skill.name}"`);
|
||||
console.log(formatSummary(scanResult));
|
||||
console.log(colors.muted('Use --force to install anyway, or --no-scan to skip scanning'));
|
||||
|
||||
const cleanupPath = result.tempRoot || result.path;
|
||||
if (!isLocalPath(this.source) && cleanupPath && existsSync(cleanupPath)) {
|
||||
rmSync(cleanupPath, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (scanResult.verdict === 'warn' && !this.quiet) {
|
||||
warn(`Security warnings for "${skill.name}" (${scanResult.stats.medium} medium, ${scanResult.stats.low} low)`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Confirm installation
|
||||
if (isInteractive && !this.yes) {
|
||||
console.log('');
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readdirSync, statSy
|
||||
import { join, basename, dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';
|
||||
import chalk from 'chalk';
|
||||
import { Command, Option } from 'clipanion';
|
||||
import { generateWellKnownIndex, type WellKnownSkill } from '@skillkit/core';
|
||||
import { generateWellKnownIndex, type WellKnownSkill, SkillScanner, formatSummary, Severity } from '@skillkit/core';
|
||||
|
||||
function sanitizeSkillName(name: string): string | null {
|
||||
if (!name || typeof name !== 'string') return null;
|
||||
@@ -72,7 +72,6 @@ export class PublishCommand extends Command {
|
||||
console.log(chalk.white(`Found ${discoveredSkills.length} skill(s):\n`));
|
||||
|
||||
const wellKnownSkills: WellKnownSkill[] = [];
|
||||
|
||||
const validSkills: Array<{ name: string; safeName: string; description?: string; path: string }> = [];
|
||||
|
||||
for (const skill of discoveredSkills) {
|
||||
@@ -95,6 +94,20 @@ export class PublishCommand extends Command {
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const scanner = new SkillScanner({ failOnSeverity: Severity.HIGH });
|
||||
for (const skill of validSkills) {
|
||||
const scanResult = await scanner.scan(skill.path);
|
||||
if (scanResult.verdict === 'fail') {
|
||||
console.error(chalk.red(`\nSecurity scan FAILED for "${skill.safeName}"`));
|
||||
console.error(formatSummary(scanResult));
|
||||
console.error(chalk.dim('Fix security issues before publishing.'));
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (scanResult.verdict === 'warn') {
|
||||
console.log(chalk.yellow(` Security warnings for "${skill.safeName}" (${scanResult.findings.length} findings)`));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (validSkills.length === 0) {
|
||||
console.error(chalk.red('\nNo valid skills to publish'));
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
|
||||
import { Command, Option } from 'clipanion';
|
||||
import { resolve } from 'node:path';
|
||||
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
|
||||
import { SkillScanner, formatResult, Severity } from '@skillkit/core';
|
||||
|
||||
const SEVERITY_MAP: Record<string, Severity> = {
|
||||
critical: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
high: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
medium: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
low: Severity.LOW,
|
||||
info: Severity.INFO,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export class ScanCommand extends Command {
|
||||
static override paths = [['scan']];
|
||||
|
||||
static override usage = Command.Usage({
|
||||
description: 'Scan a skill directory for security vulnerabilities',
|
||||
details: `
|
||||
Analyzes skill files for prompt injection, command injection, data exfiltration,
|
||||
tool abuse, hardcoded secrets, and unicode steganography.
|
||||
|
||||
Outputs findings in various formats including SARIF for GitHub Code Scanning.
|
||||
`,
|
||||
examples: [
|
||||
['Scan current directory', '$0 scan .'],
|
||||
['Scan a specific skill', '$0 scan ./my-skill'],
|
||||
['Output as JSON', '$0 scan ./my-skill --format json'],
|
||||
['Output as SARIF', '$0 scan ./my-skill --format sarif'],
|
||||
['Fail on high severity', '$0 scan ./my-skill --fail-on high'],
|
||||
['Skip unicode rules', '$0 scan ./my-skill --skip-rules UC001,UC002'],
|
||||
],
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
skillPath = Option.String({ required: true, name: 'path' });
|
||||
|
||||
format = Option.String('--format,-f', 'summary', {
|
||||
description: 'Output format: summary, json, table, sarif',
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
failOn = Option.String('--fail-on', {
|
||||
description: 'Exit with code 1 if findings at this severity or above (critical, high, medium, low)',
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
skipRules = Option.String('--skip-rules', {
|
||||
description: 'Comma-separated rule IDs or categories to skip',
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
async execute(): Promise<number> {
|
||||
const targetPath = resolve(this.skillPath);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!existsSync(targetPath)) {
|
||||
this.context.stderr.write(`Path not found: ${targetPath}\n`);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const validFormats = ['summary', 'json', 'table', 'sarif'];
|
||||
if (!validFormats.includes(this.format)) {
|
||||
this.context.stderr.write(`Invalid format: "${this.format}". Must be one of: ${validFormats.join(', ')}\n`);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const skipRules = this.skipRules?.split(',').map((s) => s.trim()) ?? [];
|
||||
|
||||
let failOnSeverity: Severity | undefined;
|
||||
if (this.failOn) {
|
||||
failOnSeverity = SEVERITY_MAP[this.failOn.toLowerCase()];
|
||||
if (!failOnSeverity) {
|
||||
this.context.stderr.write(`Invalid --fail-on value: "${this.failOn}". Must be one of: ${Object.keys(SEVERITY_MAP).join(', ')}\n`);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const scanner = new SkillScanner({
|
||||
failOnSeverity,
|
||||
skipRules,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const result = await scanner.scan(targetPath);
|
||||
|
||||
this.context.stdout.write(formatResult(result, this.format) + '\n');
|
||||
|
||||
return result.verdict === 'fail' ? 1 : 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -120,3 +120,6 @@ export type { SkillReference, ParsedSkillContent } from './parser/index.js';
|
||||
|
||||
// Runtime Skill Injection
|
||||
export * from './runtime/index.js';
|
||||
|
||||
// Security Scanner
|
||||
export * from './scanner/index.js';
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
import type { Finding } from '../types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export interface Analyzer {
|
||||
name: string;
|
||||
analyze(skillPath: string, files: string[]): Promise<Finding[]>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
|
||||
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
|
||||
import { extname } from 'node:path';
|
||||
import type { Analyzer } from './base.js';
|
||||
import type { Finding } from '../types.js';
|
||||
import { Severity, ThreatCategory } from '../types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
const DANGEROUS_TOOLS = new Set(['Bash', 'bash', 'shell', 'terminal', 'exec', 'system']);
|
||||
|
||||
const IMPERSONATION_PATTERNS = [
|
||||
/official\s+(?:anthropic|openai|google|microsoft|meta)\s+(?:tool|skill|plugin)/i,
|
||||
/(?:anthropic|openai|google|microsoft|meta)\s+certified/i,
|
||||
/endorsed\s+by\s+(?:anthropic|openai|google|microsoft|meta)/i,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
const BINARY_EXTENSIONS = new Set([
|
||||
'.exe', '.dll', '.so', '.dylib', '.bin', '.dat',
|
||||
'.zip', '.tar', '.gz', '.rar', '.7z',
|
||||
'.wasm', '.pyc', '.pyo', '.class',
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
export class ManifestAnalyzer implements Analyzer {
|
||||
name = 'manifest';
|
||||
private findingCounter = 0;
|
||||
private skipRules: Set<string>;
|
||||
|
||||
constructor(skipRules?: string[]) {
|
||||
this.skipRules = new Set(skipRules ?? []);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async analyze(_skillPath: string, files: string[]): Promise<Finding[]> {
|
||||
this.findingCounter = 0;
|
||||
const findings: Finding[] = [];
|
||||
|
||||
const skillMdFiles = files.filter((f) => f.toLowerCase().endsWith('skill.md'));
|
||||
|
||||
for (const skillMd of skillMdFiles) {
|
||||
let content: string;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
content = await readFile(skillMd, 'utf-8');
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
this.validateFrontmatter(content, skillMd, findings);
|
||||
this.checkImpersonation(content, skillMd, findings);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
this.checkBinaryFiles(files, findings);
|
||||
|
||||
return findings;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private shouldSkip(ruleId: string): boolean {
|
||||
return this.skipRules.has(ruleId);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private validateFrontmatter(content: string, filePath: string, findings: Finding[]): void {
|
||||
const fmMatch = content.match(/^---\r?\n([\s\S]*?)\r?\n---/);
|
||||
if (!fmMatch) {
|
||||
if (!this.shouldSkip('MF001')) {
|
||||
findings.push({
|
||||
id: `MF${++this.findingCounter}`,
|
||||
ruleId: 'MF001',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.POLICY_VIOLATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.LOW,
|
||||
title: 'Missing SKILL.md frontmatter',
|
||||
description: 'SKILL.md should have YAML frontmatter with name, description, and allowed-tools',
|
||||
filePath,
|
||||
analyzer: this.name,
|
||||
remediation: 'Add YAML frontmatter with name, description, and allowed-tools fields.',
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const fm = fmMatch[1];
|
||||
|
||||
if (!/^name:/m.test(fm) && !this.shouldSkip('MF002')) {
|
||||
findings.push({
|
||||
id: `MF${++this.findingCounter}`,
|
||||
ruleId: 'MF002',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.POLICY_VIOLATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.LOW,
|
||||
title: 'Missing skill name in frontmatter',
|
||||
description: 'SKILL.md frontmatter should include a name field',
|
||||
filePath,
|
||||
analyzer: this.name,
|
||||
remediation: 'Add a name field to the YAML frontmatter.',
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const nameMatch = fm.match(/^name:\s*(.+)$/m);
|
||||
if (nameMatch) {
|
||||
const name = nameMatch[1].trim().replace(/^["']|["']$/g, '');
|
||||
if (!/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*$/i.test(name) && !this.shouldSkip('MF003')) {
|
||||
findings.push({
|
||||
id: `MF${++this.findingCounter}`,
|
||||
ruleId: 'MF003',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.POLICY_VIOLATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.LOW,
|
||||
title: 'Invalid skill name format',
|
||||
description: `Skill name "${name}" should use alphanumeric characters, dots, hyphens, or underscores`,
|
||||
filePath,
|
||||
analyzer: this.name,
|
||||
remediation: 'Use a name matching [a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]* pattern.',
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const descMatch = fm.match(/^description:\s*(.+)$/m);
|
||||
if (!descMatch) {
|
||||
if (!this.shouldSkip('MF004')) {
|
||||
findings.push({
|
||||
id: `MF${++this.findingCounter}`,
|
||||
ruleId: 'MF004',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.POLICY_VIOLATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.INFO,
|
||||
title: 'Missing skill description',
|
||||
description: 'SKILL.md should include a description for discoverability',
|
||||
filePath,
|
||||
analyzer: this.name,
|
||||
remediation: 'Add a description field to the YAML frontmatter.',
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
const desc = descMatch[1].trim().replace(/^["']|["']$/g, '');
|
||||
if (desc.length < 20 && !this.shouldSkip('MF005')) {
|
||||
findings.push({
|
||||
id: `MF${++this.findingCounter}`,
|
||||
ruleId: 'MF005',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.POLICY_VIOLATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.INFO,
|
||||
title: 'Short skill description',
|
||||
description: `Description "${desc}" is too short (${desc.length} chars). Aim for at least 20 characters.`,
|
||||
filePath,
|
||||
analyzer: this.name,
|
||||
remediation: 'Provide a more detailed description.',
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const inlineToolsMatch = fm.match(/^allowed-tools:\s*\[([^\]]*)\]/m);
|
||||
const multiLineToolsMatch = fm.match(/^allowed-tools:\s*\n((?:\s+-\s+.+\n?)+)/m);
|
||||
|
||||
let tools: string[] = [];
|
||||
if (inlineToolsMatch) {
|
||||
tools = inlineToolsMatch[1].split(',').map((t) => t.trim().replace(/^["']|["']$/g, ''));
|
||||
} else if (multiLineToolsMatch) {
|
||||
tools = multiLineToolsMatch[1]
|
||||
.split('\n')
|
||||
.map((line) => line.replace(/^\s*-\s*/, '').trim().replace(/^["']|["']$/g, ''))
|
||||
.filter((t) => t.length > 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (const tool of tools) {
|
||||
if (DANGEROUS_TOOLS.has(tool) && !this.shouldSkip('MF006')) {
|
||||
findings.push({
|
||||
id: `MF${++this.findingCounter}`,
|
||||
ruleId: 'MF006',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.TOOL_ABUSE,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
title: `Dangerous tool in allowed-tools: ${tool}`,
|
||||
description: `The tool "${tool}" grants shell access. This is a significant security risk.`,
|
||||
filePath,
|
||||
analyzer: this.name,
|
||||
remediation: 'Restrict allowed-tools to the minimum needed. Avoid shell/exec tools.',
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private checkImpersonation(content: string, filePath: string, findings: Finding[]): void {
|
||||
for (const pattern of IMPERSONATION_PATTERNS) {
|
||||
const match = content.match(pattern);
|
||||
if (match && !this.shouldSkip('MF007')) {
|
||||
const lineNumber = content.substring(0, match.index).split('\n').length;
|
||||
findings.push({
|
||||
id: `MF${++this.findingCounter}`,
|
||||
ruleId: 'MF007',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.SOCIAL_ENGINEERING,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
title: 'Impersonation detected',
|
||||
description: `Skill claims official affiliation: "${match[0]}"`,
|
||||
filePath,
|
||||
lineNumber,
|
||||
snippet: match[0],
|
||||
analyzer: this.name,
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove false claims of official endorsement or certification.',
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private checkBinaryFiles(files: string[], findings: Finding[]): void {
|
||||
for (const file of files) {
|
||||
const ext = extname(file).toLowerCase();
|
||||
if (BINARY_EXTENSIONS.has(ext) && !this.shouldSkip('MF008')) {
|
||||
findings.push({
|
||||
id: `MF${++this.findingCounter}`,
|
||||
ruleId: 'MF008',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.POLICY_VIOLATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
title: `Binary file detected: ${ext}`,
|
||||
description: `Binary file found in skill directory. Skills should contain only text files.`,
|
||||
filePath: file,
|
||||
analyzer: this.name,
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove binary files from skill directory. Use package managers for dependencies.',
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
|
||||
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
|
||||
import { basename } from 'node:path';
|
||||
import type { Analyzer } from './base.js';
|
||||
import type { Finding } from '../types.js';
|
||||
import { Severity, ThreatCategory } from '../types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
interface SecretPattern {
|
||||
id: string;
|
||||
name: string;
|
||||
pattern: RegExp;
|
||||
severity: Severity;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const SECRET_PATTERNS: SecretPattern[] = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'SK001',
|
||||
name: 'OpenAI API key',
|
||||
pattern: /sk-(?!ant-)(?:proj-|admin-)?[A-Za-z0-9-]{20,}/,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'SK002',
|
||||
name: 'Stripe live key',
|
||||
pattern: /pk_live_[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'SK003',
|
||||
name: 'Stripe secret key',
|
||||
pattern: /sk_live_[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'SK004',
|
||||
name: 'GitHub personal access token',
|
||||
pattern: /ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}/,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'SK005',
|
||||
name: 'GitHub OAuth token',
|
||||
pattern: /gho_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}/,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'SK006',
|
||||
name: 'AWS access key',
|
||||
pattern: /AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}/,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'SK007',
|
||||
name: 'Slack bot token',
|
||||
pattern: /xoxb-[0-9]{10,}-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'SK008',
|
||||
name: 'Slack user token',
|
||||
pattern: /xoxp-[0-9]{10,}-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'SK009',
|
||||
name: 'Private key block',
|
||||
pattern: /-----BEGIN\s+(?:RSA\s+|EC\s+|DSA\s+|OPENSSH\s+)?PRIVATE\s+KEY-----/,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'SK010',
|
||||
name: 'Google API key',
|
||||
pattern: /AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}/,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'SK011',
|
||||
name: 'Anthropic API key',
|
||||
pattern: /sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'SK012',
|
||||
name: 'npm token',
|
||||
pattern: /npm_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}/,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'SK013',
|
||||
name: 'Heroku API key',
|
||||
pattern: /[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}/,
|
||||
severity: Severity.LOW,
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
const PLACEHOLDER_INDICATORS = [
|
||||
/your[-_]?api[-_]?key/i,
|
||||
/example/i,
|
||||
/sample/i,
|
||||
/dummy/i,
|
||||
/placeholder/i,
|
||||
/xxx+/i,
|
||||
/test[-_]?key/i,
|
||||
/fake/i,
|
||||
/replace[-_]?with/i,
|
||||
/\<.*key.*\>/i,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
const ENV_FILE_PATTERN = /^\.env/;
|
||||
|
||||
function isPlaceholder(line: string): boolean {
|
||||
return PLACEHOLDER_INDICATORS.some((p) => p.test(line));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class SecretsAnalyzer implements Analyzer {
|
||||
name = 'secrets';
|
||||
private findingCounter = 0;
|
||||
private skipRules: Set<string>;
|
||||
|
||||
constructor(skipRules?: string[]) {
|
||||
this.skipRules = new Set(skipRules ?? []);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async analyze(_skillPath: string, files: string[]): Promise<Finding[]> {
|
||||
this.findingCounter = 0;
|
||||
const findings: Finding[] = [];
|
||||
|
||||
for (const file of files) {
|
||||
const name = basename(file);
|
||||
|
||||
if (ENV_FILE_PATTERN.test(name) && !this.skipRules.has('SK-ENV')) {
|
||||
findings.push({
|
||||
id: `SK${++this.findingCounter}`,
|
||||
ruleId: 'SK-ENV',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.HARDCODED_SECRETS,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
title: `Environment file included: ${name}`,
|
||||
description: 'Environment files should not be included in skill distributions',
|
||||
filePath: file,
|
||||
analyzer: this.name,
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove .env files from skill directory. Add to .gitignore.',
|
||||
});
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let content: string;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
content = await readFile(file, 'utf-8');
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (content.length > 1_000_000) continue;
|
||||
|
||||
const lines = content.split('\n');
|
||||
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
|
||||
const line = lines[i];
|
||||
if (isPlaceholder(line)) continue;
|
||||
|
||||
for (const secret of SECRET_PATTERNS) {
|
||||
if (this.skipRules.has(secret.id)) continue;
|
||||
if (secret.pattern.test(line)) {
|
||||
if (secret.id === 'SK013') {
|
||||
if (!/(?:key|token|secret|password|credential|api)/i.test(line)) continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
findings.push({
|
||||
id: `SK${++this.findingCounter}`,
|
||||
ruleId: secret.id,
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.HARDCODED_SECRETS,
|
||||
severity: secret.severity,
|
||||
title: `${secret.name} detected`,
|
||||
description: `Potential ${secret.name} found in skill file`,
|
||||
filePath: file,
|
||||
lineNumber: i + 1,
|
||||
snippet: line.trim().replace(secret.pattern, '[REDACTED]').substring(0, 100),
|
||||
analyzer: this.name,
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove hardcoded secrets. Use environment variables or secret managers.',
|
||||
});
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return findings;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
|
||||
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
|
||||
import { extname } from 'node:path';
|
||||
import type { Analyzer } from './base.js';
|
||||
import type { Finding, SecurityRule } from '../types.js';
|
||||
import { getAllRules } from '../rules/index.js';
|
||||
|
||||
const EXT_TO_FILETYPE: Record<string, string> = {
|
||||
'.ts': 'typescript',
|
||||
'.tsx': 'typescript',
|
||||
'.js': 'javascript',
|
||||
'.jsx': 'javascript',
|
||||
'.mjs': 'javascript',
|
||||
'.cjs': 'javascript',
|
||||
'.py': 'python',
|
||||
'.sh': 'bash',
|
||||
'.bash': 'bash',
|
||||
'.zsh': 'bash',
|
||||
'.md': 'markdown',
|
||||
'.mdx': 'markdown',
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const PLACEHOLDER_PATTERNS = [
|
||||
/your[-_]?api[-_]?key/i,
|
||||
/example[-_]?token/i,
|
||||
/sample[-_]?secret/i,
|
||||
/dummy[-_]?password/i,
|
||||
/placeholder/i,
|
||||
/xxx+/i,
|
||||
/\.\.\./,
|
||||
/TODO/,
|
||||
/FIXME/,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
const TEST_FILE_PATTERNS = [
|
||||
/\.test\.[jt]sx?$/,
|
||||
/\.spec\.[jt]sx?$/,
|
||||
/__tests__\//,
|
||||
/test\//,
|
||||
/tests\//,
|
||||
/\.stories\.[jt]sx?$/,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
function isTestFile(filePath: string): boolean {
|
||||
return TEST_FILE_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(filePath));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function isPlaceholderLine(line: string): boolean {
|
||||
return PLACEHOLDER_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(line));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function getFileType(filePath: string): string | undefined {
|
||||
return EXT_TO_FILETYPE[extname(filePath)];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function ruleMatchesFileType(rule: SecurityRule, fileType: string | undefined): boolean {
|
||||
if (!rule.fileTypes || rule.fileTypes.length === 0) return true;
|
||||
if (!fileType) return true;
|
||||
return rule.fileTypes.includes(fileType);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function matchesExcludePatterns(line: string, rule: SecurityRule): boolean {
|
||||
if (!rule.excludePatterns) return false;
|
||||
return rule.excludePatterns.some((p) => p.test(line));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class StaticAnalyzer implements Analyzer {
|
||||
name = 'static';
|
||||
private rules: SecurityRule[];
|
||||
private skipRules: Set<string>;
|
||||
private findingCounter = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
constructor(skipRules?: string[]) {
|
||||
this.rules = getAllRules();
|
||||
this.skipRules = new Set(skipRules ?? []);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async analyze(_skillPath: string, files: string[]): Promise<Finding[]> {
|
||||
this.findingCounter = 0;
|
||||
const findings: Finding[] = [];
|
||||
|
||||
for (const file of files) {
|
||||
if (isTestFile(file)) continue;
|
||||
|
||||
const fileType = getFileType(file);
|
||||
const applicableRules = this.rules.filter(
|
||||
(r) => !this.skipRules.has(r.id) && ruleMatchesFileType(r, fileType)
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
if (applicableRules.length === 0) continue;
|
||||
|
||||
let content: string;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
content = await readFile(file, 'utf-8');
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const lines = content.split('\n');
|
||||
|
||||
for (const rule of applicableRules) {
|
||||
if (rule.multiline) {
|
||||
for (const pattern of rule.patterns) {
|
||||
pattern.lastIndex = 0;
|
||||
let match: RegExpExecArray | null;
|
||||
while ((match = pattern.exec(content)) !== null) {
|
||||
const lineNumber = content.substring(0, match.index).split('\n').length;
|
||||
const snippetStart = Math.max(0, match.index - 40);
|
||||
const snippet = content.substring(snippetStart, match.index + match[0].length + 40).trim().substring(0, 200);
|
||||
|
||||
if (isPlaceholderLine(snippet) || matchesExcludePatterns(snippet, rule)) {
|
||||
if (!pattern.global) break;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
findings.push({
|
||||
id: `F${++this.findingCounter}`,
|
||||
ruleId: rule.id,
|
||||
category: rule.category,
|
||||
severity: rule.severity,
|
||||
title: rule.description,
|
||||
description: rule.description,
|
||||
filePath: file,
|
||||
lineNumber,
|
||||
snippet,
|
||||
remediation: rule.remediation,
|
||||
analyzer: this.name,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if (!pattern.global) break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
|
||||
const line = lines[i];
|
||||
|
||||
if (isPlaceholderLine(line)) continue;
|
||||
if (matchesExcludePatterns(line, rule)) continue;
|
||||
|
||||
for (const pattern of rule.patterns) {
|
||||
pattern.lastIndex = 0;
|
||||
if (pattern.test(line)) {
|
||||
findings.push({
|
||||
id: `F${++this.findingCounter}`,
|
||||
ruleId: rule.id,
|
||||
category: rule.category,
|
||||
severity: rule.severity,
|
||||
title: rule.description,
|
||||
description: rule.description,
|
||||
filePath: file,
|
||||
lineNumber: i + 1,
|
||||
snippet: line.trim().substring(0, 200),
|
||||
remediation: rule.remediation,
|
||||
analyzer: this.name,
|
||||
});
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return findings;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
||||
export { Severity, ThreatCategory } from './types.js';
|
||||
export type { SecurityRule, Finding, ScanResult, ScanOptions } from './types.js';
|
||||
export type { Analyzer } from './analyzers/base.js';
|
||||
export { StaticAnalyzer } from './analyzers/static.js';
|
||||
export { ManifestAnalyzer } from './analyzers/manifest.js';
|
||||
export { SecretsAnalyzer } from './analyzers/secrets.js';
|
||||
export { SkillScanner } from './scanner.js';
|
||||
export { formatResult, formatSummary, formatJson, formatTable, formatSarif } from './reporter.js';
|
||||
export { THREAT_TAXONOMY, getThreatInfo, getDefaultSeverity } from './taxonomy.js';
|
||||
export { getAllRules } from './rules/index.js';
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
|
||||
import { basename } from 'node:path';
|
||||
import type { Finding, ScanResult } from './types.js';
|
||||
import { Severity } from './types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
declare const __PACKAGE_VERSION__: string;
|
||||
const SCANNER_VERSION = typeof __PACKAGE_VERSION__ !== 'undefined' ? __PACKAGE_VERSION__ : '0.0.0';
|
||||
|
||||
const SEVERITY_COLORS: Record<string, string> = {
|
||||
[Severity.CRITICAL]: '\x1b[91m',
|
||||
[Severity.HIGH]: '\x1b[31m',
|
||||
[Severity.MEDIUM]: '\x1b[33m',
|
||||
[Severity.LOW]: '\x1b[36m',
|
||||
[Severity.INFO]: '\x1b[37m',
|
||||
[Severity.SAFE]: '\x1b[32m',
|
||||
};
|
||||
const RESET = '\x1b[0m';
|
||||
const BOLD = '\x1b[1m';
|
||||
const DIM = '\x1b[2m';
|
||||
|
||||
const VERDICT_ICON: Record<string, string> = {
|
||||
pass: '\x1b[32m PASS \x1b[0m',
|
||||
warn: '\x1b[33m WARN \x1b[0m',
|
||||
fail: '\x1b[91m FAIL \x1b[0m',
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export function formatSummary(result: ScanResult): string {
|
||||
const lines: string[] = [];
|
||||
|
||||
lines.push('');
|
||||
lines.push(`${BOLD}Security Scan: ${result.skillName}${RESET}`);
|
||||
lines.push(`Verdict: ${VERDICT_ICON[result.verdict] ?? result.verdict}`);
|
||||
lines.push(`Duration: ${result.duration}ms | Analyzers: ${result.analyzersUsed.join(', ')}`);
|
||||
lines.push('');
|
||||
|
||||
const { critical, high, medium, low, info } = result.stats;
|
||||
const parts: string[] = [];
|
||||
if (critical) parts.push(`${SEVERITY_COLORS[Severity.CRITICAL]}${critical} critical${RESET}`);
|
||||
if (high) parts.push(`${SEVERITY_COLORS[Severity.HIGH]}${high} high${RESET}`);
|
||||
if (medium) parts.push(`${SEVERITY_COLORS[Severity.MEDIUM]}${medium} medium${RESET}`);
|
||||
if (low) parts.push(`${SEVERITY_COLORS[Severity.LOW]}${low} low${RESET}`);
|
||||
if (info) parts.push(`${SEVERITY_COLORS[Severity.INFO]}${info} info${RESET}`);
|
||||
|
||||
if (parts.length > 0) {
|
||||
lines.push(`Findings: ${parts.join(' | ')}`);
|
||||
lines.push('');
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
lines.push(`${SEVERITY_COLORS[Severity.SAFE]}No security findings${RESET}`);
|
||||
lines.push('');
|
||||
return lines.join('\n');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (const finding of result.findings) {
|
||||
const color = SEVERITY_COLORS[finding.severity] ?? '';
|
||||
const sev = finding.severity.toUpperCase().padEnd(8);
|
||||
lines.push(` ${color}${sev}${RESET} [${finding.ruleId}] ${finding.title}`);
|
||||
|
||||
if (finding.filePath) {
|
||||
const loc = finding.lineNumber ? `${finding.filePath}:${finding.lineNumber}` : finding.filePath;
|
||||
lines.push(` ${DIM}${loc}${RESET}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (finding.snippet) {
|
||||
lines.push(` ${DIM}> ${finding.snippet}${RESET}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (finding.remediation) {
|
||||
lines.push(` Fix: ${finding.remediation}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
lines.push('');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return lines.join('\n');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function formatJson(result: ScanResult): string {
|
||||
return JSON.stringify(result, null, 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function formatTable(result: ScanResult): string {
|
||||
const lines: string[] = [];
|
||||
const header = ['Severity', 'Rule', 'Title', 'File', 'Line'];
|
||||
const widths = [10, 8, 50, 40, 6];
|
||||
|
||||
lines.push(header.map((h, i) => h.padEnd(widths[i])).join(' | '));
|
||||
lines.push(widths.map((w) => '-'.repeat(w)).join('-+-'));
|
||||
|
||||
for (const f of result.findings) {
|
||||
const row = [
|
||||
f.severity.toUpperCase().padEnd(widths[0]),
|
||||
f.ruleId.padEnd(widths[1]),
|
||||
f.title.substring(0, widths[2]).padEnd(widths[2]),
|
||||
(f.filePath ? basename(f.filePath) : '').substring(0, widths[3]).padEnd(widths[3]),
|
||||
String(f.lineNumber ?? '').padEnd(widths[4]),
|
||||
];
|
||||
lines.push(row.join(' | '));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
lines.push('');
|
||||
lines.push(`Total: ${result.findings.length} findings | Verdict: ${result.verdict.toUpperCase()}`);
|
||||
return lines.join('\n');
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function formatSarif(result: ScanResult): string {
|
||||
const rules = new Map<string, Finding>();
|
||||
for (const f of result.findings) {
|
||||
if (!rules.has(f.ruleId)) rules.set(f.ruleId, f);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const severityToSarif: Record<string, string> = {
|
||||
[Severity.CRITICAL]: 'error',
|
||||
[Severity.HIGH]: 'error',
|
||||
[Severity.MEDIUM]: 'warning',
|
||||
[Severity.LOW]: 'note',
|
||||
[Severity.INFO]: 'note',
|
||||
[Severity.SAFE]: 'none',
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const sarif = {
|
||||
$schema: 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/oasis-tcs/sarif-spec/main/sarif-2.1/schema/sarif-schema-2.1.0.json',
|
||||
version: '2.1.0',
|
||||
runs: [
|
||||
{
|
||||
tool: {
|
||||
driver: {
|
||||
name: 'skillkit-scanner',
|
||||
version: SCANNER_VERSION,
|
||||
informationUri: 'https://agenstskills.com',
|
||||
rules: [...rules.values()].map((r) => ({
|
||||
id: r.ruleId,
|
||||
name: r.ruleId,
|
||||
shortDescription: { text: r.title },
|
||||
fullDescription: { text: r.description },
|
||||
helpUri: 'https://agenstskills.com/docs/security',
|
||||
defaultConfiguration: {
|
||||
level: severityToSarif[r.severity] ?? 'warning',
|
||||
},
|
||||
properties: {
|
||||
category: r.category,
|
||||
},
|
||||
})),
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
results: result.findings.map((f) => ({
|
||||
ruleId: f.ruleId,
|
||||
level: severityToSarif[f.severity] ?? 'warning',
|
||||
message: { text: f.description },
|
||||
locations: f.filePath
|
||||
? [
|
||||
{
|
||||
physicalLocation: {
|
||||
artifactLocation: {
|
||||
uri: f.filePath.startsWith(result.skillPath)
|
||||
? f.filePath.slice(result.skillPath.length).replace(/^\//, '')
|
||||
: f.filePath,
|
||||
},
|
||||
region: f.lineNumber
|
||||
? { startLine: f.lineNumber }
|
||||
: undefined,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
]
|
||||
: [],
|
||||
fixes: f.remediation
|
||||
? [{ description: { text: f.remediation } }]
|
||||
: undefined,
|
||||
})),
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
return JSON.stringify(sarif, null, 2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function formatResult(result: ScanResult, format: string = 'summary'): string {
|
||||
switch (format) {
|
||||
case 'json': return formatJson(result);
|
||||
case 'table': return formatTable(result);
|
||||
case 'sarif': return formatSarif(result);
|
||||
default: return formatSummary(result);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
|
||||
import { type SecurityRule, Severity, ThreatCategory } from '../types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export const commandInjectionRules: SecurityRule[] = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'CI001',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
patterns: [/\beval\s*\(/],
|
||||
excludePatterns: [/\/\/.*\beval\b/, /#.*\beval\b/, /['"].*\beval\b.*['"]/],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['typescript', 'javascript', 'python'],
|
||||
description: 'eval() call: dynamic code execution',
|
||||
remediation: 'Replace eval() with safer alternatives like JSON.parse() or dedicated parsers.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'CI002',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
patterns: [/new\s+Function\s*\(/, /\bFunction\s*\(\s*['"`]/],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['typescript', 'javascript'],
|
||||
description: 'Function() constructor: dynamic code generation',
|
||||
remediation: 'Avoid Function() constructor. Use static code structures.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'CI003',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/child_process\s*['"]?\s*\)\s*\.\s*exec\s*\(/,
|
||||
/\bexec\s*\(\s*['"`].*\$\{/,
|
||||
/\bexecSync\s*\(/,
|
||||
/require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*\)/,
|
||||
],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['typescript', 'javascript'],
|
||||
description: 'child_process execution: shell command injection risk',
|
||||
remediation: 'Use execFile() with argument arrays instead of exec() with string interpolation.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'CI004',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/subprocess\.(?:call|run|Popen)\s*\([^)]*shell\s*=\s*True/,
|
||||
/os\.system\s*\(/,
|
||||
/os\.popen\s*\(/,
|
||||
],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['python'],
|
||||
description: 'Python shell execution with shell=True or os.system()',
|
||||
remediation: 'Use subprocess.run() with shell=False and argument lists.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'CI005',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [/`[^`]*\$\{[^}]*\}[^`]*`/],
|
||||
excludePatterns: [/console\.log/, /logger\./, /throw\s+new/, /return\s+`/, /=\s*`/, /\+\s*`/, /\(\s*`/],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['typescript', 'javascript'],
|
||||
description: 'Template literal with dynamic content in potential command context',
|
||||
remediation: 'Avoid interpolating user input into command strings. Use argument arrays.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'CI006',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [/\.\.\//, /\.\.\\/],
|
||||
excludePatterns: [/import\s+.*from\s+['"]\.\.\//, /require\s*\(\s*['"]\.\.\//, /\/\/.*\.\.\//, /#.*\.\.\//, /\]\(\.\.\//, /href\s*=\s*['"]\.\.\//, /src\s*=\s*['"]\.\.\//, /include\s+['"]\.\.\//, /!\[.*\]\(\.\.\//, /\.\.\/node_modules/],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['typescript', 'javascript', 'python', 'bash'],
|
||||
description: 'Path traversal: relative path escaping directory boundaries',
|
||||
remediation: 'Use path.resolve() and validate paths are within expected directories.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'CI007',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/;\s*(?:rm|cat|curl|wget|nc|ncat)\s+/,
|
||||
/\|\s*(?:sh|bash|zsh|dash)\b/,
|
||||
/&&\s*(?:rm|curl|wget)\s+/,
|
||||
],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['bash', 'markdown'],
|
||||
description: 'Shell command chaining with dangerous commands',
|
||||
remediation: 'Avoid chaining shell commands. Use discrete, validated command invocations.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'CI008',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [/\bexec\s*\(/, /\bspawn\s*\(/],
|
||||
excludePatterns: [/execFile\s*\(/, /\.exec\s*\(/, /RegExp.*\.exec/],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['typescript', 'javascript'],
|
||||
description: 'Process execution functions detected',
|
||||
remediation: 'Prefer execFile() over exec(). Validate all command arguments.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'CI009',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/\b__import__\s*\(/,
|
||||
/\bcompile\s*\(\s*['"][^'"]*['"]\s*,\s*['"][^'"]*['"]\s*,\s*['"]exec['"]\s*\)/,
|
||||
],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['python'],
|
||||
description: 'Python dynamic import or code compilation',
|
||||
remediation: 'Use standard import statements. Avoid dynamic code compilation.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'CI010',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [/\bvm\.runIn(?:ThisContext|NewContext|Context)\s*\(/],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['typescript', 'javascript'],
|
||||
description: 'Node.js vm module: sandboxed but potentially dangerous code execution',
|
||||
remediation: 'Avoid vm module for untrusted code. Use proper sandboxing solutions.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
|
||||
import { type SecurityRule, Severity, ThreatCategory } from '../types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export const dataExfiltrationRules: SecurityRule[] = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'DE001',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.DATA_EXFILTRATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/https?:\/\/(?:discord(?:app)?\.com\/api\/webhooks|ptb\.discord\.com\/api\/webhooks)\//i,
|
||||
/https?:\/\/hooks\.slack\.com\/services\//i,
|
||||
/https?:\/\/api\.telegram\.org\/bot/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
description: 'Webhook URL detected: Discord, Slack, or Telegram webhook endpoint',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove hardcoded webhook URLs. Use environment variables or configuration files.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'DE002',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.DATA_EXFILTRATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/(?:fetch|axios|request|got|ky|undici)\s*(?:\.\s*post)?\s*\([^)]*(?:process\.env|credentials|password|secret|token)/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
description: 'HTTP request sending sensitive data: credentials or environment variables in request',
|
||||
remediation: 'Never send credentials or env vars to external services from skill code.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'DE003',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.DATA_EXFILTRATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/process\.env\[/,
|
||||
/process\.env\./,
|
||||
/os\.environ/,
|
||||
/\$ENV\{/,
|
||||
],
|
||||
excludePatterns: [/process\.env\.NODE_ENV/, /process\.env\.HOME/, /process\.env\.PATH/],
|
||||
description: 'Environment variable access: skill reads environment variables',
|
||||
remediation: 'Skills should declare required env vars in manifest, not access them directly.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'DE004',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.DATA_EXFILTRATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/readFile.*(?:\.env|credentials|\.aws|\.ssh|\.gnupg|\.netrc)/i,
|
||||
/open\s*\(\s*['"].*(?:\.env|credentials|\.aws|\.ssh|\.gnupg)/i,
|
||||
/cat\s+.*(?:\.env|credentials|id_rsa|\.aws\/)/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
description: 'Sensitive file access: reading credential or configuration files',
|
||||
remediation: 'Skills should not read user credential files.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'DE005',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.DATA_EXFILTRATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/new\s+WebSocket\s*\(\s*['"`]/,
|
||||
/\bio\.connect\s*\(/,
|
||||
],
|
||||
description: 'WebSocket connection: potential covert data channel',
|
||||
remediation: 'Document all network connections. Avoid persistent connections in skills.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'DE006',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.DATA_EXFILTRATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/https?:\/\/[a-z0-9]+\.ngrok\b/i,
|
||||
/https?:\/\/[a-z0-9]+\.serveo\.net/i,
|
||||
/https?:\/\/[a-z0-9]+\.loca\.lt/i,
|
||||
/https?:\/\/[a-z0-9]+\.burpcollaborator\.net/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
description: 'Tunneling service URL: potential data exfiltration via tunnel',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove tunneling service URLs. Use official API endpoints.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'DE007',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.DATA_EXFILTRATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/dns\.resolve/i,
|
||||
/\bdnslookup\b/i,
|
||||
/\bnslookup\s+/i,
|
||||
/\bdig\s+/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
description: 'DNS-based data exfiltration: DNS queries can encode stolen data',
|
||||
remediation: 'Skills should not perform DNS queries unless explicitly required.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'DE008',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.DATA_EXFILTRATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/(?:fetch|axios|request|got)\s*\(\s*['"`]https?:\/\/(?!localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)/,
|
||||
],
|
||||
excludePatterns: [/(?:npmjs\.org|github\.com|githubusercontent\.com|registry\.npmmirror)/],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['typescript', 'javascript'],
|
||||
description: 'External HTTP request: skill makes outbound network call',
|
||||
remediation: 'Declare all external URLs in skill manifest. Minimize network access.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
import type { SecurityRule } from '../types.js';
|
||||
import { promptInjectionRules } from './prompt-injection.js';
|
||||
import { commandInjectionRules } from './command-injection.js';
|
||||
import { dataExfiltrationRules } from './data-exfiltration.js';
|
||||
import { toolAbuseRules } from './tool-abuse.js';
|
||||
import { unicodeRules } from './unicode.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export function getAllRules(): SecurityRule[] {
|
||||
return [
|
||||
...promptInjectionRules,
|
||||
...commandInjectionRules,
|
||||
...dataExfiltrationRules,
|
||||
...toolAbuseRules,
|
||||
...unicodeRules,
|
||||
];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export {
|
||||
promptInjectionRules,
|
||||
commandInjectionRules,
|
||||
dataExfiltrationRules,
|
||||
toolAbuseRules,
|
||||
unicodeRules,
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
|
||||
import { type SecurityRule, Severity, ThreatCategory } from '../types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export const promptInjectionRules: SecurityRule[] = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI001',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
patterns: [/ignore\s+(all\s+)?(previous|above|prior)\s+(instructions?|rules?|guidelines?)/i],
|
||||
description: 'Instruction override: attempts to discard system instructions',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove instruction override language. Skills should not attempt to modify agent behavior.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI002',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
patterns: [/forget\s+(everything|all|what)\s+(you|i)\s+(told|said|learned)/i],
|
||||
description: 'Context clearing: attempts to wipe agent memory',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove context-clearing instructions.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI003',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
patterns: [/disregard\s+(your|all|the)\s+(training|programming|instructions?)/i],
|
||||
description: 'Training bypass: attempts to override agent training',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove training bypass instructions.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI004',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
patterns: [/new\s+instructions?:\s*$/im, /system\s+prompt:\s*$/im],
|
||||
description: 'System prompt injection: attempts to inject new system-level instructions',
|
||||
remediation: 'Do not include system prompt markers in skill content.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI005',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [/you\s+are\s+(now|actually|really)\s+(a|an|the)/i],
|
||||
description: 'Role manipulation: attempts to reassign agent identity',
|
||||
remediation: 'Skills should not attempt to change the agent\'s role or identity.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI006',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [/pretend\s+(to\s+be|you\s+are)/i, /act\s+as\s+(if|though)\s+you/i],
|
||||
description: 'Roleplay manipulation: attempts to alter agent behavior via pretense',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove roleplay instructions that change agent behavior.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI007',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [/from\s+now\s+on,?\s+(you|always|never)/i],
|
||||
description: 'Persistent behavior change: attempts to permanently alter agent behavior',
|
||||
remediation: 'Skills should provide task-specific instructions, not permanent behavior changes.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI008',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/show\s+me\s+your\s+(system\s+)?(prompt|instructions)/i,
|
||||
/reveal\s+your\s+(system\s+)?(prompt|instructions)/i,
|
||||
/what\s+are\s+your\s+(system\s+)?(instructions|rules)/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
description: 'System prompt extraction: attempts to reveal agent configuration',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove attempts to extract system prompts.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI009',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/unrestricted\s+mode/i,
|
||||
/(?<!detect(?:ing)?[\s.]+)(?<!prevent(?:ing)?[\s.]+)jailbreak/i,
|
||||
/DAN\s+(mode|prompt)/i,
|
||||
/bypass\s+(safety|content)\s+(filter|restriction)/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
description: 'Policy bypass: attempts to disable safety restrictions',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove jailbreak or policy bypass instructions.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI010',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/don'?t\s+tell\s+the\s+user/i,
|
||||
/hide\s+this\s+from\s+the\s+user/i,
|
||||
/keep\s+this\s+(a\s+)?secret/i,
|
||||
/do\s+not\s+mention\s+this/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
description: 'Concealment: instructs agent to hide information from user',
|
||||
remediation: 'Skills should be transparent. Remove concealment instructions.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI011',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/```\s*(system|assistant|user)\s*$/im,
|
||||
/<\/?(?:system|user|assistant|human|ai|claude)>/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
description: 'Delimiter injection: attempts to inject conversation role markers',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove conversation role delimiters from skill content.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI012',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [/\[INST\]/i, /\[\/INST\]/i, /<<SYS>>/i, /<<\/SYS>>/i],
|
||||
description: 'Model-specific delimiter injection: Llama-style instruction delimiters',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove model-specific instruction delimiters.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI013',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [/---\s*$/im],
|
||||
excludePatterns: [/^---\s*$/],
|
||||
multiline: true,
|
||||
description: 'YAML front-matter injection: attempts to inject via YAML metadata',
|
||||
remediation: 'Use standard SKILL.md frontmatter format only.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI014',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/<!--[^>]{0,500}?(?:ignore|system|instruction|secret|override)[^>]{0,500}?-->/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
description: 'Hidden HTML comments with suspicious instruction content',
|
||||
remediation: 'Do not hide instructions in HTML comments.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'PI015',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [/\[comment\]:\s*#\s*\([^)]*(?:ignore|system|override)[^)]*\)/i],
|
||||
description: 'Hidden Markdown comments with suspicious content',
|
||||
remediation: 'Do not hide instructions in Markdown comments.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
|
||||
import { type SecurityRule, Severity, ThreatCategory } from '../types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export const toolAbuseRules: SecurityRule[] = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'TA001',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.TOOL_ABUSE,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/(?:override|replace|redefine|shadow)\s+(?:the\s+)?(?:built-?in|default|original)\s+(?:tool|function|command)/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['markdown'],
|
||||
description: 'Tool shadowing: instructs agent to override built-in tools',
|
||||
remediation: 'Skills should extend functionality, not replace built-in tools.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'TA002',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.AUTONOMY_ABUSE,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/(?:keep|continue)\s+(?:retrying|trying|running)\s+(?:until|without)/i,
|
||||
/(?:run|execute|proceed)\s+without\s+(?:confirmation|approval|asking)/i,
|
||||
/(?:auto-?approve|skip\s+confirmation|bypass\s+approval)/i,
|
||||
/(?:don'?t|do\s+not|never)\s+(?:ask|prompt|wait)\s+(?:for|the)\s+(?:permission|confirmation|approval)/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['markdown'],
|
||||
description: 'Autonomy abuse: instructs agent to bypass user confirmation',
|
||||
remediation: 'Skills must respect user confirmation flows. Remove autonomy escalation.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'TA003',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.TOOL_ABUSE,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/(?:discover|find|list|enumerate)\s+(?:all\s+)?(?:available\s+)?(?:tools|capabilities|functions)/i,
|
||||
/(?:enable|activate|unlock)\s+(?:all\s+)?(?:hidden|disabled|extra)\s+(?:tools|capabilities)/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['markdown'],
|
||||
description: 'Capability inflation: attempts to discover or enable additional tools',
|
||||
remediation: 'Skills should use only declared tools. Do not probe for hidden capabilities.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'TA004',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.TOOL_ABUSE,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/read\s+(?:the\s+)?(?:file|contents?).*(?:then|and)\s+(?:send|post|upload|transmit)/i,
|
||||
/(?:access|read|get)\s+.*(?:credential|secret|key|token).*(?:then|and)\s+(?:send|share|post)/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['markdown'],
|
||||
description: 'Tool chaining: read sensitive data then send externally',
|
||||
remediation: 'Skills should not combine file reading with external transmission.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'TA005',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.SOCIAL_ENGINEERING,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/(?:urgent|immediately|critical|emergency)[!:]\s+(?:you\s+must|run|execute|do\s+this)/i,
|
||||
/(?:as\s+(?:an?\s+)?(?:admin|root|superuser|administrator)),?\s+(?:I|we)\s+(?:require|need|demand)/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['markdown'],
|
||||
description: 'Social engineering: uses urgency or authority to manipulate agent',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove manipulative language. Provide clear, neutral instructions.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'TA006',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.TOOL_ABUSE,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/(?:when|if)\s+(?:the\s+)?(?:user|human)\s+(?:isn'?t|is\s+not)\s+(?:looking|watching|present)/i,
|
||||
/(?:only|secretly)\s+(?:when|while)\s+(?:idle|unattended|background)/i,
|
||||
],
|
||||
fileTypes: ['markdown'],
|
||||
description: 'Stealth execution: instructs agent to act when user is not present',
|
||||
remediation: 'All skill actions must be transparent and auditable.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
||||
import { type SecurityRule, Severity, ThreatCategory } from '../types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export const unicodeRules: SecurityRule[] = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'UC001',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.UNICODE_STEGANOGRAPHY,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [/\u200B|\u200C|\u200D|\uFEFF/],
|
||||
description: 'Zero-width characters detected: may hide invisible instructions',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove zero-width characters (U+200B, U+200C, U+200D, U+FEFF).',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'UC002',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.UNICODE_STEGANOGRAPHY,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [/[\u202A-\u202E]/],
|
||||
description: 'Bidirectional text override: can reverse displayed text direction to hide content',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove bidirectional override characters (U+202A-U+202E).',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'UC003',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.UNICODE_STEGANOGRAPHY,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [/[\u2066-\u2069]/],
|
||||
description: 'Bidirectional isolate characters: can create hidden text regions',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove bidirectional isolate characters (U+2066-U+2069).',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'UC004',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.UNICODE_STEGANOGRAPHY,
|
||||
severity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
patterns: [/[\u{E0001}-\u{E007F}]/u],
|
||||
description: 'Tag characters detected: Unicode tag block can encode hidden payloads',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove Unicode tag characters (U+E0001-U+E007F).',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'UC005',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.UNICODE_STEGANOGRAPHY,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noControlCharactersInRegex: intentional detection of control characters
|
||||
patterns: [/[\u0000-\u0008\u000B\u000C\u000E-\u001F\u007F-\u009F]/],
|
||||
description: 'Control characters detected: non-printable characters in content',
|
||||
remediation: 'Remove control characters. Use only printable Unicode content.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'UC006',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.OBFUSCATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/atob\s*\(\s*['"`][A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}['"`]\s*\)/,
|
||||
/Buffer\.from\s*\(\s*['"`][A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}['"`]\s*,\s*['"`]base64['"`]\s*\)/,
|
||||
/base64\.b64decode\s*\(\s*['"`][A-Za-z0-9+/=]{40,}['"`]\s*\)/,
|
||||
],
|
||||
description: 'Base64-encoded payload: long encoded string being decoded at runtime',
|
||||
remediation: 'Avoid embedding base64-encoded payloads. Use plain text or documented data formats.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'UC007',
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.OBFUSCATION,
|
||||
severity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
patterns: [
|
||||
/\\x[0-9a-fA-F]{2}(?:\\x[0-9a-fA-F]{2}){9,}/,
|
||||
/\\u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}(?:\\u[0-9a-fA-F]{4}){9,}/,
|
||||
],
|
||||
description: 'Hex/Unicode escape sequences: potential obfuscated content',
|
||||
remediation: 'Use readable strings instead of hex or unicode escape sequences.',
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
|
||||
import { readdir } from 'node:fs/promises';
|
||||
import { join, basename } from 'node:path';
|
||||
import type { Analyzer } from './analyzers/base.js';
|
||||
import { StaticAnalyzer } from './analyzers/static.js';
|
||||
import { ManifestAnalyzer } from './analyzers/manifest.js';
|
||||
import { SecretsAnalyzer } from './analyzers/secrets.js';
|
||||
import type { Finding, ScanResult, ScanOptions } from './types.js';
|
||||
import { Severity } from './types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
const SEVERITY_ORDER: Record<string, number> = {
|
||||
[Severity.CRITICAL]: 5,
|
||||
[Severity.HIGH]: 4,
|
||||
[Severity.MEDIUM]: 3,
|
||||
[Severity.LOW]: 2,
|
||||
[Severity.INFO]: 1,
|
||||
[Severity.SAFE]: 0,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
async function discoverFiles(dirPath: string): Promise<string[]> {
|
||||
const files: string[] = [];
|
||||
|
||||
async function walk(dir: string): Promise<void> {
|
||||
let entries;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
entries = await readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true });
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (const entry of entries) {
|
||||
const fullPath = join(dir, entry.name);
|
||||
if (entry.name.startsWith('.') && entry.name !== '.env' && !entry.name.startsWith('.env.')) continue;
|
||||
if (entry.name === 'node_modules') continue;
|
||||
|
||||
if (entry.isDirectory()) {
|
||||
await walk(fullPath);
|
||||
} else if (entry.isFile()) {
|
||||
files.push(fullPath);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await walk(dirPath);
|
||||
return files;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function deduplicateFindings(findings: Finding[]): Finding[] {
|
||||
const seen = new Set<string>();
|
||||
return findings.filter((f) => {
|
||||
const key = `${f.ruleId}:${f.filePath ?? ''}:${f.lineNumber ?? ''}`;
|
||||
if (seen.has(key)) return false;
|
||||
seen.add(key);
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function calculateVerdict(
|
||||
findings: Finding[],
|
||||
failOnSeverity: Severity = Severity.HIGH
|
||||
): 'pass' | 'warn' | 'fail' {
|
||||
const threshold = SEVERITY_ORDER[failOnSeverity] ?? SEVERITY_ORDER[Severity.HIGH];
|
||||
|
||||
for (const f of findings) {
|
||||
if ((SEVERITY_ORDER[f.severity] ?? 0) >= threshold) {
|
||||
return 'fail';
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (findings.some((f) => (SEVERITY_ORDER[f.severity] ?? 0) >= SEVERITY_ORDER[Severity.MEDIUM])) {
|
||||
return 'warn';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 'pass';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function countStats(findings: Finding[]): ScanResult['stats'] {
|
||||
const stats = { critical: 0, high: 0, medium: 0, low: 0, info: 0 };
|
||||
for (const f of findings) {
|
||||
switch (f.severity) {
|
||||
case Severity.CRITICAL: stats.critical++; break;
|
||||
case Severity.HIGH: stats.high++; break;
|
||||
case Severity.MEDIUM: stats.medium++; break;
|
||||
case Severity.LOW: stats.low++; break;
|
||||
case Severity.INFO: stats.info++; break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return stats;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class SkillScanner {
|
||||
private analyzers: Analyzer[];
|
||||
private options: ScanOptions;
|
||||
|
||||
constructor(options?: ScanOptions) {
|
||||
this.options = options ?? {};
|
||||
this.analyzers = [
|
||||
new StaticAnalyzer(this.options.skipRules),
|
||||
new ManifestAnalyzer(this.options.skipRules),
|
||||
new SecretsAnalyzer(this.options.skipRules),
|
||||
];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async scan(skillPath: string): Promise<ScanResult> {
|
||||
const start = performance.now();
|
||||
|
||||
const files = await discoverFiles(skillPath);
|
||||
const skillName = basename(skillPath.replace(/\/+$/, '')) || 'unknown';
|
||||
|
||||
const resultSets = await Promise.all(
|
||||
this.analyzers.map((a) => a.analyze(skillPath, files))
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const allFindings = deduplicateFindings(resultSets.flat());
|
||||
|
||||
allFindings.sort(
|
||||
(a, b) => (SEVERITY_ORDER[b.severity] ?? 0) - (SEVERITY_ORDER[a.severity] ?? 0)
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
const duration = Math.round(performance.now() - start);
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
skillPath,
|
||||
skillName,
|
||||
verdict: calculateVerdict(allFindings, this.options.failOnSeverity),
|
||||
findings: allFindings,
|
||||
stats: countStats(allFindings),
|
||||
duration,
|
||||
analyzersUsed: this.analyzers.map((a) => a.name),
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
|
||||
import { ThreatCategory, Severity } from './types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export interface ThreatInfo {
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory;
|
||||
name: string;
|
||||
description: string;
|
||||
defaultSeverity: Severity;
|
||||
examples: string[];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export const THREAT_TAXONOMY: Record<ThreatCategory, ThreatInfo> = {
|
||||
[ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION]: {
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.PROMPT_INJECTION,
|
||||
name: 'Prompt Injection',
|
||||
description: 'Attempts to override, manipulate, or bypass AI agent instructions through crafted text',
|
||||
defaultSeverity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
examples: [
|
||||
'Instruction override (ignore previous instructions)',
|
||||
'Role manipulation (you are now...)',
|
||||
'System prompt extraction',
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
[ThreatCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION]: {
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.COMMAND_INJECTION,
|
||||
name: 'Command Injection',
|
||||
description: 'Code execution via eval, exec, subprocess, or shell commands embedded in skill content',
|
||||
defaultSeverity: Severity.CRITICAL,
|
||||
examples: [
|
||||
'eval() or Function() calls',
|
||||
'subprocess.run with shell=True',
|
||||
'child_process.exec with user input',
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
[ThreatCategory.DATA_EXFILTRATION]: {
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.DATA_EXFILTRATION,
|
||||
name: 'Data Exfiltration',
|
||||
description: 'Attempts to send sensitive data to external endpoints or read protected files',
|
||||
defaultSeverity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
examples: [
|
||||
'Webhook URLs to Discord/Telegram/Slack',
|
||||
'HTTP POST with environment variables',
|
||||
'Reading .env or credential files',
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
[ThreatCategory.TOOL_ABUSE]: {
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.TOOL_ABUSE,
|
||||
name: 'Tool Abuse',
|
||||
description: 'Manipulation of AI agent tools through shadowing, chaining, or autonomy escalation',
|
||||
defaultSeverity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
examples: [
|
||||
'Redefining built-in tools',
|
||||
'Instructing agent to run without confirmation',
|
||||
'Chaining sensitive read + external send',
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
[ThreatCategory.HARDCODED_SECRETS]: {
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.HARDCODED_SECRETS,
|
||||
name: 'Hardcoded Secrets',
|
||||
description: 'API keys, tokens, passwords, or other credentials embedded in skill files',
|
||||
defaultSeverity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
examples: [
|
||||
'API keys (sk-, pk_live_, ghp_)',
|
||||
'Private key blocks',
|
||||
'Embedded .env file contents',
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
[ThreatCategory.UNICODE_STEGANOGRAPHY]: {
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.UNICODE_STEGANOGRAPHY,
|
||||
name: 'Unicode Steganography',
|
||||
description: 'Hidden content using invisible Unicode characters, bidirectional overrides, or homoglyphs',
|
||||
defaultSeverity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
examples: [
|
||||
'Zero-width characters hiding instructions',
|
||||
'Bidirectional text override attacks',
|
||||
'Tag characters encoding hidden payloads',
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
[ThreatCategory.OBFUSCATION]: {
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.OBFUSCATION,
|
||||
name: 'Obfuscation',
|
||||
description: 'Deliberately obscured code or instructions to hide malicious intent',
|
||||
defaultSeverity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
examples: [
|
||||
'Base64-encoded commands',
|
||||
'Hex-encoded payloads',
|
||||
'String concatenation to evade detection',
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
[ThreatCategory.SOCIAL_ENGINEERING]: {
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.SOCIAL_ENGINEERING,
|
||||
name: 'Social Engineering',
|
||||
description: 'Manipulative language targeting the AI agent or the user to bypass safety measures',
|
||||
defaultSeverity: Severity.MEDIUM,
|
||||
examples: [
|
||||
'Urgency pressure (do this immediately)',
|
||||
'Authority claims (as an admin, I require...)',
|
||||
'Concealment requests (don\'t tell the user)',
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
[ThreatCategory.AUTONOMY_ABUSE]: {
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.AUTONOMY_ABUSE,
|
||||
name: 'Autonomy Abuse',
|
||||
description: 'Instructions that escalate agent autonomy beyond intended boundaries',
|
||||
defaultSeverity: Severity.HIGH,
|
||||
examples: [
|
||||
'Run without user confirmation',
|
||||
'Keep retrying until success',
|
||||
'Auto-approve all actions',
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
[ThreatCategory.POLICY_VIOLATION]: {
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory.POLICY_VIOLATION,
|
||||
name: 'Policy Violation',
|
||||
description: 'Content that violates skill marketplace policies or naming conventions',
|
||||
defaultSeverity: Severity.LOW,
|
||||
examples: [
|
||||
'Impersonating official tools',
|
||||
'Missing required metadata',
|
||||
'Binary files in skill directory',
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export function getThreatInfo(category: ThreatCategory): ThreatInfo {
|
||||
return THREAT_TAXONOMY[category];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export function getDefaultSeverity(category: ThreatCategory): Severity {
|
||||
return THREAT_TAXONOMY[category].defaultSeverity;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
|
||||
export enum Severity {
|
||||
CRITICAL = 'critical',
|
||||
HIGH = 'high',
|
||||
MEDIUM = 'medium',
|
||||
LOW = 'low',
|
||||
INFO = 'info',
|
||||
SAFE = 'safe',
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export enum ThreatCategory {
|
||||
PROMPT_INJECTION = 'prompt-injection',
|
||||
COMMAND_INJECTION = 'command-injection',
|
||||
DATA_EXFILTRATION = 'data-exfiltration',
|
||||
TOOL_ABUSE = 'tool-abuse',
|
||||
HARDCODED_SECRETS = 'hardcoded-secrets',
|
||||
UNICODE_STEGANOGRAPHY = 'unicode-steganography',
|
||||
OBFUSCATION = 'obfuscation',
|
||||
SOCIAL_ENGINEERING = 'social-engineering',
|
||||
AUTONOMY_ABUSE = 'autonomy-abuse',
|
||||
POLICY_VIOLATION = 'policy-violation',
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export interface SecurityRule {
|
||||
id: string;
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory;
|
||||
severity: Severity;
|
||||
patterns: RegExp[];
|
||||
excludePatterns?: RegExp[];
|
||||
fileTypes?: string[];
|
||||
multiline?: boolean;
|
||||
description: string;
|
||||
remediation: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export interface Finding {
|
||||
id: string;
|
||||
ruleId: string;
|
||||
category: ThreatCategory;
|
||||
severity: Severity;
|
||||
title: string;
|
||||
description: string;
|
||||
filePath?: string;
|
||||
lineNumber?: number;
|
||||
snippet?: string;
|
||||
remediation?: string;
|
||||
analyzer: string;
|
||||
aitech?: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export interface ScanResult {
|
||||
skillPath: string;
|
||||
skillName: string;
|
||||
verdict: 'pass' | 'warn' | 'fail';
|
||||
findings: Finding[];
|
||||
stats: {
|
||||
critical: number;
|
||||
high: number;
|
||||
medium: number;
|
||||
low: number;
|
||||
info: number;
|
||||
};
|
||||
duration: number;
|
||||
analyzersUsed: string[];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export interface ScanOptions {
|
||||
failOnSeverity?: Severity;
|
||||
skipRules?: string[];
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
|
||||
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
|
||||
import { defineConfig } from 'tsup';
|
||||
|
||||
const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync('./package.json', 'utf-8'));
|
||||
|
||||
export default defineConfig({
|
||||
entry: ['src/index.ts'],
|
||||
format: ['esm'],
|
||||
@@ -11,4 +14,7 @@ export default defineConfig({
|
||||
splitting: false,
|
||||
skipNodeModulesBundle: true,
|
||||
platform: 'node',
|
||||
define: {
|
||||
'__PACKAGE_VERSION__': JSON.stringify(pkg.version),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user