Files
skillshare/internal/server/handler_audit.go
T
Willie 89fc4fbdf1 feat(sourcewalk): follow first-level source links when enabled
Users link a checkout directly under the skills source (e.g.
skills/_dev-skills -> ~/code/dev-skills) and expect it to behave like any
other first-level entry. sourcewalk resolved only the root, so these links
were invisible to discovery, sync, update, and the dashboard.

follow_source_links (global and project config, default false) enables a
per-operation sourcewalk.Follow policy. Walk, WalkDir, and ReadDir report a
followed link under its own name as a directory and descend into its
target, so names, RelPath, FlatName, SourcePath, tracked-repo detection, and
metadata keys stay logical. Only entries directly under the source root are
followed. The policy is built from config and passed explicitly to every
discovery caller in the CLI, server, and reconcile, so counts agree; the
server keeps a per-instance snapshot refreshed on config load and save
instead of a process-global flag.

A link is skipped, with one warning per operation, when its target is
missing or unreadable, is the source or a parent of it, or overlaps an
active skills target. A missing or unreadable target marks the operation
incomplete: sync then skips pruning and copy-orphan deletion, and reconcile
keeps metadata, so an unmounted drive or a re-clone in progress cannot
erase target entries or install records. A link to an existing file is not
a directory link and stays an ordinary entry; treating it as incomplete
would disable pruning for anyone sharing a file such as .skillignore.

doctor keeps raw link identity: with the key off it still says the link is
not followed and names follow_source_links: true; with it on it reports
followed links and skipped links with the reason.

The raw-walk allowlist gains entries for the policy path in Walk and
WalkDir: the source root walk with a policy, and the walk of a validated
link target whose paths are remapped to the logical link path. Both live
in sourcewalk itself, the package that owns source traversal.

Refs #274
2026-10-05 14:26:09 +08:00

825 lines
22 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"time"
"skillshare/internal/audit"
"skillshare/internal/resource"
"skillshare/internal/sourcewalk"
"skillshare/internal/sync"
)
type auditFindingResponse struct {
Severity string `json:"severity"`
Pattern string `json:"pattern"`
Message string `json:"message"`
File string `json:"file"`
Line int `json:"line"`
Snippet string `json:"snippet"`
// Phase 2 fields — analyzer traceability and deduplication.
RuleID string `json:"ruleId,omitempty"`
Analyzer string `json:"analyzer,omitempty"`
Category string `json:"category,omitempty"`
Confidence float64 `json:"confidence,omitempty"`
Fingerprint string `json:"fingerprint,omitempty"`
}
type auditResultResponse struct {
SkillName string `json:"skillName"`
Findings []auditFindingResponse `json:"findings"`
RiskScore int `json:"riskScore"`
RiskLabel string `json:"riskLabel"`
Threshold string `json:"threshold"`
IsBlocked bool `json:"isBlocked"`
ScanTarget string `json:"scanTarget,omitempty"`
TotalBytes int64 `json:"totalBytes"`
AuditableBytes int64 `json:"auditableBytes"`
Analyzability float64 `json:"analyzability"`
TierProfile audit.TierProfile `json:"tierProfile"`
Kind string `json:"kind,omitempty"`
}
type auditSummary struct {
Total int `json:"total"`
Passed int `json:"passed"`
Warning int `json:"warning"`
Failed int `json:"failed"`
Critical int `json:"critical"`
High int `json:"high"`
Medium int `json:"medium"`
Low int `json:"low"`
Info int `json:"info"`
Threshold string `json:"threshold"`
RiskScore int `json:"riskScore"`
RiskLabel string `json:"riskLabel"`
ScanErrors int `json:"scanErrors,omitempty"`
AvgAnalyzability float64 `json:"avgAnalyzability"`
ByCategory map[string]int `json:"byCategory,omitempty"`
PolicyProfile string `json:"policyProfile,omitempty"`
PolicyDedupe string `json:"policyDedupe,omitempty"`
}
type skillEntry struct {
name string
path string
}
// discoverAuditAgents discovers agents (individual .md files) for audit scanning.
func discoverAuditAgents(source string) ([]skillEntry, error) {
if source == "" {
return []skillEntry{}, nil
}
if _, err := os.Stat(source); err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return []skillEntry{}, nil
}
return nil, err
}
discovered, err := resource.AgentKind{}.Discover(source)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var agents []skillEntry
for _, d := range discovered {
agents = append(agents, skillEntry{name: d.FlatName, path: d.AbsPath})
}
return agents, nil
}
// discoverAuditSkills discovers and deduplicates skills for audit scanning.
func discoverAuditSkills(source string, walk sourcewalk.Options) ([]skillEntry, error) {
if source == "" {
return []skillEntry{}, nil
}
if _, err := os.Stat(source); err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return []skillEntry{}, nil
}
return nil, err
}
discovered, err := sync.DiscoverSourceSkills(source, walk)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return []skillEntry{}, nil
}
return nil, err
}
seen := make(map[string]bool)
var skills []skillEntry
for _, d := range discovered {
if seen[d.SourcePath] {
continue
}
seen[d.SourcePath] = true
skills = append(skills, skillEntry{d.FlatName, d.SourcePath})
}
return skills, nil
}
// auditAggregation holds the aggregated audit results and summary.
type auditAggregation struct {
Results []auditResultResponse
Summary auditSummary
LogArgs map[string]any
Status string
Message string
}
// processAuditResults aggregates scan outputs into results, summary, and log args.
// projectRoot selects which audit-rules.yaml layers apply to cross-skill findings
// ("" = global mode).
func processAuditResults(skills []skillEntry, scanned []audit.ScanOutput, policy audit.Policy, projectRoot string) auditAggregation {
threshold := policy.Threshold
var results []auditResultResponse
var rawResults []*audit.Result
summary := auditSummary{
Total: len(skills),
Threshold: threshold,
}
criticalCount := 0
highCount := 0
mediumCount := 0
lowCount := 0
infoCount := 0
failedSkills := make([]string, 0)
warningSkills := make([]string, 0)
lowSkills := make([]string, 0)
infoSkills := make([]string, 0)
scanErrors := 0
maxRisk := 0
maxSeverity := ""
sumAnalyzability := 0.0
catCounts := make(map[string]int)
for i := range skills {
se := scanned[i]
if se.Err != nil {
scanErrors++
continue
}
result := se.Result
result.Threshold = threshold
result.IsBlocked = result.HasSeverityAtOrAbove(threshold)
rawResults = append(rawResults, result)
resp := toAuditResponse(result)
results = append(results, resp)
if len(result.Findings) == 0 {
summary.Passed++
} else if result.IsBlocked {
summary.Failed++
failedSkills = append(failedSkills, result.SkillName)
} else {
summary.Warning++
warningSkills = append(warningSkills, result.SkillName)
}
c, h, m, l, i := result.CountBySeverityAll()
criticalCount += c
highCount += h
mediumCount += m
lowCount += l
infoCount += i
for cat, n := range result.CountByCategory() {
catCounts[cat] += n
}
if l > 0 {
lowSkills = append(lowSkills, result.SkillName)
}
if i > 0 {
infoSkills = append(infoSkills, result.SkillName)
}
if result.RiskScore > maxRisk {
maxRisk = result.RiskScore
}
if ms := result.MaxSeverity(); ms != "" {
if maxSeverity == "" || audit.SeverityRank(ms) < audit.SeverityRank(maxSeverity) {
maxSeverity = ms
}
}
sumAnalyzability += result.Analyzability
}
status := "ok"
msg := ""
if summary.Failed > 0 {
status = "blocked"
msg = "findings at/above threshold detected"
}
summary.Critical = criticalCount
summary.High = highCount
summary.Medium = mediumCount
summary.Low = lowCount
summary.Info = infoCount
summary.ScanErrors = scanErrors
summary.RiskScore = maxRisk
summary.RiskLabel = audit.RiskLabelFromScoreAndMaxSeverity(maxRisk, maxSeverity)
if len(results) > 0 {
summary.AvgAnalyzability = sumAnalyzability / float64(len(results))
}
summary.PolicyProfile = string(policy.Profile)
summary.PolicyDedupe = string(policy.DedupeMode)
if len(catCounts) > 0 {
summary.ByCategory = catCounts
}
args := map[string]any{
"scope": "all",
"mode": "ui",
"threshold": threshold,
"scanned": summary.Total,
"passed": summary.Passed,
"warning": summary.Warning,
"failed": summary.Failed,
"critical": criticalCount,
"high": highCount,
"medium": mediumCount,
"low": lowCount,
"info": infoCount,
"risk_score": summary.RiskScore,
"risk_label": summary.RiskLabel,
"scan_errors": scanErrors,
}
if len(failedSkills) > 0 {
args["failed_skills"] = failedSkills
}
if len(warningSkills) > 0 {
args["warning_skills"] = warningSkills
}
if len(lowSkills) > 0 {
args["low_skills"] = lowSkills
}
if len(infoSkills) > 0 {
args["info_skills"] = infoSkills
}
// Cross-skill analysis (after summary so counts are unaffected).
disabled := audit.DisabledRuleIDs()
if projectRoot != "" {
disabled = audit.DisabledRuleIDsForProject(projectRoot)
}
if xr := audit.CrossSkillAnalysis(rawResults, disabled); xr != nil {
results = append(results, toAuditResponse(xr))
}
return auditAggregation{
Results: results,
Summary: summary,
LogArgs: args,
Status: status,
Message: msg,
}
}
// resolveAuditSource returns the source directory, result kind label, and whether agents are being scanned.
func (s *Server) resolveAuditSource(r *http.Request) (string, string, bool) {
kind := r.URL.Query().Get("kind")
if kind == "agents" {
return s.agentsSource(), "agent", true
}
return s.cfg.EffectiveSkillsSource(), "skill", false
}
func (s *Server) handleAuditAll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Snapshot config under RLock, then release before I/O.
s.mu.RLock()
source, resultKind, isAgents := s.resolveAuditSource(r)
policy := s.auditPolicy()
projectRoot := s.projectRoot
cfgPath := s.configPath()
s.mu.RUnlock()
isProjectMode := projectRoot != ""
start := time.Now()
var skills []skillEntry
var err error
if isAgents {
skills, err = discoverAuditAgents(source)
} else {
skills, err = discoverAuditSkills(source, s.skillsWalk())
}
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
auditProjectRoot := projectRoot
if !isProjectMode {
auditProjectRoot = ""
}
var inputs []audit.SkillInput
if isAgents {
inputs = make([]audit.SkillInput, len(skills))
for i, s := range skills {
inputs[i] = audit.SkillInput{Name: s.name, Path: s.path, IsFile: true}
}
} else {
inputs = skillsToAuditInputs(skills)
}
scanned := audit.ParallelScan(inputs, auditProjectRoot, nil, nil)
agg := processAuditResults(skills, scanned, policy, auditProjectRoot)
for i := range agg.Results {
agg.Results[i].Kind = resultKind
}
writeAuditLogTo(cfgPath, agg.Status, start, agg.LogArgs, agg.Message)
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
"results": agg.Results,
"summary": agg.Summary,
})
}
func (s *Server) handleAuditSkill(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Snapshot config under RLock, then release before I/O.
s.mu.RLock()
source := s.cfg.EffectiveSkillsSource()
agentsSource := s.agentsSource()
policy := s.auditPolicy()
projectRoot := s.projectRoot
cfgPath := s.configPath()
s.mu.RUnlock()
isProjectMode := projectRoot != ""
start := time.Now()
name := r.PathValue("name")
kind := r.URL.Query().Get("kind")
threshold := policy.Threshold
var (
result *audit.Result
err error
)
if kind == "agent" {
// Resolve agent file path via discovery
var agentPath string
if agentsSource != "" {
discovered, _ := resource.AgentKind{}.Discover(agentsSource)
for _, d := range discovered {
if d.FlatName == name || d.Name == name {
agentPath = d.AbsPath
break
}
}
}
if agentPath == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "agent not found: "+name)
return
}
if isProjectMode {
result, err = audit.ScanFileForProject(agentPath, projectRoot)
} else {
result, err = audit.ScanFile(agentPath)
}
} else {
if !validSourceName(name) {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid skill name: "+name)
return
}
skillPath := filepath.Join(source, name)
if _, statErr := os.Stat(skillPath); os.IsNotExist(statErr) {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "skill not found: "+name)
return
}
if isProjectMode {
result, err = audit.ScanSkillForProject(skillPath, projectRoot)
} else {
result, err = audit.ScanSkill(skillPath)
}
}
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
result.Threshold = threshold
result.IsBlocked = result.HasSeverityAtOrAbove(threshold)
c, h, m, l, i := result.CountBySeverityAll()
warningCount := 0
failedCount := 0
failedSkills := []string{}
warningSkills := []string{}
lowSkills := []string{}
infoSkills := []string{}
if len(result.Findings) == 0 {
// no-op
} else if result.IsBlocked {
failedCount = 1
failedSkills = append(failedSkills, result.SkillName)
} else {
warningCount = 1
warningSkills = append(warningSkills, result.SkillName)
}
if l > 0 {
lowSkills = append(lowSkills, result.SkillName)
}
if i > 0 {
infoSkills = append(infoSkills, result.SkillName)
}
status := "ok"
msg := ""
if result.IsBlocked {
status = "blocked"
msg = "findings at/above threshold detected"
}
args := map[string]any{
"scope": "single",
"name": name,
"mode": "ui",
"threshold": threshold,
"scanned": 1,
"passed": boolToInt(len(result.Findings) == 0),
"warning": warningCount,
"failed": failedCount,
"critical": c,
"high": h,
"medium": m,
"low": l,
"info": i,
"risk_score": result.RiskScore,
"risk_label": result.RiskLabel,
}
if len(failedSkills) > 0 {
args["failed_skills"] = failedSkills
}
if len(warningSkills) > 0 {
args["warning_skills"] = warningSkills
}
if len(lowSkills) > 0 {
args["low_skills"] = lowSkills
}
if len(infoSkills) > 0 {
args["info_skills"] = infoSkills
}
writeAuditLogTo(cfgPath, status, start, args, msg)
singleCats := result.CountByCategory()
var byCat map[string]int
if len(singleCats) > 0 {
byCat = singleCats
}
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
"result": toAuditResponse(result),
"summary": auditSummary{
Total: 1,
Passed: boolToInt(len(result.Findings) == 0),
Warning: warningCount,
Failed: failedCount,
Critical: c,
High: h,
Medium: m,
Low: l,
Info: i,
Threshold: threshold,
RiskScore: result.RiskScore,
RiskLabel: result.RiskLabel,
AvgAnalyzability: result.Analyzability,
ByCategory: byCat,
PolicyProfile: string(policy.Profile),
PolicyDedupe: string(policy.DedupeMode),
},
})
}
func boolToInt(v bool) int {
if v {
return 1
}
return 0
}
var auditProfiles = []string{string(audit.ProfileDefault), string(audit.ProfileStrict), string(audit.ProfilePermissive)}
// handleAuditPolicy — PATCH /api/audit/policy
// Sets the severity at which install and sync refuse a resource, and the profile
// that presets how strict a scan is. Each field is optional; only what is sent changes.
func (s *Server) handleAuditPolicy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
start := time.Now()
var body struct {
BlockThreshold string `json:"blockThreshold"`
Profile string `json:"profile"`
}
if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &body, defaultJSONBodyLimit); err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, errBodyTooLarge) {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body: "+err.Error())
}
return
}
if body.BlockThreshold == "" && body.Profile == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "blockThreshold or profile is required")
return
}
var threshold string
if body.BlockThreshold != "" {
var err error
if threshold, err = audit.NormalizeThreshold(body.BlockThreshold); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid blockThreshold: "+err.Error())
return
}
}
if body.Profile != "" && !slices.Contains(auditProfiles, body.Profile) {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid profile: "+body.Profile)
return
}
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
cfg := &s.cfg.Audit
if s.IsProjectMode() {
cfg = &s.projectCfg.Audit
}
if threshold != "" {
cfg.BlockThreshold = threshold
}
if body.Profile != "" {
cfg.Profile = body.Profile
}
if err := s.saveConfig(); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to save config: "+err.Error())
return
}
args := map[string]any{"scope": "ui"}
if threshold != "" {
args["block_threshold"] = threshold
}
if body.Profile != "" {
args["profile"] = body.Profile
}
s.writeOpsLog("audit-policy", "ok", start, args, "")
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"threshold": cfg.BlockThreshold, "profile": cfg.Profile})
}
func (s *Server) auditPolicy() audit.Policy {
var in audit.PolicyInputs
in.ConfigThreshold = s.cfg.Audit.BlockThreshold
in.ConfigProfile = s.cfg.Audit.Profile
in.ConfigDedupe = s.cfg.Audit.DedupeMode
in.ConfigAnalyzers = s.cfg.Audit.EnabledAnalyzers
if s.IsProjectMode() && s.projectCfg != nil {
if s.projectCfg.Audit.BlockThreshold != "" {
in.ConfigThreshold = s.projectCfg.Audit.BlockThreshold
}
if s.projectCfg.Audit.Profile != "" {
in.ConfigProfile = s.projectCfg.Audit.Profile
}
if s.projectCfg.Audit.DedupeMode != "" {
in.ConfigDedupe = s.projectCfg.Audit.DedupeMode
}
if len(s.projectCfg.Audit.EnabledAnalyzers) > 0 {
in.ConfigAnalyzers = s.projectCfg.Audit.EnabledAnalyzers
}
}
return audit.ResolvePolicy(in)
}
func (s *Server) auditThreshold() string {
return s.auditPolicy().Threshold
}
// auditRulesPath returns the correct audit-rules.yaml path for the current mode.
func (s *Server) auditRulesPath() string {
if s.IsProjectMode() {
return audit.ProjectAuditRulesPath(s.projectRoot)
}
return audit.GlobalAuditRulesPath()
}
func (s *Server) handleGetAuditRules(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Snapshot config under RLock, then release before I/O.
s.mu.RLock()
path := s.auditRulesPath()
s.mu.RUnlock()
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
"exists": false,
"raw": "",
"path": path,
})
return
}
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to read rules: "+err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
"exists": true,
"raw": string(data),
"path": path,
})
}
func (s *Server) handlePutAuditRules(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
var body struct {
Raw string `json:"raw"`
}
if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &body, defaultJSONBodyLimit); err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, errBodyTooLarge) {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid JSON body")
}
return
}
if err := audit.ValidateRulesYAML(body.Raw); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid rules: "+err.Error())
return
}
path := s.auditRulesPath()
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0755); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "create directory: "+err.Error())
return
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(body.Raw), 0644); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to write rules: "+err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"success": true})
}
func (s *Server) handleInitAuditRules(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
path := s.auditRulesPath()
if err := audit.InitRulesFile(path); err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
// File already exists → 409 Conflict
if _, statErr := os.Stat(path); statErr == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "rules file already exists: "+path)
return
}
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
"success": true,
"path": path,
})
}
func (s *Server) handleGetCompiledRules(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Snapshot config under RLock, then release before I/O.
s.mu.RLock()
projectRoot := s.projectRoot
auditCfg := s.cfg.Audit
if s.IsProjectMode() {
auditCfg = s.projectCfg.Audit
}
s.mu.RUnlock()
isProjectMode := projectRoot != ""
policy := audit.ResolvePolicy(audit.PolicyInputs{ConfigProfile: auditCfg.Profile, ConfigThreshold: auditCfg.BlockThreshold, ConfigDedupe: auditCfg.DedupeMode})
var rules []audit.CompiledRule
var err error
if isProjectMode {
rules, err = audit.ListRulesWithProject(projectRoot)
} else {
rules, err = audit.ListRules()
}
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "list rules: "+err.Error())
return
}
patterns := audit.PatternSummary(rules)
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
"rules": rules,
"patterns": patterns,
"profile": string(policy.Profile),
})
}
func (s *Server) handleToggleRule(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
var req struct {
ID string `json:"id,omitempty"`
Pattern string `json:"pattern,omitempty"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
Severity string `json:"severity,omitempty"`
}
if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req, defaultJSONBodyLimit); err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, errBodyTooLarge) {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
}
return
}
path := s.auditRulesPath()
var err error
// Severity override takes precedence when provided
if req.Severity != "" {
if req.Pattern != "" {
err = audit.SetPatternSeverity(path, req.Pattern, req.Severity)
} else if req.ID != "" {
err = audit.SetSeverity(path, req.ID, req.Severity)
} else {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "id or pattern required")
return
}
} else if req.Pattern != "" {
err = audit.TogglePattern(path, req.Pattern, req.Enabled)
} else if req.ID != "" {
err = audit.ToggleRule(path, req.ID, req.Enabled)
} else {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "id or pattern required")
return
}
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "toggle rule: "+err.Error())
return
}
audit.ResetGlobalCache()
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"success": true})
}
func (s *Server) handleResetRules(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
path := s.auditRulesPath()
if err := audit.ResetRules(path); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "reset rules: "+err.Error())
return
}
audit.ResetGlobalCache()
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"success": true})
}
func skillsToAuditInputs(skills []skillEntry) []audit.SkillInput {
inputs := make([]audit.SkillInput, len(skills))
for i, s := range skills {
inputs[i] = audit.SkillInput{Name: s.name, Path: s.path}
}
return inputs
}
func toAuditResponse(result *audit.Result) auditResultResponse {
findings := make([]auditFindingResponse, 0, len(result.Findings))
for _, f := range result.Findings {
findings = append(findings, auditFindingResponse{
Severity: f.Severity,
Pattern: f.Pattern,
Message: f.Message,
File: f.File,
Line: f.Line,
Snippet: f.Snippet,
RuleID: f.RuleID,
Analyzer: f.Analyzer,
Category: f.Category,
Confidence: f.Confidence,
Fingerprint: f.Fingerprint,
})
}
return auditResultResponse{
SkillName: result.SkillName,
Kind: result.Kind,
Findings: findings,
RiskScore: result.RiskScore,
RiskLabel: result.RiskLabel,
Threshold: result.Threshold,
IsBlocked: result.IsBlocked,
ScanTarget: result.ScanTarget,
TotalBytes: result.TotalBytes,
AuditableBytes: result.AuditableBytes,
Analyzability: result.Analyzability,
TierProfile: result.TierProfile,
}
}