mirror of
https://github.com/runkids/skillshare.git
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* fix(update): audit tracked candidates before publication Prevent rejected tracked-update bytes from becoming readable through published target links by staging and auditing a private candidate before updating the active checkout. Publish the exact approved revision without a second upstream pull. Preserve sparse state, audit metadata, followed checkouts, and compatible edits. Recover staged and unstaged changes after failed forced publication, including deletions, renames, and sparse exclusions. Cover the boundary deterministically and align error messages and localized documentation. * fix(update): preserve local bytes across Git line-ending conversion Overlay dirty worktree bytes after staging candidate patches so core.autocrlf does not silently rewrite local edits. Cover staged, unstaged, and cancelled worktree changes while retaining their index state. Make permission-failure coverage explicitly POSIX-only and compare private checkout contents to their original bytes. Align red-team assertions with candidate rejection and register private temporary cleanup with the raw-write guard. * test(install): normalize checkout after configuring line endings Windows fixtures initially inherit core.autocrlf=true. Reset the isolated checkout after selecting the subtest setting so changing it to false does not turn untouched upstream files into local edits.
554 lines
19 KiB
Go
554 lines
19 KiB
Go
package install
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"skillshare/internal/audit"
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"skillshare/internal/sourcewalk"
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)
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// Audit rollback resets the whole checkout, so followed user repositories
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// must be clean before pulling even when their edits do not conflict upstream.
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func checkFollowedCheckoutClean(repoPath string, opts InstallOptions) error {
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checkout, followed := opts.SourceFollow.Resolve(repoPath)
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if !followed {
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return nil
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}
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status, err := gitOutput(checkout, "status", "--porcelain")
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("cannot check Git status of followed checkout %s; resolve the status error and commit or stash changes before updating: %w", checkout, err)
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}
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if status != "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("uncommitted changes in followed checkout %s: commit or stash them before updating", checkout)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// auditInstalledResource runs the audit gate shared by skill and agent installs.
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// scan performs the actual scan; cleanupOnBlock removes the installed artifact
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// when findings at/above threshold fire and --force is not set.
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func auditInstalledResource(
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destPath string,
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result *InstallResult,
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opts InstallOptions,
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scan func() (*audit.Result, error),
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cleanupOnBlock func() error,
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) error {
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if opts.SkipAudit {
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result.AuditSkipped = true
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result.AuditThreshold = opts.AuditThreshold
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result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, "audit skipped (--skip-audit)")
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return nil
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}
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threshold, err := audit.NormalizeThreshold(opts.AuditThreshold)
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if err != nil {
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threshold = audit.DefaultThreshold()
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}
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result.AuditThreshold = threshold
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scanResult, err := scan()
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if err != nil {
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// Non-fatal: warn but don't block
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result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, fmt.Sprintf("audit scan error: %v", err))
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return nil
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}
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result.AuditRiskScore = scanResult.RiskScore
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result.AuditRiskLabel = scanResult.RiskLabel
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if result.AuditRiskLabel == "" && len(scanResult.Findings) == 0 {
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result.AuditRiskLabel = "CLEAN"
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}
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scanResult.Threshold = threshold
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acceptRoot, acceptPath := opts.auditAcceptTarget(destPath)
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ApplyAcceptedFindings(acceptRoot, acceptPath, scanResult)
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scanResult.IsBlocked = scanResult.HasSeverityAtOrAbove(threshold)
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if len(scanResult.Findings) == 0 {
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return nil
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}
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for _, f := range scanResult.Findings {
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msg := fmt.Sprintf("audit %s: %s (%s:%d)", f.Severity, f.Message, f.File, f.Line)
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if f.Acknowledged {
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msg += " (accepted earlier)"
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}
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if f.Snippet != "" {
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msg += fmt.Sprintf("\n %q", f.Snippet)
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}
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result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, msg)
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}
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if scanResult.IsBlocked && !opts.AuditOverride {
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details := blockedFindingDetails(scanResult.Findings, threshold)
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if cleanupErr := cleanupOnBlock(); cleanupErr != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"security audit failed — findings at/above %s detected:\n%s\n\nAutomatic cleanup failed for %s: %v\nManual removal is required: %w",
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threshold,
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strings.Join(details, "\n"),
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destPath,
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cleanupErr,
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audit.ErrBlocked,
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)
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}
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"security audit failed — findings at/above %s detected:\n%s\n\nUse --force to override or --skip-audit to bypass scanning: %w",
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threshold,
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strings.Join(details, "\n"),
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audit.ErrBlocked,
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)
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}
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if scanResult.IsBlocked && opts.AuditOverride {
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result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings,
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fmt.Sprintf("audit findings at/above block threshold (%s); proceeding due to --force", threshold))
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result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, recordAcceptedWarning(acceptRoot, acceptPath, scanResult, threshold)...)
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} else if !scanResult.IsBlocked {
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result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings,
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fmt.Sprintf("audit findings detected, but none at/above block threshold (%s)", threshold))
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}
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return nil
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}
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func auditInstalledSkill(destPath string, result *InstallResult, opts InstallOptions) error {
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scan := func() (*audit.Result, error) {
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if opts.AuditProjectRoot != "" {
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return audit.ScanSkillForProject(destPath, opts.AuditProjectRoot, opts.SourceFollow)
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}
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return audit.ScanSkillWithFollow(destPath, opts.SourceFollow)
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}
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cleanup := func() error { return removeAll(destPath) }
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return auditInstalledResource(destPath, result, opts, scan, cleanup)
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}
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func auditInstalledAgent(destFile string, result *InstallResult, opts InstallOptions) error {
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scan := func() (*audit.Result, error) {
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if opts.AuditProjectRoot != "" {
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return audit.ScanFileForProject(destFile, opts.AuditProjectRoot)
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}
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return audit.ScanFile(destFile)
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}
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// Agents are single .md files. After removing the file, walk up any
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// newly-empty parent directories (e.g. into-subdir) so a blocked install
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// leaves nothing behind.
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cleanup := func() error {
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if err := removeAll(destFile); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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cleanEmptyInstallParents(destFile, opts.SourceDir)
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return nil
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}
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return auditInstalledResource(destFile, result, opts, scan, cleanup)
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}
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func cleanEmptyInstallParents(path, stopAt string) {
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stopAt = filepath.Clean(stopAt)
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dir := filepath.Dir(filepath.Clean(path))
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for dir != stopAt && dir != "." && dir != "/" {
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entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
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if err != nil || len(entries) > 0 {
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break
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}
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_ = os.Remove(dir)
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dir = filepath.Dir(dir)
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}
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}
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// auditTrackedRepo scans an entire tracked repo directory for security threats.
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// It blocks installation when findings are at or above configured threshold
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// unless force is enabled. On block, the repo directory is removed.
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func auditTrackedRepo(repoPath string, result *TrackedRepoResult, opts InstallOptions) error {
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if opts.SkipAudit {
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result.AuditSkipped = true
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result.AuditThreshold = opts.AuditThreshold
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result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, "audit skipped (--skip-audit)")
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return nil
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}
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threshold, err := audit.NormalizeThreshold(opts.AuditThreshold)
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if err != nil {
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threshold = audit.DefaultThreshold()
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}
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result.AuditThreshold = threshold
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var scanResult *audit.Result
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if opts.AuditProjectRoot != "" {
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scanResult, err = audit.ScanSkillForProject(repoPath, opts.AuditProjectRoot, opts.SourceFollow)
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} else {
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scanResult, err = audit.ScanSkillWithFollow(repoPath, opts.SourceFollow)
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}
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if err != nil {
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result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, fmt.Sprintf("audit scan error: %v", err))
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return nil
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}
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result.AuditRiskScore = scanResult.RiskScore
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result.AuditRiskLabel = scanResult.RiskLabel
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if result.AuditRiskLabel == "" && len(scanResult.Findings) == 0 {
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result.AuditRiskLabel = "CLEAN"
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}
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scanResult.Threshold = threshold
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acceptRoot, acceptPath := opts.auditAcceptTarget(repoPath)
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ApplyAcceptedFindings(acceptRoot, acceptPath, scanResult)
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scanResult.IsBlocked = scanResult.HasSeverityAtOrAbove(threshold)
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if len(scanResult.Findings) == 0 {
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return nil
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}
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for _, f := range scanResult.Findings {
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msg := fmt.Sprintf("audit %s: %s (%s:%d)", f.Severity, f.Message, f.File, f.Line)
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if f.Acknowledged {
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msg += " (accepted earlier)"
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}
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if f.Snippet != "" {
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msg += fmt.Sprintf("\n %q", f.Snippet)
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}
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result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, msg)
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}
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if scanResult.IsBlocked && !opts.AuditOverride {
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details := blockedFindingDetails(scanResult.Findings, threshold)
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if removeErr := removeAll(repoPath); removeErr != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"security audit failed — findings at/above %s detected in tracked repository:\n%s\n\nAutomatic cleanup failed for %s: %v\nManual removal is required: %w",
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threshold,
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strings.Join(details, "\n"),
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repoPath,
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removeErr,
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audit.ErrBlocked,
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)
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}
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"security audit failed — findings at/above %s detected in tracked repository:\n%s\n\nUse --force to override or --skip-audit to bypass scanning: %w",
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threshold,
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strings.Join(details, "\n"),
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audit.ErrBlocked,
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)
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}
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if scanResult.IsBlocked && opts.AuditOverride {
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result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings,
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fmt.Sprintf("audit findings at/above block threshold (%s); proceeding due to --force", threshold))
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result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, recordAcceptedWarning(acceptRoot, acceptPath, scanResult, threshold)...)
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} else if !scanResult.IsBlocked {
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result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings,
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fmt.Sprintf("audit findings detected, but none at/above block threshold (%s)", threshold))
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}
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return nil
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}
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// RollbackState says what the audit gate did to the checkout when it blocked.
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type RollbackState int
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const (
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// RolledBack means the checkout is back at the pre-pull commit.
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RolledBack RollbackState = iota
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// RollbackUnavailable means no pre-pull commit was known.
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RollbackUnavailable
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// RollbackFailed means the reset failed and pulled content may remain.
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RollbackFailed
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// CheckoutUnchanged means only an isolated candidate was changed.
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CheckoutUnchanged
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)
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// AuditGate is the fail-closed audit of a git checkout that has just been
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// pulled. A candidate is discarded on block; a live checkout is reset.
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type AuditGate struct {
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SourceDir string // root the accepted findings are stored under
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RepoPath string
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AcceptPath string // path the accepted findings are keyed on; RepoPath when empty
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BeforeHash string // pre-pull commit; without it nothing is let through
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Candidate bool // isolated checkout: rejection must not reset the live repo
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Threshold string
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ProjectRoot string // non-empty scans with the project's audit rules
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Follow *sourcewalk.Follow
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// Override lets findings at/above the threshold through (--force). A scan
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// that could not run stays blocked: "I accept these findings" is not the
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// same as "I could not be told any".
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Override bool
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// Confirm is asked once when findings would block and Override is unset.
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// Nil, false or an error blocks.
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Confirm func(*AuditGateResult) (bool, error)
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}
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// AuditGateResult is what the scan found. It is also returned next to an
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// *AuditGateError when findings blocked.
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type AuditGateResult struct {
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Audit *audit.Result
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Threshold string // normalized
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AcceptedSkipped int // findings an earlier override accepted
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Overridden bool // blocking findings were let through
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}
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// AuditGateError reports a blocked update. It wraps audit.ErrBlocked.
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type AuditGateError struct {
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ScanErr error // the scan could not run; nil when findings blocked
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Threshold string
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BeforeHash string
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Rollback RollbackState
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ResetErr error // set when Rollback is RollbackFailed
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}
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// RollbackNote describes the state of the checkout after the block.
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func (e *AuditGateError) RollbackNote() string {
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switch e.Rollback {
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case CheckoutUnchanged:
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return "candidate rejected; checkout unchanged"
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case RollbackUnavailable:
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return "rollback commit unavailable, update aborted and repository state is unknown"
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case RollbackFailed:
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return fmt.Sprintf("WARNING: rollback also failed: %v — malicious content may remain", e.ResetErr)
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}
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return "rolled back"
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}
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func (e *AuditGateError) Error() string {
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return e.message("security audit failed") + ": " + audit.ErrBlocked.Error()
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}
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// message words the block starting with subject, e.g. "security audit failed".
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func (e *AuditGateError) message(subject string) string {
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head := fmt.Sprintf("%s — findings at/above %s detected", subject, e.Threshold)
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if e.ScanErr != nil {
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head = fmt.Sprintf("%s: %v", subject, e.ScanErr)
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}
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switch e.Rollback {
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case CheckoutUnchanged:
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return head + " — " + e.RollbackNote() + " (use --skip-audit to bypass)"
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case RollbackUnavailable:
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return subject + " — " + e.RollbackNote()
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case RollbackFailed:
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return head + "; " + e.RollbackNote()
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}
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return head + " — rolled back (use --skip-audit to bypass)"
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}
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func (e *AuditGateError) Unwrap() error { return audit.ErrBlocked }
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// Run scans the checkout and decides whether the pulled content stays.
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func (g AuditGate) Run() (*AuditGateResult, error) {
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threshold, err := audit.NormalizeThreshold(g.Threshold)
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if err != nil {
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threshold = audit.DefaultThreshold()
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}
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if g.BeforeHash == "" {
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return nil, &AuditGateError{Threshold: threshold, Rollback: RollbackUnavailable}
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}
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acceptPath := g.AcceptPath
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if acceptPath == "" {
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acceptPath = g.RepoPath
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}
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if g.Candidate {
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if err := prepareCandidateAudit(g.SourceDir, acceptPath, g.RepoPath); err != nil {
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return nil, g.block(&AuditGateError{ScanErr: err, Threshold: threshold})
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}
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}
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var scanResult *audit.Result
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if g.ProjectRoot != "" {
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scanResult, err = audit.ScanSkillForProject(g.RepoPath, g.ProjectRoot, g.Follow)
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} else {
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scanResult, err = audit.ScanSkillWithFollow(g.RepoPath, g.Follow)
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, g.block(&AuditGateError{ScanErr: err, Threshold: threshold})
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}
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res := &AuditGateResult{Audit: scanResult, Threshold: threshold}
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res.AcceptedSkipped = ApplyAcceptedFindings(g.SourceDir, acceptPath, scanResult)
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if !scanResult.HasSeverityAtOrAbove(threshold) {
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return res, nil
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}
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if g.Override {
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res.Overridden = true
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return res, nil
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}
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var confirmErr error
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if g.Confirm != nil {
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ok, err := g.Confirm(res)
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if err == nil && ok {
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res.Overridden = true
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return res, nil
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}
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confirmErr = err
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}
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blocked := g.block(&AuditGateError{Threshold: threshold})
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if confirmErr != nil {
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return res, fmt.Errorf("%w (confirmation failed: %v)", blocked, confirmErr)
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}
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return res, blocked
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}
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// block rejects a candidate or resets a live checkout, and records the outcome.
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func (g AuditGate) block(e *AuditGateError) *AuditGateError {
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e.BeforeHash = g.BeforeHash
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if g.Candidate {
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e.Rollback = CheckoutUnchanged
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return e
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}
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if err := gitResetHard(g.RepoPath, g.BeforeHash); err != nil {
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e.Rollback, e.ResetErr = RollbackFailed, err
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}
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return e
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}
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// blockedDetailsError lists the blocked findings and names the override flags.
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func blockedDetailsError(e *AuditGateError, res *AuditGateResult, subject string) error {
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note := "rolled back to " + shortHash(e.BeforeHash)
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if e.Rollback == CheckoutUnchanged {
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note = e.RollbackNote()
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}
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return fmt.Errorf(
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"%s (%s):\n%s\n\nUse --force to override or --skip-audit to bypass scanning: %w",
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subject,
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note,
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strings.Join(blockedFindingDetails(res.Audit.Findings, e.Threshold), "\n"),
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audit.ErrBlocked,
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)
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}
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// auditGateFailClosed gates a pulled non-tracked skill checkout (update and
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// relock). The dashboard reads "post-update audit failed" as "force will not
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// help", so this wording stays separate from AuditGateError's.
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func auditGateFailClosed(sourceDir, repoPath, beforeHash, threshold, projectRoot string, auditOverride bool, follow ...*sourcewalk.Follow) (*audit.Result, error) {
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gate := AuditGate{
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SourceDir: sourceDir,
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RepoPath: repoPath,
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BeforeHash: beforeHash,
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Threshold: threshold,
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ProjectRoot: projectRoot,
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Override: auditOverride,
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}
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if len(follow) > 0 {
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gate.Follow = follow[0]
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}
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res, err := gate.Run()
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var blocked *AuditGateError
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switch {
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case err == nil:
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return res.Audit, nil
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case !errors.As(err, &blocked):
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return nil, err
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case blocked.ScanErr != nil || blocked.Rollback == RollbackUnavailable:
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", blocked.message("post-update audit failed"), audit.ErrBlocked)
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case blocked.Rollback == RolledBack:
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return nil, blockedDetailsError(blocked, res,
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fmt.Sprintf("post-update audit failed — findings at/above %s detected", blocked.Threshold))
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}
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("post-update audit found findings at/above %s; %s: %w", blocked.Threshold, blocked.RollbackNote(), audit.ErrBlocked)
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}
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// auditTrackedRepoUpdate audits an isolated candidate and publishes only its
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// approved revision. Accepted findings are recorded only after publication.
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func auditTrackedRepoUpdate(candidate *GitUpdateCandidate, result *TrackedRepoResult, opts InstallOptions) error {
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repoPath, beforeHash := candidate.Path, candidate.BeforeHash
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revision, err := getGitFullHash(repoPath)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if opts.SkipAudit {
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result.AuditSkipped = true
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result.AuditThreshold = opts.AuditThreshold
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result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, "audit skipped (--skip-audit)")
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return candidate.Publish(revision)
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}
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if opts.OnProgress != nil {
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opts.OnProgress("Auditing update candidate...")
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}
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acceptRoot, acceptPath := opts.auditAcceptTarget(candidate.repoPath)
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res, err := AuditGate{
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SourceDir: acceptRoot,
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RepoPath: repoPath,
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AcceptPath: acceptPath,
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BeforeHash: beforeHash,
|
|
Candidate: true,
|
|
Threshold: opts.AuditThreshold,
|
|
ProjectRoot: opts.AuditProjectRoot,
|
|
Follow: opts.SourceFollow,
|
|
Override: opts.AuditOverride,
|
|
}.Run()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
var blocked *AuditGateError
|
|
// The CLI reads "tracked repository" from these to word its summary.
|
|
if errors.As(err, &blocked) && blocked.ScanErr == nil && blocked.Rollback == CheckoutUnchanged {
|
|
return blockedDetailsError(blocked, res,
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("security audit failed — findings at/above %s detected in tracked repository", blocked.Threshold))
|
|
}
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := candidate.Publish(revision); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to publish audited update: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
threshold, scanResult := res.Threshold, res.Audit
|
|
result.AuditThreshold = threshold
|
|
result.AuditRiskScore = scanResult.RiskScore
|
|
result.AuditRiskLabel = scanResult.RiskLabel
|
|
if result.AuditRiskLabel == "" && len(scanResult.Findings) == 0 {
|
|
result.AuditRiskLabel = "CLEAN"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(scanResult.Findings) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, f := range scanResult.Findings {
|
|
msg := fmt.Sprintf("audit %s: %s (%s:%d)", f.Severity, f.Message, f.File, f.Line)
|
|
if f.Acknowledged {
|
|
msg += " (accepted earlier)"
|
|
}
|
|
if f.Snippet != "" {
|
|
msg += fmt.Sprintf("\n %q", f.Snippet)
|
|
}
|
|
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if res.Overridden {
|
|
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings,
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("audit findings at/above block threshold (%s); proceeding due to --force", threshold))
|
|
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings, recordAcceptedWarning(acceptRoot, acceptPath, scanResult, threshold)...)
|
|
} else {
|
|
result.Warnings = append(result.Warnings,
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("audit findings detected, but none at/above block threshold (%s)", threshold))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// recordAcceptedWarning persists the findings a --force override just accepted
|
|
// and returns a warning line describing the outcome.
|
|
func recordAcceptedWarning(sourceDir, path string, res *audit.Result, threshold string) []string {
|
|
n, err := RecordAcceptedFindings(sourceDir, path, res, threshold)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return []string{fmt.Sprintf("failed to record accepted findings: %v", err)}
|
|
}
|
|
if n == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return []string{fmt.Sprintf("recorded %d accepted finding(s); future updates won't block on them", n)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func blockedFindingDetails(findings []audit.Finding, threshold string) []string {
|
|
var details []string
|
|
for _, f := range findings {
|
|
if f.Acknowledged {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if audit.SeverityRank(f.Severity) <= audit.SeverityRank(threshold) {
|
|
detail := fmt.Sprintf(" %s: %s (%s:%d)", f.Severity, f.Message, f.File, f.Line)
|
|
if f.Snippet != "" {
|
|
detail += fmt.Sprintf("\n %q", f.Snippet)
|
|
}
|
|
details = append(details, detail)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return details
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// isGitInstalled checks if git command is available
|