Files
skillshare/internal/server/handler_audit.go
Willie 9dbcd925d8 feat(audit): honor findings accepted with --force via --respect-accepted (#872)
* feat(audit): honor findings accepted with --force via --respect-accepted

install and update --force record the findings a user accepted in
audit_accepted, but audit ignored that record. A skill installed with
--force therefore kept failing `skillshare audit` in CI with no way to
let the accepted findings pass (#869).

audit --respect-accepted marks those findings as acknowledged. They stay
in every output (JSON acknowledged: true, a text/TUI note, "(accepted
earlier)" in Markdown, SARIF external suppressions), but they are counted
in summary.accepted instead of their severity and no longer fail the
audit. Without the flag nothing changes, so existing CI gates keep their
behavior. A changed file or snippet produces a new key and blocks again.

Tracked repositories record acceptances at the repo root with paths
relative to it, so ApplyAcceptedFindings walks up from each skill to
match them. The install, update and edit gates use the same function and
now honor repo-wide acceptances for skills inside tracked repos too.

The dashboard always honors accepted findings: the Audit page mutes them
and counts them apart, the skill Audit tab collapses them, and the
Dashboard attention card no longer lists a skill whose only blocking
findings were accepted. The CLI JSON summary and the server summary share
Result.CountOpenBySeverity so both count accepted findings the same way.
The oplog records the accepted count and the log views show it.

* fix(audit): match acceptances when a single file is scanned

A single-file scan names its findings by the file's base name, but the
ancestor lookup used the file's whole path as the prefix, so it hashed
SKILL.md/SKILL.md instead of the recorded SKILL.md. Auditing a skill file
directly with --respect-accepted, and auditing agents inside a tracked
repository in the CLI or the dashboard, still failed on unchanged
accepted findings. For a file target the prefix is now the file's own
directory.
2026-11-12 11:15:44 +08:00

876 lines
24 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"slices"
"time"
"skillshare/internal/audit"
"skillshare/internal/install"
"skillshare/internal/resource"
"skillshare/internal/sourcewalk"
"skillshare/internal/sync"
)
type auditFindingResponse struct {
Severity string `json:"severity"`
Pattern string `json:"pattern"`
Message string `json:"message"`
File string `json:"file"`
Line int `json:"line"`
Snippet string `json:"snippet"`
// Phase 2 fields — analyzer traceability and deduplication.
RuleID string `json:"ruleId,omitempty"`
Analyzer string `json:"analyzer,omitempty"`
Category string `json:"category,omitempty"`
Confidence float64 `json:"confidence,omitempty"`
Fingerprint string `json:"fingerprint,omitempty"`
SeverityContext string `json:"severityContext,omitempty"`
Acknowledged bool `json:"acknowledged,omitempty"` // accepted earlier with --force; does not block
}
type auditResultResponse struct {
BinaryFiles int `json:"binaryFiles"`
SkippedFiles int `json:"skippedFiles"`
OversizedFiles int `json:"oversizedFiles"`
SkillName string `json:"skillName"`
Findings []auditFindingResponse `json:"findings"`
RiskScore int `json:"riskScore"`
RiskLabel string `json:"riskLabel"`
Threshold string `json:"threshold"`
IsBlocked bool `json:"isBlocked"`
ScanTarget string `json:"scanTarget,omitempty"`
TotalBytes int64 `json:"totalBytes"`
AuditableBytes int64 `json:"auditableBytes"`
Analyzability float64 `json:"analyzability"`
TierProfile audit.TierProfile `json:"tierProfile"`
Kind string `json:"kind,omitempty"`
}
type auditSummary struct {
BinaryFiles int `json:"binaryFiles"`
SkippedFiles int `json:"skippedFiles"`
OversizedFiles int `json:"oversizedFiles"`
Total int `json:"total"`
Passed int `json:"passed"`
Warning int `json:"warning"`
Failed int `json:"failed"`
Critical int `json:"critical"`
High int `json:"high"`
Medium int `json:"medium"`
Low int `json:"low"`
Info int `json:"info"`
Accepted int `json:"accepted,omitempty"` // accepted earlier with --force; left out of the severity counts
Threshold string `json:"threshold"`
RiskScore int `json:"riskScore"`
RiskLabel string `json:"riskLabel"`
ScanErrors int `json:"scanErrors,omitempty"`
AvgAnalyzability float64 `json:"avgAnalyzability"`
ByCategory map[string]int `json:"byCategory,omitempty"`
PolicyProfile string `json:"policyProfile,omitempty"`
PolicyDedupe string `json:"policyDedupe,omitempty"`
}
type skillEntry struct {
name string
path string
}
// discoverAuditAgents discovers agents (individual .md files) for audit scanning.
func discoverAuditAgents(source string) ([]skillEntry, error) {
if source == "" {
return []skillEntry{}, nil
}
if _, err := os.Stat(source); err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return []skillEntry{}, nil
}
return nil, err
}
discovered, err := resource.AgentKind{}.Discover(source)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var agents []skillEntry
for _, d := range discovered {
agents = append(agents, skillEntry{name: d.FlatName, path: d.AbsPath})
}
return agents, nil
}
// discoverAuditSkills discovers and deduplicates skills for audit scanning.
func discoverAuditSkills(source string, walk sourcewalk.Options) ([]skillEntry, error) {
if source == "" {
return []skillEntry{}, nil
}
if _, err := os.Stat(source); err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return []skillEntry{}, nil
}
return nil, err
}
discovered, err := sync.DiscoverSourceSkills(source, walk)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return []skillEntry{}, nil
}
return nil, err
}
seen := make(map[string]bool)
var skills []skillEntry
for _, d := range discovered {
if seen[d.SourcePath] {
continue
}
seen[d.SourcePath] = true
skills = append(skills, skillEntry{d.FlatName, d.SourcePath})
}
return skills, nil
}
// auditAggregation holds the aggregated audit results and summary.
type auditAggregation struct {
Results []auditResultResponse
Summary auditSummary
LogArgs map[string]any
Status string
Message string
}
// processAuditResults aggregates scan outputs into results, summary, and log args.
// projectRoot selects which audit-rules.yaml layers apply to cross-skill findings
// ("" = global mode). source is the root whose .metadata.json records the
// findings accepted earlier with --force.
func processAuditResults(skills []skillEntry, scanned []audit.ScanOutput, policy audit.Policy, projectRoot, source string) auditAggregation {
threshold := policy.Threshold
var results []auditResultResponse
var rawResults []*audit.Result
summary := auditSummary{
Total: len(skills),
Threshold: threshold,
}
criticalCount := 0
highCount := 0
mediumCount := 0
lowCount := 0
infoCount := 0
failedSkills := make([]string, 0)
warningSkills := make([]string, 0)
lowSkills := make([]string, 0)
infoSkills := make([]string, 0)
scanErrors := 0
maxRisk := 0
maxSeverity := ""
sumAnalyzability := 0.0
catCounts := make(map[string]int)
for i := range skills {
se := scanned[i]
if se.Err != nil {
scanErrors++
continue
}
result := se.Result
result.Threshold = threshold
install.ApplyAcceptedFindings(source, result.ScanTarget, result)
result.IsBlocked = result.HasSeverityAtOrAbove(threshold)
rawResults = append(rawResults, result)
resp := toAuditResponse(result)
results = append(results, resp)
if len(result.Findings) == 0 {
summary.Passed++
} else if result.IsBlocked {
summary.Failed++
failedSkills = append(failedSkills, result.SkillName)
} else {
summary.Warning++
warningSkills = append(warningSkills, result.SkillName)
}
c, h, m, l, i, accepted := result.CountOpenBySeverity()
summary.Accepted += accepted
criticalCount += c
highCount += h
mediumCount += m
lowCount += l
infoCount += i
for cat, n := range result.CountByCategory() {
catCounts[cat] += n
}
if l > 0 {
lowSkills = append(lowSkills, result.SkillName)
}
if i > 0 {
infoSkills = append(infoSkills, result.SkillName)
}
if result.RiskScore > maxRisk {
maxRisk = result.RiskScore
}
if ms := result.MaxSeverity(); ms != "" {
if maxSeverity == "" || audit.SeverityRank(ms) < audit.SeverityRank(maxSeverity) {
maxSeverity = ms
}
}
sumAnalyzability += result.Analyzability
summary.BinaryFiles += result.BinaryFiles
summary.SkippedFiles += result.SkippedFiles
summary.OversizedFiles += result.OversizedFiles
}
status := "ok"
msg := ""
if summary.Failed > 0 {
status = "blocked"
msg = "findings at/above threshold detected"
}
summary.Critical = criticalCount
summary.High = highCount
summary.Medium = mediumCount
summary.Low = lowCount
summary.Info = infoCount
summary.ScanErrors = scanErrors
summary.RiskScore = maxRisk
summary.RiskLabel = audit.RiskLabelFromScoreAndMaxSeverity(maxRisk, maxSeverity)
if len(results) > 0 {
summary.AvgAnalyzability = sumAnalyzability / float64(len(results))
}
summary.PolicyProfile = string(policy.Profile)
summary.PolicyDedupe = string(policy.DedupeMode)
if len(catCounts) > 0 {
summary.ByCategory = catCounts
}
args := map[string]any{
"scope": "all",
"mode": "ui",
"threshold": threshold,
"scanned": summary.Total,
"passed": summary.Passed,
"warning": summary.Warning,
"failed": summary.Failed,
"critical": criticalCount,
"high": highCount,
"medium": mediumCount,
"low": lowCount,
"info": infoCount,
"risk_score": summary.RiskScore,
"risk_label": summary.RiskLabel,
"scan_errors": scanErrors,
}
if summary.Accepted > 0 {
args["accepted"] = summary.Accepted
}
if len(failedSkills) > 0 {
args["failed_skills"] = failedSkills
}
if len(warningSkills) > 0 {
args["warning_skills"] = warningSkills
}
if len(lowSkills) > 0 {
args["low_skills"] = lowSkills
}
if len(infoSkills) > 0 {
args["info_skills"] = infoSkills
}
// Cross-skill analysis (after summary so counts are unaffected).
disabled := audit.DisabledRuleIDs()
if projectRoot != "" {
disabled = audit.DisabledRuleIDsForProject(projectRoot)
}
if xr := audit.CrossSkillAnalysis(rawResults, disabled); xr != nil {
results = append(results, toAuditResponse(xr))
}
return auditAggregation{
Results: results,
Summary: summary,
LogArgs: args,
Status: status,
Message: msg,
}
}
// resolveAuditSource returns the source directory, result kind label, and whether agents are being scanned.
func (s *Server) resolveAuditSource(r *http.Request) (string, string, bool) {
kind := r.URL.Query().Get("kind")
if kind == "agents" {
return s.agentsSource(), "agent", true
}
return s.cfg.EffectiveSkillsSource(), "skill", false
}
func (s *Server) handleAuditAll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Snapshot config under RLock, then release before I/O.
s.mu.RLock()
source, resultKind, isAgents := s.resolveAuditSource(r)
policy := s.auditPolicy()
projectRoot := s.projectRoot
cfgPath := s.configPath()
s.mu.RUnlock()
isProjectMode := projectRoot != ""
start := time.Now()
walk := s.skillsWalk()
var skills []skillEntry
var err error
if isAgents {
skills, err = discoverAuditAgents(source)
} else {
skills, err = discoverAuditSkills(source, walk)
}
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
auditProjectRoot := projectRoot
if !isProjectMode {
auditProjectRoot = ""
}
var inputs []audit.SkillInput
if isAgents {
inputs = make([]audit.SkillInput, len(skills))
for i, s := range skills {
inputs[i] = audit.SkillInput{Name: s.name, Path: s.path, IsFile: true}
}
} else {
inputs = skillsToAuditInputs(skills)
}
scanned := audit.ParallelScan(inputs, auditProjectRoot, nil, nil, walk.Follow)
agg := processAuditResults(skills, scanned, policy, auditProjectRoot, source)
for i := range agg.Results {
agg.Results[i].Kind = resultKind
}
writeAuditLogTo(cfgPath, agg.Status, start, agg.LogArgs, agg.Message)
writeJSON(w, withSourceLinkStatus(map[string]any{
"results": agg.Results,
"summary": agg.Summary,
}, walk))
}
// withSourceLinkStatus adds the source links walk did not follow, as
// `skillshare audit --format json` does, so the dashboard does not show a
// partial scan as a full one.
func withSourceLinkStatus(payload map[string]any, walk sourcewalk.Options) map[string]any {
if warnings := sync.SourceLinkWarnings(walk, false); len(warnings) > 0 {
payload["warnings"] = warnings
}
if walk.Follow.Incomplete() {
payload["incomplete"] = true
}
return payload
}
func (s *Server) handleAuditSkill(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Snapshot config under RLock, then release before I/O.
s.mu.RLock()
source := s.cfg.EffectiveSkillsSource()
agentsSource := s.agentsSource()
policy := s.auditPolicy()
projectRoot := s.projectRoot
cfgPath := s.configPath()
s.mu.RUnlock()
isProjectMode := projectRoot != ""
start := time.Now()
name := r.PathValue("name")
kind := r.URL.Query().Get("kind")
threshold := policy.Threshold
var (
result *audit.Result
err error
)
if kind == "agent" {
// Resolve agent file path via discovery
var agentPath string
if agentsSource != "" {
discovered, _ := resource.AgentKind{}.Discover(agentsSource)
for _, d := range discovered {
if d.FlatName == name || d.Name == name {
agentPath = d.AbsPath
break
}
}
}
if agentPath == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "agent not found: "+name)
return
}
if isProjectMode {
result, err = audit.ScanFileForProject(agentPath, projectRoot)
} else {
result, err = audit.ScanFile(agentPath)
}
} else {
if !validSourceName(name) {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid skill name: "+name)
return
}
skillPath := filepath.Join(source, name)
if _, statErr := os.Stat(skillPath); os.IsNotExist(statErr) {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "skill not found: "+name)
return
}
if isProjectMode {
result, err = audit.ScanSkillForProject(skillPath, projectRoot, s.skillsWalk().Follow)
} else {
result, err = audit.ScanSkillWithFollow(skillPath, s.skillsWalk().Follow)
}
}
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
result.Threshold = threshold
if kind == "agent" {
install.ApplyAcceptedFindings(agentsSource, result.ScanTarget, result)
} else {
install.ApplyAcceptedFindings(source, result.ScanTarget, result)
}
result.IsBlocked = result.HasSeverityAtOrAbove(threshold)
c, h, m, l, i, accepted := result.CountOpenBySeverity()
warningCount := 0
failedCount := 0
failedSkills := []string{}
warningSkills := []string{}
lowSkills := []string{}
infoSkills := []string{}
if len(result.Findings) == 0 {
// no-op
} else if result.IsBlocked {
failedCount = 1
failedSkills = append(failedSkills, result.SkillName)
} else {
warningCount = 1
warningSkills = append(warningSkills, result.SkillName)
}
if l > 0 {
lowSkills = append(lowSkills, result.SkillName)
}
if i > 0 {
infoSkills = append(infoSkills, result.SkillName)
}
status := "ok"
msg := ""
if result.IsBlocked {
status = "blocked"
msg = "findings at/above threshold detected"
}
args := map[string]any{
"scope": "single",
"name": name,
"mode": "ui",
"threshold": threshold,
"scanned": 1,
"passed": boolToInt(len(result.Findings) == 0),
"warning": warningCount,
"failed": failedCount,
"critical": c,
"high": h,
"medium": m,
"low": l,
"info": i,
"risk_score": result.RiskScore,
"risk_label": result.RiskLabel,
}
if accepted > 0 {
args["accepted"] = accepted
}
if len(failedSkills) > 0 {
args["failed_skills"] = failedSkills
}
if len(warningSkills) > 0 {
args["warning_skills"] = warningSkills
}
if len(lowSkills) > 0 {
args["low_skills"] = lowSkills
}
if len(infoSkills) > 0 {
args["info_skills"] = infoSkills
}
writeAuditLogTo(cfgPath, status, start, args, msg)
singleCats := result.CountByCategory()
var byCat map[string]int
if len(singleCats) > 0 {
byCat = singleCats
}
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
"result": toAuditResponse(result),
"summary": auditSummary{
Total: 1,
Passed: boolToInt(len(result.Findings) == 0),
Warning: warningCount,
Failed: failedCount,
Critical: c,
High: h,
Medium: m,
Low: l,
Info: i,
Accepted: accepted,
Threshold: threshold,
RiskScore: result.RiskScore,
RiskLabel: result.RiskLabel,
AvgAnalyzability: result.Analyzability,
BinaryFiles: result.BinaryFiles,
SkippedFiles: result.SkippedFiles,
OversizedFiles: result.OversizedFiles,
ByCategory: byCat,
PolicyProfile: string(policy.Profile),
PolicyDedupe: string(policy.DedupeMode),
},
})
}
func boolToInt(v bool) int {
if v {
return 1
}
return 0
}
var auditProfiles = []string{string(audit.ProfileDefault), string(audit.ProfileStrict), string(audit.ProfilePermissive)}
// handleAuditPolicy — PATCH /api/audit/policy
// Sets the severity at which install and sync refuse a resource, and the profile
// that presets how strict a scan is. Each field is optional; only what is sent changes.
func (s *Server) handleAuditPolicy(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
start := time.Now()
var body struct {
BlockThreshold string `json:"blockThreshold"`
Profile string `json:"profile"`
}
if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &body, defaultJSONBodyLimit); err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, errBodyTooLarge) {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body: "+err.Error())
}
return
}
if body.BlockThreshold == "" && body.Profile == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "blockThreshold or profile is required")
return
}
var threshold string
if body.BlockThreshold != "" {
var err error
if threshold, err = audit.NormalizeThreshold(body.BlockThreshold); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid blockThreshold: "+err.Error())
return
}
}
if body.Profile != "" && !slices.Contains(auditProfiles, body.Profile) {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid profile: "+body.Profile)
return
}
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
cfg := &s.cfg.Audit
if s.IsProjectMode() {
cfg = &s.projectCfg.Audit
}
if threshold != "" {
cfg.BlockThreshold = threshold
}
if body.Profile != "" {
cfg.Profile = body.Profile
}
if err := s.saveConfig(); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to save config: "+err.Error())
return
}
args := map[string]any{"scope": "ui"}
if threshold != "" {
args["block_threshold"] = threshold
}
if body.Profile != "" {
args["profile"] = body.Profile
}
s.writeOpsLog("audit-policy", "ok", start, args, "")
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"threshold": cfg.BlockThreshold, "profile": cfg.Profile})
}
func (s *Server) auditPolicy() audit.Policy {
var in audit.PolicyInputs
in.ConfigThreshold = s.cfg.Audit.BlockThreshold
in.ConfigProfile = s.cfg.Audit.Profile
in.ConfigDedupe = s.cfg.Audit.DedupeMode
in.ConfigAnalyzers = s.cfg.Audit.EnabledAnalyzers
if s.IsProjectMode() && s.projectCfg != nil {
if s.projectCfg.Audit.BlockThreshold != "" {
in.ConfigThreshold = s.projectCfg.Audit.BlockThreshold
}
if s.projectCfg.Audit.Profile != "" {
in.ConfigProfile = s.projectCfg.Audit.Profile
}
if s.projectCfg.Audit.DedupeMode != "" {
in.ConfigDedupe = s.projectCfg.Audit.DedupeMode
}
if len(s.projectCfg.Audit.EnabledAnalyzers) > 0 {
in.ConfigAnalyzers = s.projectCfg.Audit.EnabledAnalyzers
}
}
return audit.ResolvePolicy(in)
}
func (s *Server) auditThreshold() string {
return s.auditPolicy().Threshold
}
// auditRulesPath returns the correct audit-rules.yaml path for the current mode.
func (s *Server) auditRulesPath() string {
if s.IsProjectMode() {
return audit.ProjectAuditRulesPath(s.projectRoot)
}
return audit.GlobalAuditRulesPath()
}
func (s *Server) handleGetAuditRules(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Snapshot config under RLock, then release before I/O.
s.mu.RLock()
path := s.auditRulesPath()
s.mu.RUnlock()
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
"exists": false,
"raw": "",
"path": path,
})
return
}
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to read rules: "+err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
"exists": true,
"raw": string(data),
"path": path,
})
}
func (s *Server) handlePutAuditRules(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
var body struct {
Raw string `json:"raw"`
}
if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &body, defaultJSONBodyLimit); err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, errBodyTooLarge) {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid JSON body")
}
return
}
if err := audit.ValidateRulesYAML(body.Raw); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid rules: "+err.Error())
return
}
path := s.auditRulesPath()
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0755); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "create directory: "+err.Error())
return
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(body.Raw), 0644); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to write rules: "+err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"success": true})
}
func (s *Server) handleInitAuditRules(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
path := s.auditRulesPath()
if err := audit.InitRulesFile(path); err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
// File already exists → 409 Conflict
if _, statErr := os.Stat(path); statErr == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "rules file already exists: "+path)
return
}
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
"success": true,
"path": path,
})
}
func (s *Server) handleGetCompiledRules(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Snapshot config under RLock, then release before I/O.
s.mu.RLock()
projectRoot := s.projectRoot
auditCfg := s.cfg.Audit
if s.IsProjectMode() {
auditCfg = s.projectCfg.Audit
}
s.mu.RUnlock()
isProjectMode := projectRoot != ""
policy := audit.ResolvePolicy(audit.PolicyInputs{ConfigProfile: auditCfg.Profile, ConfigThreshold: auditCfg.BlockThreshold, ConfigDedupe: auditCfg.DedupeMode})
var rules []audit.CompiledRule
var err error
if isProjectMode {
rules, err = audit.ListRulesWithProject(projectRoot)
} else {
rules, err = audit.ListRules()
}
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "list rules: "+err.Error())
return
}
patterns := audit.PatternSummary(rules)
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{
"rules": rules,
"patterns": patterns,
"profile": string(policy.Profile),
})
}
func (s *Server) handleToggleRule(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
var req struct {
ID string `json:"id,omitempty"`
Pattern string `json:"pattern,omitempty"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
Severity string `json:"severity,omitempty"`
}
if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req, defaultJSONBodyLimit); err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, errBodyTooLarge) {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
}
return
}
path := s.auditRulesPath()
var err error
// Severity override takes precedence when provided
if req.Severity != "" {
if req.Pattern != "" {
err = audit.SetPatternSeverity(path, req.Pattern, req.Severity)
} else if req.ID != "" {
err = audit.SetSeverity(path, req.ID, req.Severity)
} else {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "id or pattern required")
return
}
} else if req.Pattern != "" {
err = audit.TogglePattern(path, req.Pattern, req.Enabled)
} else if req.ID != "" {
err = audit.ToggleRule(path, req.ID, req.Enabled)
} else {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "id or pattern required")
return
}
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "toggle rule: "+err.Error())
return
}
audit.ResetGlobalCache()
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"success": true})
}
func (s *Server) handleResetRules(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
path := s.auditRulesPath()
if err := audit.ResetRules(path); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "reset rules: "+err.Error())
return
}
audit.ResetGlobalCache()
writeJSON(w, map[string]any{"success": true})
}
func skillsToAuditInputs(skills []skillEntry) []audit.SkillInput {
inputs := make([]audit.SkillInput, len(skills))
for i, s := range skills {
inputs[i] = audit.SkillInput{Name: s.name, Path: s.path}
}
return inputs
}
func toAuditResponse(result *audit.Result) auditResultResponse {
findings := make([]auditFindingResponse, 0, len(result.Findings))
for _, f := range result.Findings {
findings = append(findings, auditFindingResponse{
Severity: f.Severity,
Pattern: f.Pattern,
Message: f.Message,
File: f.File,
Line: f.Line,
Snippet: f.Snippet,
RuleID: f.RuleID,
Analyzer: f.Analyzer,
Category: f.Category,
Confidence: f.Confidence,
Fingerprint: f.Fingerprint,
SeverityContext: f.SeverityContext,
Acknowledged: f.Acknowledged,
})
}
return auditResultResponse{
BinaryFiles: result.BinaryFiles,
SkippedFiles: result.SkippedFiles,
OversizedFiles: result.OversizedFiles,
SkillName: result.SkillName,
Kind: result.Kind,
Findings: findings,
RiskScore: result.RiskScore,
RiskLabel: result.RiskLabel,
Threshold: result.Threshold,
IsBlocked: result.IsBlocked,
ScanTarget: result.ScanTarget,
TotalBytes: result.TotalBytes,
AuditableBytes: result.AuditableBytes,
Analyzability: result.Analyzability,
TierProfile: result.TierProfile,
}
}