package install import "testing" // SEC003: Subdir path traversal // Claim: GitHub URL subdir can contain .. for path traversal // Status: FIXED — validateRepoSubdir now rejects traversal func TestSecurity_ParseSource_SEC003_SubdirTraversal(t *testing.T) { traversalURLs := []struct { input string badSubdir string }{ {"github.com/owner/repo/../../etc/passwd", "../../etc/passwd"}, {"github.com/owner/repo/../../../etc/shadow", "../../../etc/shadow"}, {"https://github.com/owner/repo/../../etc/passwd", "../../etc/passwd"}, } for _, tc := range traversalURLs { t.Run(tc.input, func(t *testing.T) { _, err := ParseSourceWithOptions(tc.input, ParseOptions{}) if err == nil { t.Errorf("expected error for traversal subdir, input=%s", tc.input) } t.Logf("correctly rejected: input=%s err=%v", tc.input, err) }) } } // SEC003: Subdir null byte func TestSecurity_ParseSource_SEC003_SubdirNullByte(t *testing.T) { input := "github.com/owner/repo/path\x00/../../etc/passwd" _, err := ParseSourceWithOptions(input, ParseOptions{}) if err == nil { t.Errorf("expected error for null byte subdir, input=%s", input) } t.Logf("correctly rejected: err=%v", err) } // SEC003: URL-encoded traversal func TestSecurity_ParseSource_SEC003_SubdirEncodedTraversal(t *testing.T) { encodedURLs := []string{ "github.com/owner/repo/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd", "github.com/owner/repo/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd", } for _, input := range encodedURLs { t.Run(input, func(t *testing.T) { _, err := ParseSourceWithOptions(input, ParseOptions{}) if err == nil { t.Errorf("expected error for encoded traversal, input=%s", input) } t.Logf("correctly rejected: err=%v", err) }) } } // SEC003: Safe subdirs are still accepted func TestSecurity_ParseSource_SEC003_AllowsSafeSubdir(t *testing.T) { safeCases := []struct { input string wantSubdir string wantName string }{ // GitHub shorthand {"github.com/owner/repo/skills/frontend", "skills/frontend", "frontend"}, // GitHub web URL with tree/branch {"https://github.com/user/repo/tree/main/path/to/skill", "path/to/skill", "skill"}, // GitLab with nested groups and tree URL {"https://gitlab.com/group/subgroup/project/-/tree/main/skills/foo", "skills/foo", "foo"}, // Azure DevOps HTTPS {"https://dev.azure.com/org/project/_git/repo/skills/bar", "skills/bar", "bar"}, // Azure DevOps SSH (no subdir — single slash after repo is not subdir) {"git@ssh.dev.azure.com:v3/org/proj/repo", "", "repo"}, // Generic HTTPS (non-GitHub, non-GitLab) {"https://git.example.com/owner/repo/skills/foo", "skills/foo", "foo"}, // Generic HTTPS with subdir {"https://gitea.example.com/user/repo/sub/dir", "sub/dir", "dir"}, } for _, tc := range safeCases { t.Run(tc.input, func(t *testing.T) { source, err := ParseSourceWithOptions(tc.input, ParseOptions{}) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("unexpected error for safe subdir: %v", err) } if source.Subdir != tc.wantSubdir { t.Errorf("Subdir = %q, want %q", source.Subdir, tc.wantSubdir) } if source.Name != tc.wantName { t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", source.Name, tc.wantName) } }) } } // SEC003: Embedded traversal is not silently cleaned into a safe path func TestSecurity_ParseSource_SEC003_DoesNotSilentlyCleanTraversal(t *testing.T) { maliciousInputs := []string{ "github.com/owner/repo/a/../b", "github.com/owner/repo/skills/../../../etc", } for _, input := range maliciousInputs { t.Run(input, func(t *testing.T) { _, err := ParseSourceWithOptions(input, ParseOptions{}) if err == nil { t.Errorf("expected error for embedded traversal, input=%s", input) } }) } } // SEC003: Double-encoded traversal func TestSecurity_ParseSource_SEC003_DoubleEncodedTraversal(t *testing.T) { inputs := []string{ "github.com/owner/repo/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd", "github.com/owner/repo/..%252F..%252Fetc%252Fpasswd", } for _, input := range inputs { t.Run(input, func(t *testing.T) { _, err := ParseSourceWithOptions(input, ParseOptions{}) if err == nil { t.Errorf("expected error for double-encoded traversal: %s", input) } t.Logf("correctly rejected: err=%v", err) }) } } // SEC003: Overly deep URL encoding — still unstable after max decode rounds func TestSecurity_ParseSource_SEC003_RejectsTooDeeplyEncodedTraversal(t *testing.T) { inputs := []string{ "github.com/owner/repo/%252525252e%252525252e%252525252fetc/passwd", "github.com/owner/repo/%2525252e%2525252e%2525252fetc/passwd", } for _, input := range inputs { t.Run(input, func(t *testing.T) { _, err := ParseSourceWithOptions(input, ParseOptions{}) if err == nil { t.Errorf("expected error for deeply encoded traversal: %s", input) } t.Logf("correctly rejected: err=%v", err) }) } } // SEC003: Each parser branch must reject unsafe repo subdirs. func TestSecurity_ParseSource_SEC003_RejectsUnsafeSubdirAcrossParserBranches(t *testing.T) { unsafeCases := []struct { name string input string }{ { name: "git ssh scp-style", input: "git@example.com:owner/repo.git//../etc/passwd", }, { name: "ssh url", input: "ssh://git@example.com/owner/repo.git//../etc/passwd", }, { name: "file url", input: "file:///tmp/repo//../etc/passwd", }, { name: "azure devops https", input: "https://dev.azure.com/org/project/_git/repo/../etc/passwd", }, { name: "azure devops ssh", input: "git@ssh.dev.azure.com:v3/org/project/repo//../etc/passwd", }, { name: "generic https git suffix", input: "https://git.example.com/owner/repo.git/../etc/passwd", }, { name: "generic https encoded traversal", input: "https://git.example.com/owner/repo/%2e%2e/etc/passwd", }, } for _, tc := range unsafeCases { t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { _, err := ParseSourceWithOptions(tc.input, ParseOptions{}) if err == nil { t.Fatalf("expected error for unsafe subdir, input=%s", tc.input) } t.Logf("correctly rejected: input=%s err=%v", tc.input, err) }) } } // SEC003: Blob URLs ending in SKILL.md must not clean traversal while trimming // the file suffix into a parent subdir. func TestSecurity_ParseSource_SEC003_RejectsUnsafeBlobSkillPath(t *testing.T) { unsafeCases := []struct { name string input string }{ { name: "github blob skill", input: "https://github.com/user/repo/blob/main/skills/foo/../../SKILL.md", }, { name: "gitlab blob skill", input: "https://gitlab.com/group/project/-/blob/main/skills/foo/../../SKILL.md", }, { name: "bitbucket skill path", input: "https://bitbucket.org/owner/repo/src/main/skills/foo/../../SKILL.md", }, } for _, tc := range unsafeCases { t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { _, err := ParseSourceWithOptions(tc.input, ParseOptions{}) if err == nil { t.Fatalf("expected error for unsafe blob skill path, input=%s", tc.input) } t.Logf("correctly rejected: input=%s err=%v", tc.input, err) }) } } // SEC003: Versioned subdirs with dots are not affected func TestSecurity_ParseSource_SEC003_AllowsVersionedSubdir(t *testing.T) { safeCases := []struct { input string wantSubdir string wantName string }{ {"github.com/owner/repo/docs/v1.2.3", "docs/v1.2.3", "v1.2.3"}, {"github.com/owner/repo/skills/frontend", "skills/frontend", "frontend"}, {"github.com/owner/repo/a.b/c.d", "a.b/c.d", "c.d"}, } for _, tc := range safeCases { t.Run(tc.input, func(t *testing.T) { source, err := ParseSourceWithOptions(tc.input, ParseOptions{}) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("unexpected error for safe subdir: %v", err) } if source.Subdir != tc.wantSubdir { t.Errorf("Subdir = %q, want %q", source.Subdir, tc.wantSubdir) } if source.Name != tc.wantName { t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", source.Name, tc.wantName) } }) } }