mirror of
https://github.com/rohitg00/skillkit.git
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* feat: add viral growth features (quick setup, badges, matrix, SKILL.md, federated search) Tier 2: skillkit quick zero-friction entry, shareable badge generator, agent compatibility matrix on website. Tier 3: reposition as npm for agent skills, SKILL.md validate/init/check commands, federated GitHub skill search with --federated flag on find. * fix: matrix filtering, path traversal, cross-platform paths, fetch timeout - CompatibilityMatrix: query matching agents now shows all categories (and vice versa) instead of hiding both dimensions independently - quick.ts: sanitize skill names and validate targetInstallPath stays inside installDir before rmSync/cpSync/symlinkSync - skillmd.ts: use path.relative() instead of string replace for cross-platform path display - registry: add AbortController timeout (10s default) and distinct RateLimitError on 403 instead of silent empty return - find.ts: handle RateLimitError with user-facing message - Add quick-security.test.ts regression tests for path traversal * fix: harden isPathInside with path.resolve, propagate RateLimitError - isPathInside now uses path.resolve() + path.sep comparison instead of naive string replacement, fixing detection of paths completely outside the parent directory (both packages/core and src/core copies) - FederatedSearch.search re-throws RateLimitError from rejected Promise.allSettled results so callers (find.ts) can handle 403s - Updated security test to use the corrected isPathInside logic * fix: use GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKEN for authenticated GitHub API requests GitHubSkillRegistry now reads GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN from env and sends Bearer auth header, raising the rate limit from 10 to 30 req/min for code search. Matches the guidance shown to users on 403 errors.
70 lines
2.5 KiB
TypeScript
70 lines
2.5 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
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import { join, normalize, resolve, sep } from 'node:path';
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function isPathInside(child: string, parent: string): boolean {
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const resolved = resolve(child);
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const resolvedParent = resolve(parent);
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return resolved === resolvedParent || resolved.startsWith(resolvedParent + sep);
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}
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function sanitizeName(name: string): string {
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return name.split(/[/\\]/).pop() || name;
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}
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describe('Quick Command Security', () => {
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describe('path traversal protection', () => {
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const installDir = '/home/user/.claude/skills';
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it('should block skill names that escape the install directory', () => {
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const maliciousNames = ['../evil', '../../etc/passwd', '../../../tmp/bad', '..\\evil'];
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for (const name of maliciousNames) {
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const sanitized = sanitizeName(name);
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const targetPath = normalize(join(installDir, sanitized));
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expect(isPathInside(targetPath, installDir)).toBe(true);
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expect(sanitized).not.toContain('..');
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expect(sanitized).not.toContain('/');
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expect(sanitized).not.toContain('\\');
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}
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});
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it('should sanitize "../evil" to "evil"', () => {
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expect(sanitizeName('../evil')).toBe('evil');
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});
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it('should sanitize "../../etc/passwd" to "passwd"', () => {
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expect(sanitizeName('../../etc/passwd')).toBe('passwd');
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});
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it('should sanitize "..\\evil" to "evil"', () => {
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expect(sanitizeName('..\\evil')).toBe('evil');
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});
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it('should keep valid skill names unchanged', () => {
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expect(sanitizeName('my-skill')).toBe('my-skill');
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expect(sanitizeName('react-best-practices')).toBe('react-best-practices');
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});
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it('should produce a path inside installDir after sanitization', () => {
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const evilName = '../evil';
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const sanitized = sanitizeName(evilName);
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const targetPath = normalize(join(installDir, sanitized));
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expect(isPathInside(targetPath, installDir)).toBe(true);
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expect(targetPath).toBe(join(installDir, 'evil'));
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});
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it('should detect unsanitized traversal names before normalization', () => {
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const rawPath = `${installDir}/../evil`;
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expect(isPathInside(rawPath, installDir)).toBe(false);
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});
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it('should ensure sanitization prevents the traversal entirely', () => {
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const evilName = '../evil';
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const sanitized = sanitizeName(evilName);
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const targetPath = normalize(join(installDir, sanitized));
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expect(targetPath).toBe(join(installDir, 'evil'));
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expect(targetPath.startsWith(installDir)).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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});
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