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opencode-power-pack/skills/variant-analysis/resources/codeql/python.ql
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Wayner Barrios ab04919087 Add 10 more piolium security skills (MIT)
GitHub Actions prompt-injection audit, threat modeling, differential
review, variant analysis, SARIF parsing, Semgrep/CodeQL scanning and
rule authoring, and WooYun-derived web vuln methodology. Generalized
semgrep's piolium-specific subagent references. Skill count 45 -> 55.
2026-08-02 15:54:18 -04:00

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/**
* @name [VARIANT_NAME]
* @description Find variants of [ORIGINAL_BUG_ID]
* @kind path-problem
* @problem.severity error
* @precision high
* @tags security
* variant-analysis
*/
import python
import semmle.python.dataflow.new.DataFlow
import semmle.python.dataflow.new.TaintTracking
import semmle.python.ApiGraphs
module VariantConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
// Sources: where untrusted data originates
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
// Flask request parameters
source = API::moduleImport("flask").getMember("request")
.getMember(["args", "form", "json", "data"])
.getAUse()
or
// Environment variables
exists(Call c |
c.getFunc().(Attribute).getObject().(Name).getId() = "os" and
c.getFunc().(Attribute).getName() in ["getenv", "environ"] and
source.asExpr() = c
)
}
// Sinks: where tainted data becomes dangerous
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
// os.system()
exists(Call c |
c.getFunc().(Attribute).getObject().(Name).getId() = "os" and
c.getFunc().(Attribute).getName() = "system" and
sink.asExpr() = c.getArg(0)
)
or
// subprocess with shell=True
exists(Call c |
c.getFunc().(Attribute).getName() in ["call", "run", "Popen"] and
c.getArgByName("shell").(NameConstant).getValue() = true and
sink.asExpr() = c.getArg(0)
)
}
// Barriers: sanitization functions
predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node node) {
exists(Call c |
c.getFunc().(Attribute).getObject().(Name).getId() = "shlex" and
c.getFunc().(Attribute).getName() = "quote" and
node.asExpr() = c
)
or
exists(Call c |
c.getFunc().(Name).getId() in ["sanitize", "escape", "validate"] and
node.asExpr() = c
)
}
// Custom flow steps (optional)
predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node pred, DataFlow::Node succ) {
exists(Call c |
c.getFunc().(Attribute).getName() = "format" and
pred.asExpr() = c.getFunc().(Attribute).getObject() and
succ.asExpr() = c
)
}
}
module VariantFlow = TaintTracking::Global<VariantConfig>;
import VariantFlow::PathGraph
from VariantFlow::PathNode source, VariantFlow::PathNode sink
where VariantFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
"Potential variant: tainted data from $@ flows to dangerous sink.",
source.getNode(), "user-controlled input"