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Context: - Subprocess + netns probes are not enough for production agent code execution. - Ephemeral docker run --rm with --network=none and optional --memory is the essential isolation path for agentbox-backed products like agentforge. Test Plan: - docker compose run --rm test - ruff check src tests - pytest tests/test_docker.py (mocks CLI; live skip without docker) Additional Notes: - Default remains subprocess for local/CI unit tests. - Set AGENTBOX_SANDBOX_BACKEND=docker (plus Docker CLI/daemon) for production.
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Security Policy
Reporting a vulnerability
Email yash376351@gmail.com with the repo name, a short description, and steps to reproduce. Please do not open a public issue for exploitable findings until we have had a reasonable chance to respond.
Threat model (honest)
agentbox executes untrusted code on your machine via a configurable sandbox backend.
- Recommended:
AGENTBOX_SANDBOX_BACKEND=docker— ephemeral containers (--rm,--network=none, optional--memory). Still not gVisor/Firecracker; do not expose it to the public internet without additional hardening/auth. - Default:
subprocess+ optionalRLIMIT_AS— convenient for local tests, not production-grade isolation. - Credential stripping and timeouts reduce accidents; they are not a full kernel isolation story.
limits.memory_mbuses Docker--memory(docker backend) orRLIMIT_AS(subprocess); behavior differs by OS/backend.- Snapshots persist workspace files on disk under
AGENTBOX_SNAPSHOT_DIR. - Prefer running the API only on trusted networks, behind auth you add yourself.